

# Global Enterprise Security Without Security Analysts...Yes You Can!

Jason Bareiszis

Incident Response Manager



# Agenda

- Transition from two former SIEMs to Splunk
- Incident Response Light (IR Light) Program
  - What it is
  - How it is used to offload work from Security Analysts
- IR Light Dashboard examples

# Why Splunk?

Challenges then Success with Splunk

## Support Model

Online/Phone

- Priority 1 events
- Response times

## Search Times

- Search times for events that spanned long periods of time
- Multiple concurrent searches
- Console access

## Ease of Use


- Acquired taste
- Time to train

## Flexibility


- Accelerate the overall IR process
- IR Light Program

# Incident Response Light (IR Light)


- Help Desk is a very process driven group
- No focus on security



- Phases of traditional IR
- Phases of IR Light



# Architecture And Indexes




## Indexes for IR Light

- Firewall traffic
- EndPoint Security Agents
  - Cylance Protect
  - ScanSafe
- Threat Lists
- Active directory

# IR Light Dashboard Concept

- Simple, not overly complicated
- Congruent
- Address one specific problem where the activity is “blocked”
- Contain actionable information



# Endpoint Security Software Status

**Endpoint Check**  
Endpoint Security Software Status

Time:

**Security Applications Installed**

Host	owner	name	version
TTL-9Q80VZ1	jason.bareis@zsc	Cisco AnyConnect Web Security Module	4.2.01035

**Total CylancePROTECT Hosts: 14,006**  
Total CylancePROTECT Hosts

**Total ScanSafe Hosts: 10,465**  
Total ScanSafe Hosts

**CylancePROTECT Agents Installed**

version	count
1.2.1290.17	1094
1.2.1300.29	16
1.2.1330.31	1745
1.2.1360.571	1
1.2.1380.41	2181

**ScanSafe Agents Installed**

version	count
4.2.04018	25
4.2.03013	1
4.2.01035	9171
4.2.01022	13
3.1.11004	2

**Workflow Diagram:**

```
graph LR; Start(( )) --> EPC[End Point Check]; EPC --> BIR[Begin IIR Report]; EPC --> D{ }; D -- Fail --> Update[Update]; D -- Pass --> HD[Help Desk Triage]; Update --> HD; HD --> End(( ));
```

# Policy Violation

## Policy Violation

Blocked apps to the internet

Edit More Info


Time

Last 4 hours

Total Count

# 167

### Blocked Apps Activity




### Blocked Apps Information


	src	user	application	count
1	10.12.8.99	...	netflix-streaming	24
2	10.11.24.97	...	tor	14
3	10.1.180.131	...	smtp	11
4	10.38.0.109	...	pop3	11
5	192.168.15.61	...	pop3	10
6	192.168.15.60	...	smtp	6
7	192.168.25.138	...	pop3	6
8	66.240.192.138	...	bittorrent	6
9	10.2.7.55	...	smtp	5
10	198.20.70.114	...	bittorrent	5




# Recursive vs Iterative DNS



# Iterative DNS



# DNS Sinkhole Explained



# DNS Sinkhole

## Tetra Tech Sinkhole

DNS Sinkhole activity


Edit More Info



Time

Last 12 hours

### Sinkholes by Rule




3m ago

_time	rule	count	values(src_ip)	values(dest_ip)	values(signature)	values(user)	values(dvc)	values(threat_name)
2016-08-03 10:05:01	INSIDE to OUTSIDE	1	10.5.1.30	8.8.8.8	DNS Botnet signatures(4012422)	[REDACTED]	Site000-Texas-Core-HA1	Suspicious DNS Query (generic:pushcodered.com)(4012422)
2016-08-03 10:16:02	INSIDE to OUTSIDE	1	10.5.1.32	8.8.8.8	DNS Botnet signatures(4012422)	[REDACTED]	Site000-Texas-Core-HA1	Suspicious DNS Query (generic:pushcodered.com)(4012422)
2016-08-03 10:18:21	INSIDE to OUTSIDE	1	10.5.1.32	8.8.8.8	DNS Botnet signatures(4012422)	[REDACTED]	Site000-Texas-Core-HA1	Suspicious DNS Query (generic:pushcodered.com)(4012422)

### Potential Recursive DNS

_time	Source IP	Destination IP	PA Device	User	Rule
2016-08-03 10:04:58	10.1.40.109	5.5.5.6	Site000-Texas-Core-HA1	[REDACTED]	Deny All
2016-08-03 10:05:01	10.1.40.109	5.5.5.6	Site000-Texas-Core-HA1	[REDACTED]	Deny All
2016-08-03 10:05:07	10.1.40.109	5.5.5.6	Site000-Texas-Core-HA1	[REDACTED]	Deny All
2016-08-03 10:15:56	10.1.40.109	5.5.5.6	Site000-Texas-Core-HA1	[REDACTED]	Deny All
2016-08-03 10:15:59	10.1.40.109	5.5.5.6	Site000-Texas-Core-HA1	[REDACTED]	Deny All
2016-08-03 10:16:05	10.1.40.109	5.5.5.6	Site000-Texas-Core-HA1	[REDACTED]	Deny All
2016-08-03 10:18:15	10.1.40.109	5.5.5.6	Site000-Texas-Core-HA1	[REDACTED]	Deny All
2016-08-03 10:18:18	10.1.40.109	5.5.5.6	Site000-Texas-Core-HA1	[REDACTED]	Deny All
2016-08-03 10:18:24	10.1.40.109	5.5.5.6	Site000-Texas-Core-HA1	[REDACTED]	Deny All

# Third Party Threat List



# Infected Host

## Tetra Tech Infected Host Denied

Infected host denied on firewall

Edit More Info


Time

Last 7 days

Total Count

21

Hosts Denied Activity



### Hosts Denied Details

src	dest	threat name	user	app	count
185.17.184.6	10.2.2.214	Virus/Win32.WGeneric.jjmuo(2586428)	web-browsing	web-browsing	5
104.84.114.37	192.168.100.27 192.168.15.54 192.168.15.90	Trojan/Win32.ramnit.gceeg(2781632) Trojan/Win32.ramnit.gdbzj(2217686)	web-browsing	web-browsing	3
104.95.177.21	192.168.15.57 192.168.15.7	Trojan/Win32.ramnit.gceeg(2781632) Trojan/Win32.ramnit.gdbzj(2217686)	web-browsing	web-browsing	2
104.116.252.47	192.168.15.107	Trojan/Win32.ramnit.gdbzj(2217686)	web-browsing	web-browsing	1
104.117.2.8	192.168.15.52	Trojan/Win32.ramnit.gceeg(2781632)	web-browsing	web-browsing	1
104.85.112.58	192.168.15.68	Trojan/Win32.ramnit.gdbzj(2217686)	web-browsing	web-browsing	1
185.17.184.11	10.2.2.214	Virus/Win32.WGeneric.jjmuo(2586428)	web-browsing	web-browsing	1
208.111.160.6	10.1.40.62	Virus/Win32.WGeneric.jjxhj(2498692)	web-browsing	web-browsing	1
208.111.161.254	10.1.40.109	Virus/Win32.WGeneric.jluhm(2161001)	web-browsing	web-browsing	1
23.196.128.54	192.168.15.9	Trojan/Win32.ramnit.gdbzj(2217686)	web-browsing	web-browsing	1

# Summary

- Is it possible to do Incident Response without analysis... **no**, BUT you can take a big chunk of the work load off of them by using Splunk
- Byproduct – IR Light has become a great mentoring program

# Special Thank You



BAI is a group of Solution Architects focused on network monitoring, security, and control. They have spent nearly 40 years working with Fortune 1000 accounts, the Civilian government, the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community to build and maintain highly secure, reliable, and resilient networks. BAI's goal is not to rip and replace current solutions – it is to help customers evolve in the way they control their networks and in their ability to react and respond to network, application, and security incidents.



Aplura is committed to improving the IT security of organizations by providing expert knowledge and ingenuity to produce solutions tailored to our clients' specific needs. Our measurable results are highlighted by diminished security-related incidents leading to reduced overall client costs. Aplura's staff of credentialed IT security professionals provides our clients information security resources for daily operations as well as project-based expert technical assistance.



# THANK YOU

.conf2016

