

Analytic Stories or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Respond to Threats

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Who's This Guy?

- Splunk Security Research Team
 - We really just create memes all day
- ▶ Been around for almost 15 years now, mainly on defensive side
- ▶ RE, IR, File Analysis, Network Analysis, Machine Learning
- Loves
 - BBQ
 - Pie
- Dislikes
 - Pants
 - Socks



Agenda

- Level setting
- Analytic story anatomy
- Building an analytic story
- Analytic story in action





Level Setting

What are we talking about?





What Should We Take From This Talk

- Analytic Stories Will Help
 - Demonstrate the value of your data
 - Get value from your data quicker
 - Prioritize data ingestion
 - Understand your defensive posture
 - Resolve incidents faster
 - Empower your analysts



Why Are We Here

- Analytic Story
 - It's about understanding, not detection
 - Empowering the analyst
 - A collection of searches grouped together around a common theme
 - Associated metadata
 - References
 - Industry Frameworks
 - Descriptions
 - Data Required



Words

- Detection Search
 - Finds a specific behavior
- ► Investigative Search
 - Help investigate the detected event
- Contextual Search
 - Gathers context to enrich the detected event
- Support Search
 - Helps setup the detection search



Buzz Words

► Kill Chain

- The Cyber Kill Chain is where the stages of an attack are enumerated. And likewise, they can be used for protection of an organization's network.
 - Reconnaissance
 - Weaponization
 - Delivery
 - Exploitation
 - Installation
 - Command & Control
 - Actions on Objective



More Buzz Words

- ► Center for Internet Security Critical Security Controls
 - A list of 20 controls to implement to help secure your organization

► MITRE ATT&CK

- Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge
- Threat modeling methodology and suite of models for the various phases of an adversary's lifecycle





Analytic Story Anatomy

A story by any other name...



Building Blocks

- Manifest File
 - JSON Specification
- ► A story can consist of multiple searches
- ▶ A search can belong to multiple stories






Schemas

- ▶ Different schemas for searches and stories
 - Facilitate the many to many mappings
- ▶ Next few slides will focus on some of the fields we found useful to track
 - Why we found them useful
 - What are the benefits to tracking them



Why Many to Many

- Stories should contain multiple searches
 - More than one way to detect something
 - More than one behavior that should be detected by the story
- Searches belong to many stories
 - It's often not clear right away what a specific behavior means
 - Consider schtasks.exe
 - Legitimate behavior by your sys admin?
 - Being used for lateral movement?
 - Being used for persistence?
 - Being used for privilege escalation?







splunk> .conf2017



Search Manifest

- analytic_story
 - List of stories this search belongs to
- author
- modification_time
- creation_time
- version
- status
 - Where in the development cycle is this?



Search Manifest - The Sequel

- search
 - The SPL
- search_id
 - Unique identifier
- search_name
- search_type

Search Manifest – Where's the Data?

- data_models
 - List of any data models used by this search
- data_sourcetypes
 - List of any specific sourcetypes referenced in the search
- data_source
 - List of the sources of data for this search
 - Next gen firewall, ETDR agent, Microsoft Windows Event Logs
- providing_technologies
 - List of technologies that can provide that information



Search Manifest - Words

- search_description
 - High level description of the search and what its goal is
- ▶ eli5
 - Explain it like I'm 5 Much more detailed explanation of the SPL
- how_to_implement
 - Some assembly required

Search Manifest – How Does This Fit

- Mappings
- Currently we map to three frameworks
 - Kill Chain
 - Center for Internet Security Critical Security Controls
 - MITRE ATT&CK




Why Do We Map?

- ▶ Multiple Frameworks
 - Each framework has its pros and cons
- Where the search, and ultimately the analytic story, fits into your defensive strategy
- Allows you to understand what part of your defense is strong
- Allows you to identify weaknesses in your defense
- Allows you to navigate a content library to find what you are interested in



Mapping Example



- ▶ Installation and Recon are relatively low in comparison
- Strongest in Actions on Objective



Search Manifest – When Do We Do Things

- Scheduling
 - cron_schedule
 - latest_time
 - earliest_time

Story Manifest!

- author
- requestor
- ▶ id
- version
- modification_time
- creation_time



Story Manifest – The Info

- name
- category
 - High level categories
- description
- narrative
- references



Story Manifest – The Searches

- detection searches
- investigative_searches
- contextual_searches
- support_searches







Developing Stories

- Can be time consuming, so why do it?
- Empower analysts to explore events
 - Many contextual and investigative searches are shared across stories
 - Quicker response times
- Demonstrate value of the data you are ingesting
- Allows you to prioritize what data you want to ingest
- Map your defensive posture
- Allows you to prioritize what new analytics to write



How We Develop Stories

- ► Analytic stories allows for flexibility in topic
 - Threat actors
 - Malware families
 - Malware techniques
 - Malware of the day
- Standard Process
 - Knowledge Acquisition
 - Codification
 - Testing
 - Deploy



Ransomware



"GET /category.screen?category_id=GIFTS&JSESSIONID=SDISLAFF10ADFF10 HTTP 1.1" 404 720 "http://buttercup-shopping.com/cart.do/actronopyrchaseagery_i23] "GET /product.screen?category_id=GIFTS&JSESSIONID=SDISLAFF10ADFF10 HTTP 1.1" 404 3322 "http://buttercup-shopping.com/cart.do/actronopyrchaseagery_id=GIFTS&JSESSIONID=SDISLAFF10ADFF10 HTTP 1.1" 404 3322 "http://buttercup-shopping.com/cart.do/actronopyrchaseagery_id=GIFTS&JSESSIONID=SDISLAFF10ADFF10 HTTP 1.1" 404 3322 "http://buttercup-shopping.com/cart.do/actronopyrchaseagery_id=SIGTS-Idea into id=STI-SBIS-Idea into id



Knowledge Acquisition

▶ The sites you go to and learn from become the references

	Google			
ransomware				
	Google Search	I'm Feeling Lucky		



Codification

- Start with the basics of the story manifest
- Some fields are easy to fill out
 - id
 - creation_time
 - modification_time
 - version
 - author
 - requester
 - name
 - references



Codification

- Some require some thought
 - category
 - description
 - narrative





Detection Searches

- No idea is too horrible at this point
- Don't have to worry about the details... yet
 - USN Journal Deletion
 - Deleting Shadow Copies
 - Spike in File Writes
 - Common Ransomware Extensions
 - Common Ransomware Notes
 - Detect SMB Traffic Allowed
 - Detect Spike in SMB Traffic
 - Monitor TOR traffic



Support Searches

- ▶ Still, no idea is too horrible at this point
- Searches to give you a better understanding of your environment
 - Monitor Successful Backups
 - Monitor Unsuccessful Backups
 - Windows Updates Install Failures
 - Windows Updates Install Successes
 - Common Vulnerabilities Used By Ransomware



Contextual Searches

- Once again, no idea is too horrible at this point
- What would you want to know to help scope this event
 - Backup Status of Endpoint
 - Patch Status of Endpoint
 - Vulnerability Status of Endpoint
 - Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint
 - Get Notable History
 - Get User Information from Identity Table



Investigative Searches

- Things get tricky here
- Don't have to worry about the details... yet
 - Get Process Info
 - Get Process Information For Port Activity
 - Investigate Web Activity
 - Get Parent Process Info



Analytic Story

- ▶ At this point, we have an outline of a story
 - Bunch of searches
 - References
- ▶ Need to start filling in the details

Deleting Shadow Copies

- ► Let's write the search
- ▶ index=* (sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational OR tag=process) (process=*vssadmin* OR process=*wmic*) cmdline=*delete* cmdline=*shadow* | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, user, process, cmdline | `ctime(firstTime)` | `ctime(lastTime)`

It's All About The Data

- What type of data do we need (data_source field)
 - Endpoint Intelligence
- Where can we get this data (providing technologies)
 - Carbon Black Response
 - CrowdStrike Falcon
 - Sysmon
- ▶ Fill out data_sourcetypes or data_models as appropriate



The Details

Search Description

The vssadmin.exe utility is used to interact with the Volume Shadow Copy Service. Wmic is an
interface to the Windows Management Instrumentation. This search looks for either of these
tools being used to delete shadow copies

► How to Implement

• To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with both the process name and command line from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.

► ELI5

• This search looks for execution of vssadmin or wmic with both the "delete" and "shadow" parameters passed on the command line. The two arguments are searched for separately because we can't predict the number of spaces between the words on the command line. The search will return the number of times this activity was observed, and the times of the first and last event."

The Mappings

- ► Kill Chain Phase
 - Actions on Objective
- ► CSC 20
 - CSC 8 Malware Defenses
 - CSC 10 Data Recovery Capability
- ► ATT&CK
 - Execution



Why Did I Just Do All That

- ▶ Allows you to prioritize what data you want to ingest
- Demonstrate value of the data you are ingesting
- Empower analysts to explore events
- ► The beginnings of orchestration
- Map your defensive posture
- ▶ Allows you to prioritize what new analytics to write






Analytic Story In Action



- ▶ Not just theory, we're here to help
- Enterprise Security Content Updates
 - Library of Analytic Stories
 - Stories distributed as an app on SplunkBase
 - AR Action to automatically gather context and begin investigation









Category: Malware Version: 1 Created: 07/24/2017 Modified: 09/20/2017

Ransomware


Run Story

Description:

Activities, techniques, and best practices associated with detecting, investigating, and mitigating your risk to ransomware

Narrative:

Ransomware is an ever present risk to many enterprises where by an infected hosts encrypts business critical data until the victim pays the attacker a ransom. There are many types and varieties of Ransomware of which can affect an enterprise. Attackers can deploy Ransomware to enterprises through spear phishing campaigns, drive by downloads as well as through traditional remote service based exploitation. In the case of the WannaCry campaign there was self propagating wormable functionality that was used to maximize infection. To effectively combat Ransomware organizations can apply several techniques to detect and or mitigate the effects of Ransomware.



Analytic Story Sparoboo



▼ ESCU - Deleting Shadow Copies

Configure in ES

Description

The vssadmin.exe utiltiy is used to interact with the Volume Shadow Copy Service. Wmic is an interface to the Windows Management Instrumentation. This search looks for either of these tools being used to delete shadow copies.

ELI5

This search looks for execution of vssadmin or wmic with both the "delete" and "shadows" parameters passed on the command line. The two arguments are searched for separately because we can't predict the number of spaces between the words on the command line. The search will return the number of times this activity was observed, and the times of the first and last event.

Search

```
index=* (sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon
   /Operational OR tag=process) (process=*vssadmin* OR process
   =*wmic*) cmdline=*delete* cmdline=*shadow* | stats count min
   (_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, user,
   process, cmdline | `ctime(firstTime)` | `ctime(lastTime)`
```


Data Models Technology Carbon Black CrowdStrike Falcon Sysmon Tanium Ziften Att&ck Execution **Kill Chain Phases Actions on Objective CIS 20** CIS 8 CIS 10 **Asset at Risk Endpoint** Confidence medium



▼ Context

- ▶ ESCU Get Authentication Logs For Endpoint
- ▶ ESCU Get Backup Logs For Endpoint
- ESCU Get Notable History
- ▶ ESCU Get Update Logs For Endpoint
- ▶ ESCU Get User Information from Identity Table
- ▼ ESCU Get Vulnerability Logs For Endpoint







ESCU Context ESCU - Get Notable History index=main sourcetype=escu-contextualize orig sid=scheduler admin REEtRVNTLUNvbnRlbnRVcGRhdGU RMD5f681a143dfa7cc07 at 1506027300 1020 orig rid All time ∨ =O search_name="ESCU - Get Notable History" | table _raw | spath input=_raw | fields - _raw raw search name 0 time 0 priority 0 rule name 0 severity 0 status_description \(\chi\) owner 🗘 unassigned unknown **Common Ransomware Notes ESCU - Get Notable History** high Event has not been reviewed 2017-09-21T11:15:59.000-05:00 **Common Ransomware Notes ESCU - Get Notable History** Event has not been reviewed unassigned unknown high 2017-09-21T11:16:02.000-05:00 unknown Registry Keys Used For Persistence ESCU - Get Notable History medium Event has not been reviewed 2017-09-21T11:21:04.000-05:00 unassigned Registry Keys Used For Persistence **ESCU - Get Notable History** medium Event has not been reviewed 2017-09-21T11:21:04.000-05:00 unassigned unknown **ESCU - Get Notable History** Event has not been reviewed unknown Registry Keys Used For Persistence medium 2017-09-21T11:21:07.000-05:00 unassigned **Deleting Shadow Copies ESCU - Get Notable History** unassigned unknown medium Event has not been reviewed 2017-09-21T11:21:24.000-05:00 Event has not been reviewed 2017-09-21T11:21:57.000-05:00 unassigned unknown Common Ransomware Notes ESCU - Get Notable History high unassigned unknown Common Ransomware Notes **ESCU - Get Notable History** high Event has not been reviewed 2017-09-21T11:21:57.000-05:00 unknown Common Ransomware Notes **ESCU - Get Notable History** high Event has not been reviewed 2017-09-21T11:22:02.000-05:00 unassigned **ESCU - Get Notable History** medium Event has not been reviewed unassigned unknown Registry Keys Used For Persistence 2017-09-21T11:25:24.000-05:00 ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint index=main sourcetype=escu-contextualize orig sid=scheduler_admin REEtRVNTLUNvbnRlbnRVcGRhdGU_RMD5f681a143dfa7cc07 at 1506027300 1020 orig rid All time ∨ =0 search_name="ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint" | table _raw | spath input=_raw | fields - _raw raw dest 0 search_name \cdot signature 🗘 time 🗘 winterfell **ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint** An error occurred, failed to backup, 2017-09-17T23:53:30.434-05:00 ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint The task was created. 2017-09-17T23:53:29.434-05:00 winterfell winterfell ESCU - Get Backup Logs For Endpoint An error occurred, failed to backup. 2017-09-14T21:09:17.324-05:00 ESCLL- Get Backup Logs For Endpoint The task was created 2017-09-14T21:09:16 324-05:00

Product. Screen? id=GIFTS&JSESSIONID=SDISLAFFIBADFFIB HTTP 1 /oldlink?item_id=EL5T-26&JSESSIONID=SDSSL9FBADFFB HTTP 1.1" 200 131





Beyond Infinity

- Adding remediation steps into story
- Build out content library
- ► Add in more automation





Conclusions



Takeaways

- ▶ It's about understanding, not detection
 - What data do you need
 - What behaviors are you looking for
 - What value are you getting from your data
 - What are the next steps you take to validate your discovery
- Allows you to map your defensive strategy
 - Know your strengths
 - Know your weaknesses
- Faster time to resolution
 - Save time (and \$\$\$)
 - Quicker time to value
 - Uplevel your analysts



Stories For Everyone

- Enterprise Security Content Updates
- https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3449/





Questions? Queries? Posers?







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