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Modernize and Mature your SOC with Risk-Based Alerting

Forward-Looking Statements


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Super Sweet Agenda

- ▶ Intro
- ▶ Overview
- ▶ The Situation
- ▶ TI RBA Timeline
- ▶ RBA & MITRE ATT&CK
- ▶ Wrap up



Overview of Risk Based Alerting (RBA)

Hold on.....I'm gonna fly through this

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The Problem?




Alert Fatigue!

Incidents based on narrowly defined detections lead to majority noise within the SOC

Adding more sources and detection mechanisms continue to overburden the SOC Analysts with more alerts

Whitelisting as a reaction to the above results in a situational numbness

A Change of Perspective



Now Broken

How we (myself included) have been working



Analytics



Alerting



Risk Attributions



Analytics


Examine Attributions – Multiple Lenses

abstraction
(Investigation Worthy)

Risk Score


ATT&CK
Tactics

Score/BU




Alerting

RBA Using Enterprise Security



Benefits of RBA



Reduce Alerts

Leverage risk as a layer of abstraction



Improved Detections

Dramatic increase in the true positive rate



Quantified Maturity

Easier to align with a framework like MITRE ATT&CK for data sources, detections, and purple teaming




Analyst Scale

Decouple # detections and data sources from the linear scaling of the SOC analysts



Increased Analytics Window

Ability to look across much larger windows for low and slow. Red team's job is MUCH harder



Easy to Deploy

Easier to map against an industry framework than general use cases. Easy to integrate with SSE and ESCU

After viewing the presentation at 2018 .conf on RBA, we quickly set out to adopt the approach in our Security Operations. In January of 2019, before implementing RBA, we saw a 7.07% True Positive Rate. The next month we rose to a 19% True Positive Rate. In quarter two of 2019 we have been **able to maintain a 33% True Positive Rate** using the RBA system while also onboarding 29 new correlation searches. Quantifying threats has empowered our small security operations team to **scale with evolving threats without overwhelming us.**”

Kelby Shelton - Cybersecurity Engineer - Children's Mercy Hospitals and Clinics

The Situation

Texas Instruments (TI) and Risk-Based Alerting (RBA)

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The Situation

Why we decided to go down the RBA path

▶ Fear of what we are missing

- Too many alerts to handle
- SOCs have to be selective and hope you are looking at the most impactful alerts

▶ Do more with less

- Never enough people; need to optimize efficiency with what you currently have
- Close to **3 million** job shortage of cybersecurity professionals

– ISC2 Cybersecurity Workforce Study, 2018

The Situation

Goals of this talk

- ▶ Illustrate the real world benefits of this approach
- ▶ Be forthcoming with our discoveries to help your ramp up
- ▶ Not a deep dive into risk mechanics, scoring, macros, etc.
 - **SEC1479** - Say Goodbye to Your Big Alert Pipeline, and Say Hello to Your New Risk-Based Approach (.conf18)

The Situation

Overview of TI's environment

- ▶ Organization
 - ~50,000 endpoints
 - ~33,000 users
- ▶ Diverse global infrastructure
 - Large Manufacturing, Lab, Design, Administration networks
 - Every OS under the sun
 - Many remote users

The Situation

Tremendous success and discoveries with RBA

- ▶ Embarked on journey after .conf18
- ▶ Seamless integration to MITRE ATT&CK
- ▶ Well tuned risk scoring to assets and identities
 - Use of subnet, assets, and identities for modifiers
- ▶ Utilize Risk flexibility
 - Risk Object Types (systems, users, external, expanding insider threat)
 - Cases abstracted from Risk (malware, policy violations, misconfigurations, etc.)
 - Great place to hunt and check risk objects over long periods of time

The Situation

By the numbers



Risk attribution rules

Average RBA attributions per day

Risk Incident Rules (Notables)

TI RBA Timeline

Walk-through of TI's RBA growth



TI RBA Timeline

5 RBA rules

- ▶ The first risk rule is the hardest
- ▶ Not sure where to start?
 - AV detections
 - IDS events
 - Proxy blocks
 - Proxy non-HTTP/S port traffic
 - Proxy uncategorized traffic
- ▶ Pull as much investigative worthy context into Risk
 - User agents, HTTP Methods, HTTP Content type, Ports, etc.
- ▶ **Immediately saw wins solely based on attributions by risk object**



TI RBA Timeline

10-15 RBA rules

▶ Evolved whitelisting strategy

- Whitelist per risk rule
 - Spend more time tuning and evaluating a rule

- Whitelist across multiple risk rules

```
NOT[| inputlookup top_domains.csv | eval Web.dest="*."+host | table Web.dest]
```

- Global whitelist

```
| search NOT  
  ( [| inputlookup risk_object_whitelist  
    | table risk_object] OR [| inputlookup risk_whitelist  
    | eval current_date=strftime(now(), "%Y-%m-%d")  
    | eval expire_date=strftime(strptime(expiration_date, "%Y-%m-%d"), "%Y-%m-%d")  
    | where expire_date > current_date  
    | fields risk_object risk_search_name src dest risk_user])
```

TI RBA Timeline

15-20 RBA rules

► Further matured risk scoring

- Use Eval (if, case, coalesce)

```
| eval risk_confidence_default="Low"
| eval risk_severity_default=if(http_method="POST", "Medium", "Info")

| eval risk_search_name=if(http_method="POST", "RBA - Web Proxy POST
Traffic to Uncategorized Site", "RBA - Web Proxy Traffic to
Uncategorized Site")
```

- Lookups

```
| eval risk_confidence_default="High"
| eval risk_severity_default="High"
| lookup risk_edr_signature_lookup watchlist_name as signature
```

watchlist_name	risk_confidence_fine	risk_severity_fine	attack_tactic	attack_technique
*Office Product Launching Powershell	High	High	Execution Defense Evasion	T1086 - PowerShell T1064 - Scripting
*New Service	Medium	Medium	Persistence Privilege Escalation	T1050 - New Service
*System Network Configuration Discovery: IPConfig	Low	Low	Discovery	T1016 - System Network Configuration Discovery T1059 - Command-Line Interface

```
| eval severity=if(isnotnull(risk_severity_fine), risk_severity_fine, risk_severity_default)
```



TI RBA Timeline

25-30 RBA rules

- ▶ Developed first RBA Notables
 - Began folding into existing alerting ecosystem
 - Tier 1 started getting to do deeper security investigations
 - Mindset change to understand an attack sequence vs alert, alert, alert
- ▶ Struggled with how to get big picture of a Risk Object
 - Created a "Risk Object Search" dashboard to streamline investigations



TI RBA Timeline

50+ RBA rules

- ▶ Helped alpha test Splunk Security Essentials (SSE) as RBA content engine

splunk>enterprise App: Splunk Security Essentials

Administrator Messages Settings Activity Help Find

Introduction Security Content Data Source Check Beta Documentation Advanced Configuration Splunk Security Essentials

Risk-based Alerting Content Recommendation

Content with Available Data

All Content X Hide Filters

Export ...

Select a category

SaaS
0 Enabled | 52 Available

Available Content

<p>AWS Cloud Provisioning Activity from Unusual Country</p> <p>Stage 3</p> <p>Advanced Threat Detection, Insider Threat</p> <p>Account Compromise, IAM Analytics, Account Sharing, SaaS</p> <p>Looks for AWS Provisioning activities that occur from new IPs, using GeoIP to resolve the Country.</p> <p>Featured</p> <p>Searches Included</p>	<p>AWS Instance Created by Unusual User</p> <p>Stage 3</p> <p>Advanced Threat Detection</p> <p>Account Compromise, IAM Analytics, SaaS</p> <p>Detects the first time a user creates a new instance.</p> <p>Featured</p> <p>Searches Included</p> <p>AWS CloudTrail</p>	<p>AWS New API Call Per Peer Group</p> <p>Stage 4</p> <p>Advanced Threat Detection, Insider Threat</p> <p>Account Compromise, IAM Analytics, SaaS</p> <p>Looks for users that are using AWS APIs that neither they, nor their team has ever used before.</p> <p>Featured</p> <p>Searches Included</p>	<p>AWS New API Call Per User</p> <p>Stage 3</p> <p>Advanced Threat Detection, Insider Threat</p> <p>Account Compromise, IAM Analytics, SaaS</p> <p>Looks for users that are using AWS APIs that they've never used before.</p> <p>Featured</p> <p>Searches Included</p>	<p>AWS Unusual Amount of Modifications to ACLs</p> <p>Stage 3</p> <p>Advanced Threat Detection</p> <p>Account Compromise, IAM Analytics, Data Exfiltration, Network Attack, SaaS</p> <p>Looks for a large number of Security Group ACL changes in a short period of time for a user.</p> <p>Featured</p> <p>Searches Included</p>
<p>EC2 Instance Isolation</p> <p>Stage 5</p> <p>Advanced Threat Detection,</p>	<p>Emails from Outside the Organization with Company ...</p> <p>Stage 3</p> <p>Advanced Threat Detection</p>	<p>Emails with Lookalike Domains</p> <p>Stage 4</p> <p>Advanced Threat Detection</p>	<p>IP Investigate and Report</p> <p>Stage 5</p> <p>Security Monitoring</p>	<p>Malicious Insider Containment</p> <p>Stage 5</p> <p>Insider Threat, Security</p>



TI RBA Timeline

70+ RBA rules

- ▶ Continued building rules mapped to ATT&CK
 - Enterprise Security Content Update (ESCU) – <https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3449/>
 - Florian Roth's Sigma – <https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma>
- ▶ Built “Newly seen” rules
- ▶ How do you maintain this intricate ecosystem?
 - Risk Health & Analytic Dashboard
 - Monitor failed searches
- ▶ **Attend: SEC1908** - Tales From a Threat Team: Lessons and Strategies for Succeeding with a Risk-Based Approach

Finding the Needle


Complex detection in action



Normally lost in the ocean of noise...

The Needle

Risk Object Dashboard Glance



RBA & MITRE ATT&CK

How TI leverages ATT&CK with RBA

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RBA & ATT&CK

ATT&CK all the things...

- ▶ Utilize ATT&CK to assist quantifying detection coverage
- ▶ Provides great context to an attack sequence

- ▶ Add ATT&CK Tactic attribution to all RBA rules

```
| eval risk_search_name="RBA - AV Detection"  
| eval attack_tactic = "Command and Control"
```

- ▶ Add ATT&CK Technique attribution where possible to RBA rules

```
| eval risk_search_name="RBA - DNS Potential DGA Queries"  
| eval attack_tactic="Command and Control"  
| eval attack_technique="T1483 - Domain Generation Algorithms"
```

RBA & ATT&CK

Utilizing ATT&CK with RBA

- ▶ Notables look for large hits across ATT&CK
 - You can't always depend on risk score
- ▶ Allows ability to look back for “slow and low” with quick search performance

```
index=risk earliest=-1h@h latest=@h risk_object_type!=external
| bin _time span=1h
| makemv delim="|" attack_tactic
| makemv delim="|" attack_technique
| eval risk_user=nullif(risk_user,"unknown")

| stats sum(risk_score) as risk_score values(risk_search_name) as
  risk_search_name values(signature) as signature dc(risk_search_name) as
  search_count dc(attack_tactic) as tactic_count dc(attack_technique) as
  technique_count max(modifiers) as modifiers values(attack_tactic) as
  attack_tactic values(attack_technique) as attack_technique values
  (risk_object_subnet) as risk_object_subnet values(risk_user) as risk_user
  by risk_object, _time
| sort - technique_count
| search technique_count>3 AND tactic_count>2
| eval risk_message="Risk Notable - "+risk_object+" has "+technique_count+"
  unique att&ck techniques across "+tactic_count+" tactics"
```

RBA & ATT&CK

Train like you fight!

► Utilize Purview

- Develop a risk profile
- Execute a risk-based response
- Grade your risk
- Identify data sources
- Help decision makers

Risk Object Search (Dark Theme) Show Filters Edit Export ...

Total Risk Score: **1,720**

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command & Control	Exfiltration	Impact
2	6	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	5	2	0

RBA Rules Hit	count	ATT&CK Tactic	ATT&CK Technique	count
RBA - Web Proxy SOCKS Traffic	3	Command and Control	T1098 - Connection Proxy T1071 - Standard Application Layer Protocol	3
RBA - EDR PowerShell Usage via Module	2	Defensive Evasion	T1064 - Scripting T1173 - Dynamic Data Exchange	1
RBA - EDR Powershell to Web Proxy	2	Execution	T1064 - Scripting T1173 - Dynamic Data Exchange	1
RBA - EDR certutil downloading a file	2	Execution	T1086 - PowerShell	3
RBA - EDR Certutil Downloading File	1	Execution	T1053 - Schedule Task	1
RBA - EDR Mimikatz Related Files	1	Persistence	T1053 - Schedule Task	1
RBA - EDR Office Product Launching Powershell	1	Privilege Escalation	T1053 - Schedule Task	1
RBA - EDR Office Program with Unusual Child Process	1	Exfiltration		1
RBA - EDR Possible WMI Command Invocation	1	Command and Control		1
RBA - EDR Powershell with NetConns Launched by WmiPrvse	1	Initial Access		1
RBA - EDR Scheduled Tasks Created via Command Line	1			1
RBA -	1			1

Risk Score

Relate Risk Rules

Initial Access	Execution
1 items	6 items
Spearphishing Attachment	Command-Line
	PowerShell
	Scheduled Task
	Scripting
	Service Execution
	Windows Management Instrumentation

Exfiltration
1 items
Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel

Wrap Up



“RBA has changed how we fundamentally operate, raising visibility into the cumulative risk related to behaviors and allowing us to focus on the most impactful events.”

Brandon Cass

Cyber Defense Operations Manager, Texas Instruments

RBA Related Sessions



SEC 1556 – **Building Behavioral Detections: Cross-Correlating Suspicious Activity with the MITRE ATT&CK Framework**

Tuesday, October 22, 01:45 PM - 02:30 PM



SEC 1803 – **Modernize and Mature Your SOC with Risk-Based Alerting**

Tuesday, October 22, 03:00 PM - 03:45 PM



SEC 1538 - **Getting started with Risk-Based Alerting and MITRE**

Wednesday, October 23, 12:30 PM - 01:15 PM



SEC 1908 – **Tales from a Threat Team: Lessons and Strategies for Succeeding with a Risk-Based Approach**

Wednesday, October 23, 03:00 PM - 03:45 PM



Birds of the Feather – Meet the RBA community

SUGARCANE Raw Bar Grill – Tuesday, 6:30pm – 830pm



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