

# Tales From a Threat Team Lessons and Strategies for Succeeding with a Risk-Based Approach

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
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## Agenda

- 1. The Situation Report
- 2. The Notables
- 3. The Platform
- 4. The New Rules



Where is our RBA?

Why Risk-Based Approach (RBA)

#### **RBA Worked!**

- Flat SOC Staffing with 4x the amount of detections
- Absorbed and works with a multiple platforms and environments with negligible changes
  - On-Premise, AWS, O365

#### Other RBA Presentations For Background

SEC1479 - Say Goodbye to Your Big Alert Pipeline, and Say Hello to Your New Risk-Based Approach (.conf 2018)

SEC1803 - Modernize and Mature Your SOC with Risk-Based Alerting

SEC1538 - Getting Started with Risk-Based Alerting and MITRE



Overview of Our RBA Deployment

#### Ran in Parallel for 3 months

Was running RBA and Single Detection Alerts to measure accuracy and impact

#### Production for 14 months

Sole source of alerting for this period of time

#### 112 Production Risk Rules

Unique detections of anomalies in the environment

By The Numbers

Event log data analyzed per week

Risk attributions per week

Notables per week

\*Have processed over
15k RBA notables

True positive rate of notables for malicious activity

Incidents sent to HR for investigation for the year













What about RBA Notables?

## **Analyst Work**

- Prescribed Playbooks Too Fragile
- Decision Tree/Web Approach
- Escalating Response



#### **Tagging**

Have I Seen This? What's Different?

Quick view of previous notable history and close status

Indicates when risk is increasing for an object

Risk_Object	server-185-153-198-196.cloudedic.net	•
Risk_Object_Type	external_system	•
Risk_Rule	High Connections Ingress Web - Network Traffic	•
	Matched Content - Network - Threat Intelligence	•
Risk Time	1565921580.000000	•
Rule_Phases	command_and_control	•
	discovery	•
System	server-185-153-198-196.cloudedic.net	•
Tags	modaction_result	•
	Previous Notable-Last 7 days	•
	Previous Notable-Additional Risk	•
	Previous Notable-Different Risk Score	•
	Previous Notable-Malicious	•
	Previous Notable-Composite-Score-Exceeded	•



#### Volume Issues

Multiple notables for same attribution

Specific matrix of action

Leverage the tagging as knowledge

Chose to distill on if it matches score and rules then suppress

alert	previous notable	previous status	matched rules	matched score
yes	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
yes	TRUE	non-malicious	FALSE	FALSE
yes	TRUE	non-malicious	FALSE	TRUE
yes	TRUE	non-malicious	TRUE	FALSE
no	TRUE	non-malicious	TRUE	TRUE
yes	TRUE	malicous	FALSE	FALSE
yes	TRUE	malicous	FALSE	TRUE
yes	TRUE	malicous	TRUE	FALSE
no	TRUE	malicous	TRUE	TRUE





How Do You Know RBA Is Running Well?

Person of Interest - Watchlist

Additions and Removals

**Expiration Based** 

Allows Specification of Requestor


Leverages What's in Enterprise Security

watchlist=true





#### Health Analysis – Reoccurring Notables



#### Health Analysis – Risk Rule Searches

		/	dispatch.earliest_time	,	,		alert.suppress.period	sparkvisu	avg_entry_count	,	notable_count
csearch_name \$	cron_schedule \$	schedule_windov \$	\$	dispatch.latest_time \$	alert.suppress \$	alert.suppress.fields \$	\$	\$	- ,-	total_entries \$	-
Threat - AFI-RR-NonStandardPorts-WebTraffic - Rule	A7 * * * *	auto	-1h@h	@h	0			/	28844	230748	604
Threat - AFI-RR-IntrusionDetection-AllEvents-NetworkTraffic - Rule	10 * * * *	auto	-1h@h	@h	0			$\sim$	1369	10950	99
Threat - AFI-RR-SuspiciousWebCategory-WebTraffic - Rule	23 * * * *	auto	-1h@h	@h	0			$\sim$	751	6011	67
Threat - AFI-RR-MatchedContent-Network-ThreatIntel - Rule	11 * * * *	auto	-1h@h	@h	0			Λ,	3460	27683	48
Threat - AFI-RR-YoungDomain-DomainAnalysis - Rule	18 */6 * * *	auto	-6h@h	@h	0			$\sim$	396	3165	36
Threat - AFI-RR-HighRiskDomain-Email-DomainAnalysis - Rule	22 */2 * * *	0	-2h@h	@h	0			~	1206	9648	29
Threat - AFI-RR-Potential-RawIPDNS-Phish-Email - Rule	31 * * * *	auto	-1h@h	@h	0			_/_	1337	9360	26
Threat - AFI-RR-LongConnections-NetworkTraffic - Rule	21 */2 * * *	auto	-2h@h	@h	0			$\overline{}$	1793	14343	21
Threat - AFI-RR-HighConnectionsIngressWeb-NetworkTraffic - Rule	42 */4 * * *	auto	-4h@h	@h	0			~	280	2243	15
Threat - AFI-RR-Data-Exfil-Removable-Media - Rule	28 */4 * * *	auto	-4h@h	@h	0			~	82	652	10
Threat - AFI-RR-Malware-TempDirectoryBlock-Endpoint - Rule	36 * * * *	auto	-1h@h	@h	0			1	21	104	8
Threat - AFI-RR-HighKerberosUsage-DirectoryServices - Rule	27 */1 * * *	0	-4h@h	@h	0			~	70	563	7
Threat - AFI-RR-MFA-Anomalies-0365 - Rule	9 */2 * * *	auto	-2h@h	@h	0			~^	47	376	7
Threat - AFI-RR-HighConnectionsIngressWeb-AWS - Rule	7 */4 * * *	auto	-4h@h	@h	0			$\overline{}$	459	3672	6
Threat - AFT-DD-Dotential-RlankSubject-Dhich-Email - Dule	17 +/1 + + +	auto	-4h@h	@b	0			\ A	157	786	

Person Of Interest - Watchlist


Additions and Removals

**Expiration Based** 

Allows Specification of Requestor

Leverages What's in Enterprise Security

watchlist=true






Person Of Interest - Dashboard

#### **Combines Different Views**

- Security Alerts
- Risk Rules
- Email
- Web Browsing
- Removable Media

**Business Line Self-Service** 







#### **Culture Necessities**

- Environment of Experimentation
- Analysts Need to Analyze
- Impact & Effectiveness > Metrics
- Criticalness of Leadership Support



## The New Rules

What Are New Approaches To Risk Rules?

## The New Rules

#### **Dynamic Rules and Settings**

#### **Malware - All Infections - Endpoint**

```
. . .
```

eval rule impact default="High"

| eval rule\_confidence\_default="High"

| eval rule\_impact\_course=case(action == "allowed", "High", action == "blocked", "Medium", action == "deferred", "High")

| eval rule\_confidence\_course=case(action == "allowed", "Medium", action == "blocked", "High", action == "deferred", "Medium")

lookup MalwareImpactLookup action signature

| eval rule\_impact=coalesce(rule\_impact\_fine, rule\_impact\_course, rule impact default)

| eval rule\_confidence=coalesce(rule\_confidence\_fine, rule confidence course, rule confidence default)

Leveraging case, coalesce and lookups you can make rules more extensible and require fewer of them

action \$	1	rule_confidence_fine \$	1	rule_impact_fine \$	1	signature \$
allowed		High		Critical		Hacktool*
blocked		High		High		Hacktool*
deferred		High		Critical		Hacktool*
allowed		High		Low		PUA*
blocked		High		Low		PUA*
deferred		High		Low		PUA*
allowed		High		Critical		Heur*
h1ookod		Usiah		Madium		Univers



#### Art of Detection - Ideas

## The New Rules


SCF118737 - The Art of Detection Using Splunk Enterprise Security SEC1039 – Detection Technique Deep Dive

**Doug Brown** 

\*May need to watch a few times...or 7

## The New Rules

#### **Hunting Lab**





## The New Rules

#### **Effective Base Searches**

#### Non-Standard Ports - Web Traffic

index=web\_proxy dest\_port!="80" dest\_port!="443"

#### Scripting UserAgent Strings – Web Traffic

index=web\_proxy (http\_user\_agent="\*WinHttp.WinHttpRequest\*" OR http\_user\_agent="\*Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir\*")

#### Data-Exfil From Snipping Tool – Email

index=email\_proxy attachment="\*" sender="\*@acme.com" recipient!="\*@acme.com" message\_subject="\*Sent from Snipping Tool\*"

#### Potential Phish from Raw IP - Email




## "One more thing..."

Steve Jobs

## **One More Thing**

#### **Alert Modeling Tool**



- Simulate Timing And Throttling
- Models Impact of Test Risk Rules
- Shows What Notables Would Look Like



## Q&A

Stuart McIntosh | Outpost Security

## .conf19 - RBA Sessions

SEC1556 - Building Behavioral Detections: Cross-Correlating Suspicious Activity with the MITRE ATT&CK™ Framework

Tuesday, October 22, 01:45 PM - 02:30 PM

SEC1803 - Modernize and Mature Your SOC with Risk-Based Alerting

Tuesday, October 22, 03:00 PM - 03:45 PM

SEC1538 - Getting Started with Risk-Based Alerting and MITRE

Wednesday, October 23, 12:30 PM - 01:15 PM

SEC1908 - Tales From a Threat Team: Lessons and Strategies for Succeeding with a Risk-Based Approach

Wednesday, October 23, 03:00 PM - 03:45 PM

Birds of a Feather – RBA Community – Slack Channel



.CONT19
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# Thank

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