Splunk Security Essentials 3.0: Driving the Content that Drives You

.conf19 splunk>

SEC2013

Wednesday, October 23, 2019 | 03:30 PM - 05:30 PM





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Agenda

- 1. What is Splunk Security Essentials (SSE)
- 2. Introduction to BOTS
- 3. Finding Content
- 4. Being Prescriptive
- 5. Learning Splunk for Security
- 6. Improving your Production Deployment
- 7. Measuring Success



What is SSE?

Section subtitle goes here





Splunk Security Essentials is the free Splunk app that makes security easier.



Widely Deployed Today

Proven and Stable







Splunk Security Essentials

Learn to improve your security using Splunk's analytics-driven security:

- Common use cases and examples to get started
- Data onboarding guides for top data sources
- Understand how to improve your security
- Scales from small to massive companies
- Save searches, send results to ES/UBA





Four Pillars

Four ways in which SSE has delivered value to users





Security Journey



successfully attack your organization.







Introduction to MITRE ATT&CK™

A knowledge base of adversary behavior

- Based on real-world observations
- Free, open, globally accessible, and community-driven
- A common language





https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/summit/cds-2018/presentations/cds18-technical-s05-att&cking-fin7.pdf



Breaking Down Enterprise ATT&CK

Tactics: the adversary's technical goals

are	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collect	tion Exfiltration	Command & Control
	Hardware Additions		Scheduled Task		Binary Patiding -	Credentials in Registry	Browser Bookmark	Exploitation of Remote	Data from Inform	rmation Exfiltration Over	Remote Access Tools
S	Trusted Relationship	LSASS	Drives	Extra Window	Memory Injection	Exploitation for	Discovery	Services	Repositorie	es Physical Medium	Port Knocking
	Supply Chain Compromise	Local Job	Scheduling	Access Toke	n Manipulațion	Credential Access	Network Share	Distributed Component	Video Captu	ure Exfiltration Over	Multi-hop Proxy
	supply chain compromise	<u>х</u> т	rap		Scheduled Ta	ack			lio Captu	ure Command and	Domain Fronting
0	Spearphishing Attachment	N Laur	nchetl	Main page	Scheuneu 17	ISK			ited Coll	lection Control Channel	Data Encoding
Š	Spearphisning Attachment	Sigged Binary	In	nag Help Contribute	Utilities such as at and sch	tasks, along with the Windows 1	Task Scheduler, can be	Scheduled Task	board Di	Data Data Encrypted	Remote File Copy
D	Exploit Public-Facing	Proxy Execution		References	used to schedule program	s or scripts to be executed at a c	date and time. A task can	Technique	il Collect	tion Automated Exfiltration	Multi-Stage Channels
0	Application	User Execution		Data Drilldown		mote system, provided the prope		D T1053	en Capta	ture Exfiltration Over Other	Web Service
Ð	Replication Through	Exploitation for		Using the API		er sharing is turned on. Schedul eing a member of the Administr	1	factic Execution, Persistence,	Privilege ta Stage	ed Network Medium	Standard
	Removable Media	Client Execution	AppCe	Tactics Initial Access	remote system.[1]	ang a memoer of the Hammed		Escalation	ut Captu	CATION OVER	Non-Application
+	Spearphishing via	CMSTP	Hoo		An adversary may use task	k scheduling to execute program	a at austam stastus as as	Platform Windows Permissions User, Administrator, SYS	rom Net	twork Alternative Protocol	Layer Protocol
	Service	Dynamic Data Exchange	Startu	Persistence Privilege Escalation		istence, to conduct remote Exec		Required	ared Driv	Data Transfer	Connection Proxy
5	Spearphishing Link	Mshta 🔪	Launch	Da Defense Evasion	Movement, to gain SYSTEM privileges, or to run a process under the context of			Effective User, Administrator, SYS	TEM m Local	System Size Limits	Multilayer Encryption
Ó	Drive-by Compromise	AppleScript	Dylib H		specified account.			Permissions	h the Bro	owser Data Compressed	Standard Application
	Valid Accounts	Source	Application	n SI Lateral Movement	Contents [hide]			Data File monitoring, Sources Process command-line parameter Process monitoring,	arameters, pm Rem	om Removable Scheduled Transfer Media	Layer Protocol
<u> </u>	Space after Filename Execution through Module Load	Space after Filename	Appin		1 Examples				Media		Commonly Used Port
• •		Execution through	Web	Sh Exfitration Command and	2 Mitigation	2 Mitigation Windows event logs				Standard Cryptographic	
S			Service Registry Pe	Control				to a la constant a l'an			Protocol
U _		Regsvcs/Regasm	News		Procedures – Specific technique implementation			Custom Cryptographic			
57	O I	InstallUtil	File System Perm	Technique Matrix				Leo Loobeek, @leoloob			Protocol
$\vec{\tau}$	Ĩ)	Regsvr32	Path Inte		Examples			Alain Homewood, Insom			Data Obfuscation
0	Execution through API Acce		Accessibili						Custom Command		
:= :	>	PowerShell	Port M	macOS fon Add a Technique	tasks for execution on a		stablish possistance 🕅				and Control Protocol
	D Rundil32 Kernel Modules		APT29 used named and hijacked scheduled tasks to establish persistence. Groups An APT3 downloader creates persistence by creating the following scheduled task: schtasks /create /tn "mysc" /tr								
-		Third-party Software	and Extensions	All Groups		est.exe /sc ONLOGON /ru		Buncasks /ureaue /un mys	10 762		Communication Through
() -	_	Scripting	Port Knocking	Add a Group	Add a Group Add a strong and a						Removable Media
~~ (0	Graphical User Interface	SIP and Trust	Software	BRONZE BUTLER has	s used at and schtasks to registe	r a scheduled task to execute	e malware during lateral movemen	L[6]		Multiband
.Ψ;	ñ	Command-Line	Provider Hijacking	All Software	All Software			Communication			
F (Interface	Screensaver	Privilege Escalation	nidden window						Fallback Channels
				1		_					

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https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/summit/cds-2018/presentations/cds18-technical-s05-att&cking-fin7.pdf



Uncommonly Used Port

Matrices Tactics -

Scheduled Task

Techniques 🔻

Software Res

Resources 🔹 🛛 Blog 🖸

Contribute

Search site

TECHNIQUES All Initial Access Execution

+

+

Persistence

- Privilege Escalation
- Access Token

Manipulation

Accessibility

Features

AppCert DLLs

AppInit DLLs

Application

Utilities such as at and schtasks, along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on. Scheduling a task on a remote system typically required being a member of the Administrators group on the the remote system. ^[1]

Groups

An adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence, to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain SYSTEM privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specified account.

ID: T1053

Tactic: Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation

Platform: Windows

Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM, User

Effective Permissions: SYSTEM, Administrator, User

Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows event logs

Supports Remote: Yes



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Mapping to ATT&CK: the Manual, Human Way





MITRE ATT&CK

Key Concepts



splunk> .conf19

History of Security Essentials





Widely Deployed Today

Proven and Stable







splunk > .conf19

Introduction Use Cases	Assistants 🗸 Search Setu	p	rator × 2 Messages × Settings × Activity × Help × Find Splunk Security Essentials
Use Cases			Export ~
analysis and first time a illustrate how this work built reports based on (analysis, which you can apply to any s, and also provide you with easy ou Common Information Model data, or	entials. This app provides generic search builders for data you have in Splunk, for any use case you mig ut of the box analytics you can use today, the app al anonymized demo data from Splunk Inc. or volunt used for Anomaly Detection, and that you will find in	ht desire. To help Iso includes many pre- eer customers. There are
looking at the live data Splunk to do the analys running how you want,	or accelerated data views. The app v is, but remember you can always cli	e demo data. Once you understand what the analyt will try to help guide you toward making sure you h ick Open in Search to explore it on your own. Once y ggularly, and feed the results into Splunk User Beha ng system.	ave the right data in you've got the search
	lume alerts are likely to fire multiple	or "low" you can expect the alert to fire rarely, probat times per day and should be sent into some upstre	
	easy to follow, they are organized int in you're interested in (or just select	to Security Domain, and several are showcased as All Examples) below.	highlights at the top.
All Examples (42 examp	les) Access Domain (11 examples)	Data Domain (6 examples) Endpoint Domain (19	examples) Network Domain (5 examples) Threat Domain (3 examples)
Highlights			
	A common indicator for lateral move starts logging into new domain contr	Search Pivot Repor	,
100 0.0 147 100 7.0 156 100 0.0 27	Alert Volume: Medium	enter search here	
First Seen Use Case	 Examples: Demo Data Live Data 	Search Use Case ^{Jing} ∽	Alert Volume: Low Examples: • Demo Data
	O Demo Data Live Data		Examples: • Demo Data • Live Data
	 Demo Data 		Examples: • Demo Data • Live Data First Time Accessing a Git Repository
	Oemo Data Live Data Detect Data Exfiltration	Use Case ^{iling} ×	Examples: • Demo Data • Live Data First Time Accessing a Git Repository Find users who accessed a git repository for the first time.
Use Case	 Demo Data Live Data Detect Data Exfiltration Find users who are exfiltrating data. First Time Accessing a Git	Use Case Iling ~ 2 outlier(s First Seen Use Case	Examples: • Demo Data • Live Data First Time Accessing a Git Repository Find users who accessed a git repository for the first time. Alert Volume: High Examples: • Demo Data • Live Data • Live Data • Live Data • Demo Data • Live Data • Live Data

SSE 1.0 Jan 07, 2017

Splunk Security Essentials

Types of Use Cases

Outlier(s)		-	
		2 Outlier(s	3)
			"
law Data	and Outlier status		
Year 1	Contract_interest_rate(%) :	initial_free_and_charges(%) :	
981	14.85	2.57	15.40
982	15.42	2.82	16.04
978	8.51	0.46	8.58
979	9.55	0.49	9.65
980	12.09	1.23	12.33
963	12.31	3.07	12.90
964	11.84	3.35	12,48
985	11.15	2.72	11.65
986	9.79	2.21	10.18
987	8.58	2.01	8.91
Dataset Pr	eview		
djustable.)	rate_loans(%) :	Contract_interest_rate(%) 1	
LA.		8.51	

First Time Seen powered by stats



Time Series Analysis with Standard Deviation

splunk>	App: Splunk Sec	curity Essentia			
Introduction	Use Cases	Assistants			
Q Sear	ch				
enter search here					
No Event Sampling 🗸					

General Security Analytics Searches



SSE 2.0 Feb 22, 2018

ecurity Content				What	t's New In 2.2?	Manage Boo	kmarks 🛛	CSV ⊥	
• 🚺 How can you map this content to	Splunk's Security Journey, and make you	r environment more se	ecure?						
ilter Examples		Q	Learn how to use this page	2 Select Filters	431 Total 2	1 Filtered X	Clear Filters	Default I	ilters
ourney	Security Use Case	Category	Data Sou	rces	Reco	ommended			
Stage 1 - Collection (21 matches) 🔻	All 💌	All 🔻	All 🔻		Ye	es (21 matches) 💌			
Access to In-scope Resources Visibility into who is accessing in- scope resources is key to your GDPR efforts. Splunk allows easy analysis of that information. Recommended Searches Included Web Proxy	Access to In-Scope Unencrypted Resources Unencrypted communications leaves you vulnerable to a data breach when users access PII data, ensure that all connections are encrypted. Recommended Searches Included Web Proxy	New D A common li movement li logging into controllers. Recommende Searches Incl Windows Sec	uded	Basic Brute Force Detection Uses a simple threshol Windows Security Logs there are a large numb logins, and at least one login from the same so Recommended Searches Included Windows Security	d for s to alert if ier of failed s successful surce.	Looks for the occurring or short period Recommende Searches Incl Anti-Virus	nultiple sys of time. 20 uded	are tems in a	
Easic Scanning Looks for hosts that reach out to more than 500 hosts, or more than 500 ports in a short period of time, indicating scanning. Recommended Searches Included Network Communication	Basic TOR Traffic Detection The anonymity of TOR makes it th perfect place to hide C&C, exfiltration, or ransomware payme via bitcoin. This example looks for ransomware activity based on FW logs. Recommended Searches Included Network Communication	This search of have been to high number r period.	nt Update	Endpoint Unclea Malware Detection Detect a system with a detection that was not cleaned, as they carry of damage or disclosur Recommended Searches Included Anti-Virus	on malware properly a high risk	This search heuristics to	look for india a flight risk f a user who re they do.	everal cations from Web	
Increase in # of Hosts Logged into	Increase in Pages Printed	Large	Web Upload	Multiple Infection	ns on Host		teractive Log		

125 Examples, with180+ SearchesEach includes:

- Description
- Relevance
- How to Implement
- How to Respond
- Known False Positives
- Line-by-Line SPL Documentation

splunk>

.conf¹9

And More!





And a Website! And a Docs Site!

Splunk Securit Essentials	- y Home C	apabilities Dem	o Docs	Guide	Download	Contributors	
How can you map this content to S	Splunk's Security Journey, and make y	your environment mor	e secure?				
Examples /							Custo
ey ge 1 (21 matches) *	Security Use Case			Data Sour			Featured Yes (2
Access to In-scope	Access to In-Scope Security'' E's'entifal's's is Unencrypted communications leaves you vulnerable to a data breach – when users access PII data, ensure that all connections are encrypted. Featured Searches Included Proxy with App Awareness	the free ^N Sp easterning	tication Against Crink app t dicator for lateral when a user starts w domain	hat make Uses a Vindo there i logins login f Featur	Basic Brute Forn SetSecurit a simple thresho wws Security Log are a large numb , and at least one from the same so	ce y ld for s to alert if ser of failed e successful surce.	Looks t occurri short p Featur Search AV Det
Basic TOR Traffic Detection	Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts	Malwar	nt Uncleaned e Detection em with a malware		Flight Risk Web Browsing earch implement		Find us
	SS case ever, with a new interface, expanded CIM Compliance checks, docs, this websit		ons of UBA and ESC				re

https://www.splunksecurityessentials.com

Splunk Security Essentials Docs	🌴 Splunk Security Essentials Home 🛛 Download 😯 Questions 📢 Contributors
Overview P Release Notes > User Guides Advanced Detection Content Analyze CIM Compliance Automatically Generate Dashboards Data Onboarding Guides Deploy Content to your Environment Document Your Deployed Content Justify New Data Sources via MITRE ATT&CK	Search Search Splunk Security Essentials documentation sitel Here you will find a variety of technical docs, along with guides, and a content list for the free Splunk app, Splunk Security Essentials. If you don't know much about Splunk Security Essentials yet, now's the time to learn! Check out the main website to get the overview of what the app is, and then consult our user guides to see how you can use the app. If you want to get a sense of the security detections in the app without installing it, you'll find the content detail on this docs site
ATTACK Learn Security Learn Splunk Monitor Data Ingest Operationalize MITRE ATT&CK Prescriptive Content Recommendations Risk-Based Alerting Content Security Detection Basics Security Journey Data Onboarding Guides > Features	helpful. You can always try out the demo environment, linked from the main website. On the other hand, if you just want to get started and are looking for install docs, you'll find those here as well. Most importantly: Splunk Security Essentials is a free app. Download it now! Release Notes
SSE Content C	
	Last update on 26/09/2019

https://docs.splunksecurityessentials.com



+ Josef Kuepker



+ Brian Cusick

David Veuve



Johan Bjerke





James Brodsky



Kovar

SSE is a Huge Team Effort

Dave Herrald



Stoner







Filip Wijnholds



Michel Oosterhof

Derek

King

lan



Nussbaum



Richard Hensen



Tom Smit



Steve Brant



Tim Frazier



lan Richardson Forrest



Ryan

Lait

Han Leivens



Nick Roy



Cihak

Simon

O'Brien



Jeswanth Manikonda



Hands On!





Log On!

Alert a room monitor if you run into issues!





BOTS 4 – Violent Memmes





What is **BOTS**?







MEMMES.



SOCIO-POLITICAL AXIS

Seeking to obtain high end Western Beers for production in their breweries

CAPABILITIES

- PowerShell \bullet
- Spearphishing
- **Domain Fronting**
- **Ticket Passing**



TECHNICAL AXIS

persistence

Yandex browser

PSExec for lateral movment

- Metasploit
- **Credential Dumping** (Mimikatz)
- User svc print for Account Persistence
- **Remote Desktop Protocol**
- Schtasks.exe for beacon and

ADVERSARY

VICTIMS

9

- Nation-state sponsored adversary
- Uses German naming conventions \bullet

- German Based DigitalOcean servers
- Enom Registered DNS ullet



Home Brewing companies



Thanks ThreatConnect!



Finding Content





120+ Native Detections

Directly Usable Content

Each detection includes:

- Production searches including line-by-line docs
- Documented known false positives, response recommendations, implementation guidance
- Demo data and sample screenshots
- MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques, Kill Chain Phases
- Many contain related dashboard panels

Content by Use Case




Prescriptive Content What To Do Next?

SSE understands what data you have, and what content you already use. It uses that to recommend what to do next.











Splunk ES Content Update™



Also includes and maps content from Splunk Premium Solutions



Hands-On

David





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QUICK! We need some advanced detections!





Security Content -Analytics Advisor -

Security Operations -

Data 🔻 Advanced -

Documentation -

🚯 Administrator 🔻 Messages 💌 Settings 💌 Activity 💌 Help 💌

Find

Home

Home

Welcome to Splunk Security Essentials! Below you will find the primary areas where Splunk users get value from this app. Within each, you go, and what (if anything) you need to configure. The goal of this free app is to help you be more successful more quickly with Splunk for s out the docs site 2 or ask for help on Splunk Answers 2. Happy Splunking!

Find Content

- Security Detection Basics
- Advanced Detection Content
- Prescriptive Content Recommendations
- Risk-Based Alerting Content

Learn

- Learn Splunk
- Learn Security
- Security Journey
- Data Onboarding Guides

We need some advanced detections!

Help Deploy

- Operationalize MITRE ATT&CK
- Monitor Data Ingest
- Automatically Generate
- Dashboards
- Deploy Content to your Environment
- Analyze CIM Compliance

- Justify New Data Sources via MITRE ATT&CK
- Document Your Deployed Content





Advanced Detection Content

For those who have their SIEM basics under control, this guide shows you far more security content, and also recommends additional capabilities such as leveraging MITRE ATT&CK to help you view the right information.

Launch Content Clicking a use case below will bring you to the Security Content page.

Security Monitoring

Security (continuous) monitoring enables you to analyze a continuous stream of near real-time snapshots of the state of risk to your security data, the network, endpoints, as well as cloud devices, systems and applications.



Advanced Threat Detection

An advanced threat (APT) is a set of steal, ty and continuous computer hacking processes, often orchestrated by a person or persons targeting a specific entity. APTs usually targets either private organizations, states or both for business or political motives.

Insider Threat



Insider threats come from current or former employees, contractors, or partners who have access to the corporate network and intentionally or accidentally exfiltrate, misuse or destroy sensitive data. They often have legitimate access to access and download sensitive material, easily evading traditional security products. Nothing to fear. Splunk

1	
	— J

Compliance

In nearly all environments, there are regulatory requirements of one form or another - when dealing with the likes of GDPR, HIPAA, PCI, SOC, and even the 20 Critical Security Controls, Splunk enables customers to create correlation rules and reports to identify threats to sensitive data or key employees and to automatically demonstrate compliance.



D How can you map this content to Splunk's Security Journey, and make your environment more secure?

Filter 🖌			Search	Learn how to	use this page 🛽	Customize Filters	458 Total 61 Filtered	Clear	Default	Share
Journey	Security Use Case		Category		Data Sources		Featured			
All selected (6) 🔻	Advanced Threat D	etection (6	All 👻		All 🔻		All 🔻			
ATT&CK Tactic	CK Technique		reat Groups	Search Included						
All 🔻	•	All 🔻		Yes (61 matche	s) 🔻					

Stage I: Collection

You have the data onboard, what do you do first?







Stage 1: Collection **2**

You have the data onboard, what do you do first?



New Local Admin Account

Local admin accounts are used by legitimate technicians, but they're also used by attackers. This search looks for newly created accounts that are elevated to local admins.





First Time Logon to New Server

Find users who logged into a new server for the first time.

Searches Included

Lateral Movement

Remote Services

Remote Desktop Protocol



Short Lived Adr Accounts

A technique used by a create an account, tak actions, and then dele away. This search will accounts on the local

Searches Included

Defense Evasion

Pe

Create Account



Command and Control



Security Content / New Local Admin Account

Assistant: Simp

Local admin a

elevated to lo

Use Case

Advanced

Category

Endpoint Co

Security I

New local a

local admin network dor

local admin

deactivation created on a

Alert Volu

Medium (?)

SPL Diffic

Medium

Threat Group: Violent Memmes

Description Description



Violent Memmes (also known as APT404 / SUSTAINABLE PARADOX / CUBIC ZIRCONIA / SNARKY BEAR) is a hacker group identified by the FRPCENK threat intelligence company as a most likely Russian advanced actor. The group has been known to have advanced capabilities in exploiting windows machines along with knowledge of industrial control system processes. Very little is known about the group other than a recent spat of activity in 2019 detected by the threat intelligence group FRPCENK. The group's name "VIOLENT MEMMES" was coined after analysts at FRPCENK consistently saw references to the Violent Femmes in the group's malware and C2 communications. Combined with their use of stego in internet memes and the occasional utilization of Violent Femmes band members (victor.delorenzo@]gmail[.]com) in spear phishing campaigns, FRPCENK analyst Rtan Krowbar reported that "When you add it up, the name was obvious."

The VIOLENT MEMMES reportedly uses spearphishing and off-the-shelf hacking tools like Metasploit and PowerShell exploits to gain footholds on victim infrastructure. The group also uses social engineering and bribery to gain access to onsite locations. Finally, they have more than a passing knowledge of industrial control systems (ICS). Although the group appears to be primarily interested in stealing intellectual property if given the opportunity they will cause intentional physical damage to breweries. (Citation: FRPCENK)

Splunk Techni

One technique used by Violent Memmes For New Local Admin Account

> T1136: Create Account

MITRE ATT&CK Summary: Violent Memmes used Create Account when attacking other organizations. (Citation: FRPCENK)

Source Name

FRPCENK Research Organization

Description

Operation Violent Memmes: NOT Good Feelings

Such Intel!

Kill Chain Phases 🛽

Command and Control

Data Sources

Windows Security

×

Export -

Live Data



DEMO DATA You're looking at the Demo search right now. Did you know that we have 2 searches for this example? Scroll Up to the top to see the other searches.



Outliers Only 12

Account_Name 🗢	EventCode ≑	Group_Name 🖨	Message 🗢
-	4720	Administrators	A member was added to a security-enabled local group. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2206723804-4039538768-2100233310-1109 Account Name: dveuve
dveuve	4732		A member was added to a security-enabled local group. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-530973380-1803174443-1567984831-1004 Account Name: msmith
msmith			A user account was created. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2206723804-4039538768-2100233310-1109 Account Name: dveuve Account Domain: CORP Log
msmith_admin			A user account was created. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-530973380-1803174443-1567984831-1004 Account Name: msmith_admin Account Domain: IP-(

> Related Splunk Capabilities	Vindor New Local Admin
How to Implement Known False Positives	Account
> How To Respond	
> SPL Mode > Help	

DEMO DATA You're looking at the Demo search right now. Did you know that we have 2 searches for this example? Scroll Up to the top to see the other searches.



Outliers Only 🛽

Account_Name 🗢	EventCode 🖨	Group_Name 🖨	Message 🗢
-	4720	Administrators	A member was added to a security-enabled local group. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2206723804-4039538768-2100233310-1109 Account Name: dveuve
dveuve	4732		A member was added to a security-enabled local group. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-530973380-1803174443-1567984831-1004 Account Name: msmith_
msmith			A user account was created. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2206723804-4039538768-2100233310-1109 Account Name: dveuve Account Domain: CORP Log
msmith_admin			A user account was created. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-530973380-1803174443-1567984831-1004 Account Name: msmith_admin Account Domain: IP-(



Data Sources

Windows Security

Data Check	Status	Open in Search	Resolution (if needed)		Schedule in ES			
Must have Windows Security Logs								
Must have Local Account Management Logs (Event ID 4720)								
Must have Local Group Management Logs (Event ID 4732)								
Enter a search								
<pre>index=* source="*WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4720 0 transaction Security_ID maxspan=180m connected=false search EventCode=4720 (EventCode=4732 Administrators) table _time EventCode Account_Name Target_Account_Na</pre>	~	All time 🔻 Q						
✓ 1 event (10/15/16 12:00:00.000 PM to 10/17/19 2:54:35.000 AM)	✓ 1 event (10/15/16 12:00:00.000 PM to 10/17/19 2:54:35.000 AM)							
Detect New Values Line-by-Line SPL Documentation								
> Related Splunk Capabilities								
> How to Implement								
> Known False Positives								
> How To Respond								
> SPL Mode Help								
> Help			See une orlanove					

Raw Event(s)



Minor 3.0 Content Improvements

- Added GCP and Azure searches AWS detections
- The SPL is easier to find
- Search engine on Security Content page is improved
- Many small UI improvements



Okay, We Found Some Content...



Okay, we found some content...

But can we be more methodical?



Being Prescriptive





Configure SSE

The manual way

To take advantage of the full power of SSE you need to go through the configuration steps.

ata Inventory				View Products	Automated Introspection 125 Remaining	Export •					
Email (0/2) ?	IDS or IPS										
DNS (0/3) ?					ctivity by analyzing network packets and compar	-					
Authentication (0/2) ?		, ,			nines mirrored data packets from different points traffic before it can proceed further into the netw						
Anti-Virus or Anti-Malware (0/3) ?	IDS or IPS Alerts	DS or IPS Alerts									
Web Proxy (0/2) ?	When the IDS/IPS detects at	hen the IDS/IPS detects abnormal or suspicious activity, it generates an alert indicating a potential threat.									
User Activity Audit (0/5) ?	Content for This Data So	ource Category	MITRE ATT	CK Tactics							
Endpoint Detection and Response (0/6) ?	Account Compromise w	ith Suspicious Internal Activity	Defense Eva	sion Discovery E	xfiltration						
Network Communication (0/3) ?	Brute Force Compromised Account		MITRE ATT	MITRE ATT&CK Techniques IZ Exfiltration Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Network Service Scanning Remote System Discovery Web Service							
Malware Analysis (0/1) ?	Data Exfiltration after Da	ta Staging									
IDS or IPS (0/1) ?	 Lateral Movement Potential Flight Risk Exfil 	tration	Remote Syst								
? IDS or IPS Alerts	 Potential Phishing Attack Threat Hunting 	¢									
Ticket Management (0/2) ?	Vulnerability Scanner De										
Web Server (0/3) ?	 Vulnerability Scanner De And 19 others. 	etected (by targets)									
Configuration Management (0/1) ?	Open in the Security Conten	t Dashboard 🛽									
DLP (0/1) ?	Data Onboarding Guide	s									
Physical Security (0/1) ?	Palo Alto Networks										
Vulnerability Detection (0/1) ?	Products for this Data Sour	ce Category									
Patch Management (0/3) ?	i Vendor	Product	Status	Coverage	Base Search	Actions					
Host-based IDS (0/1) ?			No Product	c Found							
IP Address Assignment (0/1) ?	Automated introspection f	ound no products for this dat			icts that weren't found through introspection, or i	if you know					
Backup (0/1) ?	Automated introspection		t you have no data of this ty			you know					
Application Data (0/1) ?											
Vendor-Specific Data (0/11) ?	No Data	a Procont				Product					



Configure SSE

The automatic way

SSE comes with an option to run an automated data introspection job.

me Security	Data Introspection St	tatus				×	ecurity Essent
ata Invent	Welcome to the Data Inventor	y Introspection! Below find the s	tatus of introspection within	the environment.		Controls II O	Export 👻 🗌 .
Email (2) 🗙	> Preparation: Pull Ind	ex / Source / Sourcetypes	~		1 comple	ete / 0 currently searching / 0 queued	
DNS (3) ×	> Step One: CIM Searc	ches 🧩			20 complet	te / 0 currently searching / 13 queued	ontents to a he network and
Authentication	> Step Two: Run sourc	etype-based Searches 🔩	2		0 complet	te / 0 currently searching / 91 queued	
Web Proxy (2)	> Step Three: Review	CIM-based Results 🗸			0	complete / 0 awaiting manual review	
User Activity /	> Step Four: CIM + Eve	ent Size Introspection			0 comple	ete / 0 currently searching / 0 queued	
Network Com	> Step Five: Event Volu	ume and Host Volume Intr	ospection		0 comple	ete / 0 currently searching / 0 queued	
Malware Anal							
IDS or IPS (0/1	Reset All Configurations					Close	
? IDS or IPS		Inreat Hunting					
Ticket Managem		Vulnerability Scanner Det Vulnerability Scanner Det					
Web Server (0/3		And 19 others.					
	lanagement (0/1) ?	Open in the Security Content					
DLP (0/1) ?		Data Onboarding Guides					
Physical Securit	y (0/1) ?	Palo Alto Networks					
Vulnerability De	tection (0/1) ?	Products for this Data Source	e Category				
Patch Managem	ent (0/3) ?	i Vendor	Product	Status	Coverage	Base Search	Actions
Host-based IDS	(0/1) ?			No Produc	ts Found		
IP Address Assig	gnment (0/1) ?	Automated introspection fo	und no products for this data			eren't found through introspection, or if yo	u know
Backup (0/1) ?					/pe, click "No Data Present."		
Application Data	a (O/1) ?						
Vendor-Specific	Data (0/11) ?	No Data					



Connecting Products to Data to Content

How does it work?





Hands-On





Analytics Advisor ▼ Security Operations ▼

Data 🔻 🛛 Advanced 🔻

Documentation - Configuration

Splunk Security Essentials

ata Inventory
Email (2) ✓ DNS (0/3) ❖ Authentication (0/2) ▲ Anti-Virus or Anti-Malware (0.3) ❖ Web Proxy (2) × User Activity Audit (0/5) ? Endpoint Detection and Response (1/6) ❖ Network Communication (1/3) ❖ Malware Analysis (0/1) ? IDS or IPS (0/1) ❖ Ticket Management (2) ✓ Web Server (2/3) ❖ Configuration Management (1) ✓ DLP (1) × Physical Security (0/1) ? Vulnerability Detection (1) × Patch Management (3) ✓

•••

Export 💌

Email (2) 🗸	Email				
✓ Incoming Messages			personal) activity and can be accessible not on as become a critical part of enterprise cybersed		_
✓ Outgoing Messages	can provide critical insights		might warrant more in-depth investigation. For e		
DNS (0/3) 🌣	attached in		ious code is hosted, targeting recipients, i	in order to obtain intellectual property y include transmitting data to external	
Authentication (2) 🗸					
Anti-Virus or Anti-Malware (3) 🗸			he Simple Mail Transfer	Protocol (SMTP). Relevant data source	es include all the devices or
Web Proxy (2) ×	TM		ogs or protocol-specific	c wire data sources like Splunk Stream	, Bro/Zeek, or a network
User Activity Audit (0/5) ?					
Endpoint Detection and Response (1/6)	¢		ATT&CK Tactics I	racion Exacution Unitial Access	
Network Communication (1/3) 🌣	Emails from			Execution Initial Access	
Malware Analysis (0/1) ?	Emails with Long and Abuse Monitor Email Americand Abuse		MITRE ATT&CK Techniques		
IDS or IPS (0/1) 🌣	Phishing Investigation and Response	se	Custom Command and Control Prot		Spéarphishing Attachment
Ticket Management (2) 🗸	ishing Attempt		Spearphishing Link Standard Appli	ication Layer Protocol	
Web Server (2/3) 🌣	Reset Emails		Kill Chain Phases 🛽 🖉		
Configuration Manac	ed		Delivery		
DLP (1) ×	XALA				
Physical Sec	tent Dashboar	a R			
Vulnera'	des				
Patr	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1				
	urce Categor	У			
	oduct	Status Cove	erage Base Search		Actions
	ffice 365	Complete 🥒	index="main" sourcetype="ms:o365	:reporting:messagetrace"	Update 🖌 Delete ×

	ta Source
Email (2) Incoming Messages Outgoing Messages	Data Source Category (and personal) activity and can be accessible not of and has become a critical part of enterprise cybers that might warrant more in-depth investigation. For
DNS (0/3) 🌣	attached in a file or embedding a link to a website where the malicious code is hosted, targeting recipients information/personal data, as well as command and control. In addition, internal threats leveraging email m
Authentication (2) 🗸	
Anti-Virus or Anti-Malware (3) 🗸	Inbound messages are messages that the Linked Content e Simple Mail Transfer Linked Content
Web Proxy (2) ×	users generating email protocol traffic of an anetwork ogs or protocol-specific wire data sources like Splunk Stream, Bro/Zeek, or a network analysis solution like ExtraHop.
User Activity Audit (0/5) ?	
Endpoint Detection and Response (1/6)	Content for This Data Source Category MITRE ATT&CK Tactics I • Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces Command and Control Defense Evasion Execution Initial Access
Network Communication (1/3) 🌣	Emails from Outside the Organization with Company Domains
Malware Analysis (0/1) ?	Emails with Lookalike Domains MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
IDS or IPS (0/1) 🌣	Phishing Investigation and Response
Ticket Management (2) 🗸	Possible Phishing Attempt Potential Phishing Attack Spearphishing Link Standard Application Layer Protocol
Web Server (2/3) 🌣	Spike in Password Reset Emails Suspicious Behavior
Configuration Management (1) 🗸	Threat Activity Detected
DLP (1) ×	And 2 others.
Physical Security (0/1) ?	Open in the Security Content Dashboard 12 Data Onboarding Guides
Vulnerability Detection (1) ×	• Office 365 Product
Patch Management (3) 🗸	Products for this Data Source Cat-gory
Host-based IDS (0/1) ?	
IP Address Assignment (0/1) ?	i Vendor Product Status Coverage Base Search Actions
Backup (1) ×	Microsoft Office 365 Complete index="main" sourcetype="ms:o365:reporting:messagetrace" Update
Application Data (1) 🗸	Add Product
Vendor-Specific Data (7/11) 🌣	• Add Product

•••

Email (2)	Email									
Email (2) 🗸	Email			<i>.</i> .		Data Sa				
✓ Incoming Messages	•				activity and can be accessible no e a critical part of enterprise cybe					
✓ Outgoing Messages	•				rrant more in-depth investigation. F	• •				
DNS (0/3) 🌣		•			us code is hosted, targeting recipie on, internal threats leveraging emai	Introspe	ection			
Authentication (2) 🗸		ncoming Messages								
Anti-Virus or Anti-Malware (3) 🗸	Inbound messages	are messages the	at the mail serve	ers receive into th	ne network via the Simple Mail Transfer	Protocol (SMTP). Relevant data source	es include all the devices or			
Web Proxy (2) ×	users generating en analysis solution like	•	ic on the networ	k captured from	message trace logs or protocol-specific	wire data sources like Splunk Stream	n, Bro/Zeek, or a network			
User Activity Audit (0/5) ?		e Extra 10p.								
Endpoint Detection and Response (1/6) 🌣	Content for This				MITRE ATT&CK Tactics					
Network Communication (1/3) 🌣	Email AttachmeEmails from Out			oany Domains	Command and Control Defense Ev	asion Execution Initial Access				
Malware Analysis (0/1) ?	Emails with LooMonitor Email F				MITRE ATT&CK Techniques I					
IDS or IPS (0/1) 🌣	Phishing Investi	gation and Respo	onse							
Ticket Management (2) 🗸	 Possible Phishir Potential Phishir	•								
Web Server (2/3) 🌣	Spike in PasswoSuspicious Beha				Kill Chain Phases 🛽 🛛					
Configuration Management (1) 🗸	Threat Activity [Delivery					
DLP (1) ×	And 2 others.									
Physical Security (0/1) ?	Open in the Security		oard 12							
Vulnerability Detection (1) ×	Office 365	gouldes								
Patch Management (3) 🗸										
Host-based IDS (0/1) ?	Products for this Da	ata Source Categ	gory							
IP Address Assignment (0/1) ?	idor	Product	Status	Coverage	Base Search		Actions			
Backup (1) ×	> Microsoft	Office 365	Complete		index="main" sourcetype="ms:o365:	reporting:messagetrace"	Update 🖌 Delete ×			

Data Inventory Introspection





... C.

Export 💌

Email (2) 🗸	Email is a significant component of day-to-day business (and personal) activity and can be accessible not only on corporate desktop computers but also mobile devices, including personal devices, which introduces new vulnerabilities and has become a critical part of enterprise cybersecurity efforts. Email messages and activity logs across these endpoints can provide critical insights into communication activity that might warrant more in-depth investigation. For example, attackers may be sending emails with malicious code attached in a file or embedding a link to a website where the malicious code is hosted, targeting recipients, in order to obtain intellectual property or personally identifiable information/personal data, as well as command and control. In addition, internal threats leveraging email may include transmitting data to external email accounts.				
✓ Incoming Messages					
✓ Outgoing Messages					
DNS (0/3) 🌣					
Authentication (0/2) 🌣					
Anti-Virus or Anti-Malware (0/3) 🌣	Inbound messages are messages that the mail servers receive into the network via the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP). Relevant data sources include all the devices or users generating email protocol traffic on the network captured from message trace logs or protocol-specific wire data sources like Splunk Stream, Bro/Zeek, or a network analysis solution like ExtraHop.				
Web Proxy (2) ×					
User Activity Audit (0/5) ?					
Endpoint Detection and Response (1/6)	Content for This Data Source Category MITRE ATT&CK Tactics Command and Control Defense Evasion Execution Initial Access				
Network Communication (1/3) 🍄	Emails from Outside the Organization with Company Domains				
Malware Analysis (0/1) ?	Emails with Lookalike Domains MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Mitre ATT&CK Techniques Custom Command and Control Protocol Exploitation for Client Execution Spearphishing Attachment				
IDS or IPS (0/1) 🌣	Phishing Investigation and Response Possible Phishing Attempt Spearphishing Link Standard Application Layer Protocol				
Ticket Management (2) 🗸	Potential Phishing Attack				
Web Server (2/3) 🌣	Spike in Password Reset Emails Kill Chain Phases Kill Chain Phases				
Configuration Management (1) 🗸	Threat Activity Detected And 2 others				
DLP (1) ×	And 2 others.				
Physical Security (0/1) ?	Open in the Security Content Dashboard 12 Data Onboarding Guides				
Vulnerability Detection (1) ×	Office 365				
Patch Management (3) 🗸	Dreducts for this Data Source Cotomers				
Host-based IDS (0/1) ?	Products for this Data Source Category				
IP Address Assignment (0/1) ?	i Vendor Product Status Coverage Base Search Actions				
Backup (1) 🗙	Microsoft Office 365 Complete index="main" sourcetype="ms:o365:reporting:messagetrace" Update / Delete ×				
Application Data (1) 🗸	• Add Product				
Vendor-Specific Data (7/11) 🌣	U AUU FIOUULI				

Email (2) 🗸

✓ Incoming Messages

✓ Outgoing Messages

DNS (0/3) 🍄

Authentication (0/2) 🍄

Anti-Virus or Anti-Malware (0/3) 🍄

Web Proxy (2) 🗙

User Activity Audit (0/5) ?

Endpoint Detection and Response (1/6) 🏼 🌣

Network Communication (1/3)

Malware Analysis (0/1) ?

IDS or IPS (0/1) 🌣

Ticket Management (2) 🗸

Web Server (2/3) 🌣

Configuration Management (1) 🗸

DLP (1) ×

Physical Security (0/1) ?

Vulnerability Detection (1) ×

Patch Management (3) 🗸

Host-based IDS (0/1) ?

IP Address Assignment (0/1) ?

Backup (1) 🗙

Application Data (1) 🗸

Vendor-Specific Data (7/11) 🌣

Choose Existing Product

Add New Product

Assign Existing Product					
Vendor Name	Product Name	Data Source Categories Already Mapped To			
AWS	CloudTrail	AWS Cloudtrail			
AWS	CloudWatch	Host Performance			
AWS	Config	General Config Management Logs			
AWS	VPC Flow Logs	Basic Traffic Logs			
Azure	Active Directory	Successful Authentication Failed Authentication			
Microsoft	Office 365	Outgoing Messages Incoming Messages			
Microsoft	Sysmon	Object Change			
Microsoft	Update Log	System eligible for patch Patch Applied Patch Failed			
Microsoft	Windows Application Log	Application Logs			
Microsoft	Windows Domain Controller	Domain Controller's Windows Security Logs			
Microsoft	Windows Host and Server	Object Change on Removable Storage Windows Security Logs			
Microsoft	Windows Powershell	Microsoft Powershell Logs			

View Prog

Cancel

Products in environment



	/ie	W	P	ro	d	u	C	ts

Cancel

Add new product manually

Automated Introspection Completed Export

	lectual property or personally identifiable data to external email accounts.				
		; include all the devices or Bro/Zeek, or a network			
nitial A	ccess				
r Client	Execution	Spearphishing Attachment			
		Actions			
ace"		Update 🖌 Delete ×			

Vendor-Specific Data (7/11) 🌣

Assign Existing Vendor Name	Product Product Name	Data Source Categories Already Mapped To
AWS	CloudTrail	AWS Cloudtrail
AWS	CloudWatch	Host Performance
AWS	Config	General Config Management Logs
AWS	VPC Flow Logs	Basic Traffic Logs
Azure	Active Directory	Successful Authentication Failed Authentication
Microsoft	Office 365	Outgoing Messages Incoming Messages
Microsoft	Sysmon	Object Change
Microsoft	Update Log	System eligible for patch Patch Applied Patch Failed
Microsoft	Windows Application Log	Application Logs
Microsoft	Windows Domain Controller	Domain Controller's Windows Security Logs
Microsoft	Windows Host and Server	Object Change on Removable Storage Windows Security Logs
Microsoft	Windows Powershell	Microsoft Powershell Logs

Choose Existing Product

Add New Product


Data Inventory	Add Product ×	leted Export
Email (2) 🗸		
✓ Incoming Messages	O O O O O Sack Next>	so mobile devices, including
✓ Outgoing Messages	Locate Data Select Product Define Coverage Indexes + Sourcetypes Metadata Complete	logs across these endpoints with malicious code
DNS (0/3) 🌣	CLocate By Index and Sourcetype	personally identifiable nail accounts.
Authentication (0/2) 🌣	Locate By Search String	
Anti-Virus or Anti-Malware (0/3) 🌣		nclude all the devices or
Web Proxy (2) 🗙		ro/Zeek, or a network
User Activity Audit (0/5) ?	Present in Splunk, but will provide SPL later (Data Availability Dashboard won't function without SPL)	
Endpoint Detection and Response (1/		
Network Communication (1/3)		
Malware Analysis (0/1) ?	Cancel	
IDS or IPS (0/1) 🌣	Possible Phishing Attempt Spearphishing Link Standard Application Layer Protocol	Spearphishing Attachment
Add new pro manual	ty Detected	
Vulnerability Detection (1) ×	Office 365	
Patch Management (3) 🗸		
Host-based IDS (0/1) ?	Products for this Data Source Category	
IP Address Assignment (0/1) ?	i Vendor Product Status Coverage Base Search	Actions
Backup (1) ×	→ Microsoft Office 365 Complete Index="main" sourcetype="ms:o365:reporting:messagetrace"	Update 🖌 Delete ×
Application Data (1) 🗸		
Vendor-Specific Data (7/11) 🌣		

Data Inventory	Add Product	leted Export ▼
Email (2) 🗸		
✓ Incoming Messages	O O	so mobile devices, including
✓ Outgoing Messages	Locate Data Select Product Define Coverage Indexes + Sourcetypes Metadata Complete	logs across these endpoints with malicious code
DNS (0/3) 🌣	CLocate By Index and Sourcetype	personally identifiable
Authentication (0/2) 🌣	Cocate By Search String	iail accounts.
Anti-Virus or Anti-Malware (0/3) 🤽	• Present in Splunk, but will provide SPL later (Data Availability Dashboard won't function without SPL)	nclude all the devices or
Web Proxy (2) ×		ro/Zeek, or a network
User Activity Audit (0/5) ?	Cance	2
Endpoint Detection and Response (1		
Network Communication (1/3) 🌣	Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces Emails from Outside the Organization with Company Domains	
Malware Analysis (0/1) ?	Emails with Lookalike Domains MITRE ATT&CK Techniques	
IDS or IPS (0/1) 🌣	Phishing Investigation and Response	Ition Spearphishing Attachment
	Possible Phishing Attempt Spearphishing Link Standard Application Layer Protocol Sishing Attack	
Add new pr manual	Ly Detected	
Vulnerability Detection (1) ×	Data Onboarding Guides	
Patch Management (3) 🗸	• Office 365	
Host-based IDS (0/1) ?	Products for this Data Source Category	
IP Address Assignment (0/1) ?	i Vendor Product Status Coverage Base Search	Actions
Backup (1) ×	> Microsoft Office 365 Complete Index="main" sourcetype="ms:o365:reporting:messagetrace"	Update 🖌 Delete ×
Application Data (1) 🗸		
Vendor-Specific Data (7/11) 🌣		

Data Inventory	Add Product ×	ileted Export • o
Email (2) 🗸		
✓ Incoming Messages	O O O O O O O A Back Next >	so mobile devices, including
✓ Outgoing Messages	Locate Data Select Product Define Coverage Indexes + Sourcetypes Metadata Complete	logs across these endpoints swith malicious code
DNS (0/3) 🌣	CLocate By Index and Sourcetype	personally identifiable ail accounts.
Authentication (0/2) 🌣	 Locate By Search String Present in Splunk, but will provide SPL later (Data Availability Dashboard won't function without SPL) 	
Anti-Virus or Anti-Malware (0/3)	 Planned for the Near Future 	nclude all the devices or
Web Proxy (2) ×		ro/Zeek, or a network
User Activity Audit (0/5) ?	Cancel	
Endpoint Detection and Response (1/6		
Network Communication (1/3)	Email Attachments With Lots Of Spaces Emails from Outside the Organization with Company Domains Command and Control Defense Evasion Execution Initial Access	
Malware Analysis (0/1) ?	Emails with Lookalike Domains MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Monitor Email For Brand Abuse Custom Command and Control Protocol Exploitation for Client Execution	Coccumbiations Attachmout
IDS or IPS (0/1) 🌣	Phishing Investigation and Response Possible Phishing Attempt Spearphishing Link Standard Application Layer Protocol	Spearphishing Attachment
Add new pro manually	ty Detected	
Vulnerability Detection (1) ×	Office 365	
Patch Management (3) 🗸		
Host-based IDS (0/1) ?	Products for this Data Source Category	
IP Address Assignment (0/1) ?		Actions
Backup (1) ×	Microsoft Office 365 Complete / index="main" sourcetype="ms:o365:reporting:messagetrace"	Update 🖌 Delete ×
Application Data (1) 🗸		dd Product
Vendor-Specific Data (7/11) 🌣		

Data Inventory	Add Product	×
Email (2) ✓ ✓ Incoming Messages ✓ Outgoing Messages DNS (0/3) ‡ Authentication (0/2) ‡ Anti-Virus or Anti-Malware (0/3) ‡ Web Proxy (2) × User Activity Audit (0/5) ? Endpoint Detection and Response (1/6) Network Communication (1/3) ‡	Locate Data Select Product Define Coverage Indexes + Sourcetypes Metadata Complete Locate By Index and Sourcetype Index Sourcetype Index Sourcetype main X Duplicate values causing conflict Cocate By Search String Present in Splunk, but will provide SPL later (Data Availability Dashboard won't function without SPL) Planned for the Near Future	so mobile devices, including logs across these endpoints s with malicious code personally identifiable tail accounts. Include all the devices or ro/Zeek, or a network
Malware Analysis (0/1) ?	Phisning investigation and kesponse	Cancel Spearphishing Attachment
Add new pro manual	ty Detected	
Vulnerability Detection (1) × Patch Management (3) ✓	• Office 365	
Host-based IDS (0/1) ?	Products for this Data Source Category	Actions
IP Address Assignment (0/1) ? Backup (1) ×	i Vendor Product Status Coverage Base Search > Microsoft Office 365 Complete Index="main" sourcetype="ms:o365:reporting:messagetrace"	Actions Update Delete ×
Application Data (1) 🗸		• Add Product
Vendor-Specific Data (7/11) 🌣		

Data Inventory	Add Product	×
Email (2) ✓ ✓ Incoming Messages ✓ Outgoing Messages DNS (0/3) ‡ Authentication (0/2) ‡ Anti-Virus or Anti-Malware (0/3) ‡ Web Proxy (2) × User Activity Audit (0/5) ?	Add Froduct Locate Data Select Product Define Coverage Indexes + Sourcetypes Metadata Complete Select from Pre-Configured Products Manually Specify Vendor Carbon Black Product Carbon Black CB Response Do Not Specify Now	so mobile devices, including logs across these endpoints s with malicious code personally identifiable iail accounts. hclude all the devices or ro/Zeek, or a network
Endpoint Detection and Response (1/6	Са	ancel
Network Communication (1/3) * Malware Analysis (0/1) ? IDS or IPS (0/1) * Add new pro manually	ity Detected	cecution Spearphishing Attachment
Vulnerability Detection (1) ×	Office 365	
Patch Management (3) 🗸	Products for this Data Source Category	
Host-based IDS (0/1) ?	i Vendor Product Status Coverage Base Search	Actions
IP Address Assignment (0/1) ? Backup (1) ×	Microsoft Office 365 Complete index="main" sourcetype="ms:o365:reporting:messagetrace"	Update 🖉 Delete ×
Application Data (1) 🗸		
Vendor-Specific Data (7/11) 🌣		Add Product

Data Inventory	Add Product ×	Export •
Email (2) ✓ ✓ Incoming Messages ✓ Outgoing Messages DNS (0/3) ‡ Authentication (0/2) ‡ Anti-Virus or Anti-Malware (0/3) ‡ Web Proxy (2) ×	Add Product x Add Pr	so mobile devices, including logs across these endpoints s with malicious code personally identifiable ail accounts.
User Activity Audit (0/5) ? Endpoint Detection and Response (1/6 Network Communication (1/3) Malware Analysis (0/1) ? IDS or IPS (0/1)	100 % Complete data is in Splunk? Reset Cancel	Spearphishing Attachment
Add new pro	y Detected	
manual	Data Onboarding Guides	
manual	Data Onboarding Guides Office 365	
Imanual Physical Secondy (0/1) Vulnerability Detection (1) ×	Data Onboarding Guides Office 365 Products for this Data Source Category	
Imanual Image: Second (0/1) Vulnerability Detection (1) Patch Management (3)	Data Onboarding Guides Office 365 Products for this Data Source Category i Vendor Product Status Coverage Base Search	Actions
Image: mail of the second se	Data Onboarding Guides Office 365 Products for this Data Source Category	Actions
Image: Constraint of the second of the sec	Data Onboarding Guides • Office 365 Products for this Data Source Category i Vendor Product Status Coverage Base Search > Microsoft Office 365 Complete index="main" sourcetype="ms:o365:reporting:messagetrace"	

С.







There must be a quicker way?



Automa	ted			View Products Automated Introspection	Completed Export •				
Email	4	and Response							
	tion	Response (EDR) solutions monitor endpoints (servers, laptops, desktops, and mobile devices) for suspicious ectivity like malware and other cyber threats							
Authentication (0/2) 🌣	access information, ne			e traditional anti-virus/anti-malware. Endpoints provide critical forensic dat anges. The EDR can filter, enrich and monitor the data for signs of maliciou					
Anti-Virus or Anti-Malware (0/3) 🌣	Object Change								
Web Proxy (2) ×	An object, such as a file	e, directory, registry key, c	or other artifact was	created, modified, accessed or deleted.					
User Activity Audit (0/5) ?	Content for This Da	ata Source Category		MITRE ATT&CK Tactics					
Endpoint Detection and Response (1/6)	Abnormally High N	Number of Endpoint Chang	jes By User	Collection Command and Control Defense Evasion Execution Exfiltration Impact Initial Access Lateral Movement Persistence Privilege Escalation					
Object Change	 Batch File Write to Common Ransomv 								
Process Launch	Common Ransomv	ware Notes		MITRE ATT&CK Techniques					
Process Launch with CLI		eption By Creation Of prog User Account Control	gram.exe	Accessibility Features AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Authentication Package					
Process Launch with Executable Hash	 Email files written d Investigate GDPR I 	outside of the Outlook dire	ectory	Change Default File Association Command and Control Custom Command and Control Protocol					
✓ Object Change on Removable Storage	Registry Keys Used	d For Persistence		Data Encrypted for Impact Data Staged Disabling Security Tools Email Collection Execution					
Listening Port(s)	Threat Activity DetAnd 17 others.	ected		File Permissions Modification Modify Existing Service Modify Regi	stry New Service Port Monitors				
Network Communication (1/3) 🌣	Open in the Security C	Content Dashboard 🛽 🛽		Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Scripting Spearphishing Attach	iment				
Malware Analysis (0/1) ?	Data Onboarding G	Juides		Standard Application Layer Protocol	_				
IDS or IPS (0/1) 🌣	Windows Security	0		Kill Chain Phases 🛽 🖸					
Ticket Management (2) 🗸	Windows Process Microsoft Sysmon			Actions on Objectives Command and Control Delivery Installation	n				
Web Server (2/3) 🌣	Products for this Data	Source Category			-				
Configuration Management (1) 🗸			Courses	Page Secret	Actions				
DLP (1) ×		roduct Status	Coverage	Base Search	Actions				
Physical Security (0/1) ?	_ ≻ Microsoft Sy	ysmon Complete		index="main" sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows- Sysmon/Operational"	Update 🖌				
Vulnerability Detection (1) ×					Delete ×				

Data I

Five in		ion steps	ata Advanced Con		×	nk Security Essentia
Email (2) 🗸	,				Controls O	
DNS (0/3) 🌣	> Preparation: Pull Inde	ex / Source / Sourcetypes 🛛 💥		0 complete / 0 c	urrently searching / 1 queued	ride a
Authentication	> Step One: CIM Searc	hes 🗸		33 complete / 0 cu	rrently searching / 0 queued	exercise should
Anti-Virus or A	> Step Two: Run source	etype-based Searches 🗸		91 complete / 0 cu	irrently searching / 0 queued	possible. Access
Web Proxy (2)	> Step Three: Review C	CIM-based Results ?		0 complete	e / 13 awaiting manual review	
Endpoint Dete	> Step Four: CIM + Eve	nt Size Introspection 🗸		25 complete / 0 cu	rrently searching / 0 queued	
Network Com	> Step Five: Event Volu	me and Host Volume Introspe	ection 🗸	25 complete / 0 cu	irrently searching / 0 queued	
Malware Analy						
IDS or IPS (0/1 Ticket Manage	Reset All Configurations				Close	
Web Server (2/3)	\$					_
Configuration Ma	anagement (1) 🗸					
DLP (1) ×					Automot	ad
Physical Security	r (0/1) ?				Automat	eu
Vulnerability Det	ection (1) ×				Introspect	ion
Patch Manageme	ent (3) 🗸					
Host-based IDS ((0/1) ?					
IP Address Assig	nment (0/1) ?					
Backup (1) 🗙						
Application Data	(1) 🗸					
Vendor-Specific	Data (7/11) 🌣					



Data Inventory

a sources include all the devices or

Stream, Bro/Zeek, or a network

Actions

Update 🖋

Delete ×

Email (2) 🗸 Email Email is a significant component of day-to-day business (and personal) activity and an be accessible not only on corporate desktop computers but also mobile devices, including ✓ Incoming Messages personal devices, which introduces new vulnerabilities and has become a critical part of enterprise cybersecurity efforts. Email messages and activity logs across these endpoints ✓ Outgoing Messages can provide critical insights into communication activity that might warrant more in-depth investigation. For example, attackers may be sending emails with malicious code attached in a file or embedding a link to a website where the malicious code is hosted, targeting recipients, in order to obtain intellectual property or personally identifiable DNS (0/3) 🍄 information/personal data, as well as command and control. In addition, internal threats leveraging email may include transmitting data to external email accounts. Authentication (0/2) 🌣 Incoming Messages **Products generating** Anti-Virus or Anti-Malware (0/3) 🍄 Inbound messages are messages th users generating email protocol traf Web Proxy (2) X analysis solution like ExtraHop. the data User Activity Audit (0/5) ? Content for This Data Source Endpoint Detection and Response (1/6) 🍄 Email Attachments With Lots Of Space Network Communication (1/3) • Emails from Outside the Organization with Company Domains MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Emails with Lookalike Domains Malware Analysis (0/1) ? Monitor Email For Brand Abuse Custom Command and Control Protocol Exploitation for Client Execution Spearphishing Attachment IDS or IPS (0/1) 🌣 Phishing Investigation and Response Spearphishing Link Standard Application Layer Protocol Possible Phishing Attempt Ticket Management (2) 🗸 Potential Phishing Attack Kill Chain Phases Spike in Password Reset Emails Web Server (2/3) 🍄 Suspicious Behavior Delivery Configuration Management (1) 🗸 Threat Activity Detected And 2 others. DLP (1) × Open in the Security Content Dashboard 12 Physical Security (0/1) ? **Data Onboarding Guides** Vulnerability Detection (1) × • Office 365 Patch Management (3) 🗸 **Products for this Data Source Category** Host-based IDS (0/1) ? i Vendor Product Status Coverage **Base Search** IP Address Assignment (0/1) ? Office 365 Complete index="main" sourcetype="ms:o365:reporting:messagetrace" \sim Microsoft Backup (1) ×

	s and the Content Mapped to Them hat you have completed the Data Inventory configuration, and m	apped your active co	ntent on the Manage Bookmarks page. You will then get a complete vie	Edit -		ashboard
√7 results (16	/10/2019 09:00:00.000 to 17/10/2019 09:15:06.000)					
7 results	20 per page ▼	Data Source	Products ge the da		ng	Total Mapped Content for This Product
Product \$	Dataset That Provides Visibility ≑	Category \$	Saved Search Name 🗢	Description \$		¢
AWS CloudTrail	<pre>(index="main" sourcetype="aws:cloudtrail")</pre>	Vendor-Specific Data > AWS Cloudtrail	ESCU – Detect New Open S3 buckets – Rule	*Automation: Added comp for DSC VendorSpecific- Search that generated is where earliest=0 latest sourcetype=aws*cloudtra sourcetype*	-aws-cloudtrail. it: tstats count t=now index=*	1
Azure Active Directory	(index="main" sourcetype="ms:aad:signin")	Authentication > Failed Authentication Authentication > Successful Authentication	Access - Brute Force Access Behavior Detected - Rule Access - Brute Force Access Behavior Detected - Rule Identity - Activity from Expired User Identity - Rule			1 2
Microsoft Office 365	<pre>(index="main" sourcetype="ms:o365:reporting:messagetrace")</pre>	Email > Incoming Messages	ESCU - Monitor Email For Brand Abuse - Rule	*Automation: Added comp for DSC DS001MAIL-ET035 Search that generated i earliest=0 head 30000 index sourcetype*	Send. it: index=* tag=email	1
Microsoft Windows Host and Server	<pre>(index=main source=WinEventLog:Security) OR (index=main source=XmlWinEventLog:Security) OR (index=main source=wineventlog:security) OR (index=main source=xmlwineventlog:security)</pre>	Vendor-Specific Data > Windows Security Logs	ESCU – Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4663 – Rule ESCU – Detect New Local Admin account – Rule	*Automation: Added comp for DSC DS009EndPointIn ET050bjectChangeRemoval Search that generated is source="*winEventLog:Se EventCode=4663 removab	ntel- bleStorage. it: index=* (ecurity") 4663	2

How do we know what detections are currently operational?



Overview

Documentation

Configuration

Advanced -

View Products Automated Introspection

Completed

Export • ...

Manage Bookmarks

Security Content

Custom Content

MITRE ATT&CK-Driven Content Recommendation

Risk-based Alerting Content

Recommendation

- User Activity Audit (0/5) ?
- Endpoint Detection and Response (1/6)
- Network Communication (1/3)
- 💠 Basic Traffic Logs
- ✓ Application-aware Traffic Logs
- ? User-aware Traffic Logs

Malware Analysis (0/1) ?

IDS or IPS (0/1) 🍄

Ticket Management (2) 🗸

Web Server (2/3) 🍄

Configuration Management (1) 🗸

DLP (1) 🗙

Physical Security (0/1) ?

Vulnerability Detection (1) ×

Patch Management (3) 🗸

Host-based IDS (0/1) ?

IP Address Assignment (0/1) ?

Network Communication

Network monitoring is essential for detecting threats originating from both outside and inside the network. Network communication data is a record of communication associated with core networks or data centers, but also distribution networks, WAN connections, and local area networks. Network data can be collected at the network perimeter (e.g., IDS/m S, firewall logs), via internal networks (e.g., WANs, remote offices), Netflow, packet capture, deep packet inspection, and endpoint forensic data.

Basic Traffic Logs

Network activity data can be recorded by many technologies including host operating systems, firewalls, switches, routers, intrusion detection and prevention systems, and wire data sources. At a minimum, the event record should include the source IP address, source port number, destination IP address, destination port number, and the protocol used.

Content for This Data Source Category

- Account Compromise with Suspicious Internal Activity
- Basic Scanning
- Data Exfiltration after Data Staging
- Download from Internal Server
- IP Investigate and Report
- Investigate GDPR Breaches Using ES
- Lateral Movement
- New Connection to In-Scope Device
- Potential Phishing Attack
- SMB Traffic Spike
- And 52 others.

Open in the Security Content Dashboard 🛽

Data Onboarding Guides

- Palo Alto Networks
- Cisco ASA
- AWS VPC Flow

MITRE ATT&CK Tactics



Actions on Objectives Command and Control Delivery Reconnaissance

Products for this Data Source Category

Home	Security Content -	Analytics Advisor 🔻	Security (Operations 🔻	Data 🔻 🛛 Adva	anced v De	ocumentation •	Configuration			Splunk Securi	ty Essentials
Mar	nage Bookmarks	5									Expo	rt 🕹 🛛
									Correlation	Search Introspection	Manage List A	dd Bookmark
Boo	okmarked	Waiting on Data		Ready For Deployment		nplementatio ssues	n	Need runing	Fully Ir	nplemented C	Custom)
Ant •	Detect New Open S3 buck i-Virus or Anti-Malware Host With A Recurring Malv dit Trail	vare Infection	• Brute F	y from Expired Use Force Access Beha hosts connecting	avior Detected	ain	Malicious Powe Command Prohibited Proce Suspicious weve	nin accounts using net.e Shell Process - Encode ess Detected autil Usage	exe • D d E • D	ows Security etect Mimikatz Via PowerSi ventCode 4663 etect New Local Admin acc		
•	Detect New Open S3 buck	ets [Email • Monito	or Email For Brand	Abuse	•	Vulnerability Sca	anner Detected (by targ	ets)			
i	Content		Open	Bookmarked	Waiting on Da		eady for ployment 1	Deployment Issues 0	Needs Tuning	Successfully Implemented	Notes	Remove 1
>	Activity from Expired Use	r Identity	Z	\bigcirc	\bigcirc		\bigcirc	\bigcirc	\bigcirc	0	ø	×
>	Brute Force Access Beha	vior Detected	12	\bigcirc	\bigcirc		\bigcirc	\bigcirc	\bigcirc	0	ø	×
>	Create local admin accou	ints using net.exe	12	\bigcirc	\bigcirc		\bigcirc	\bigcirc	\bigcirc	0	A	×
>	Detect Mimikatz Via Powe 4663	erShell And EventCode	Ľ	0	0		\bigcirc	0	\bigcirc	0		×
>	Detect New Local Admin	account	12	\bigcirc	\bigcirc		\bigcirc	\bigcirc	\bigcirc	•		×

Home	Security Content • A	Analytics Adviso	.ook for A	Active Conte	nt			×	k s	plunk Securi	ty Essentials
Mar	nage Bookmarks	e	xisting levels of your local s	of coverage and a aved searches and	areas of focus. To make d then either mapping t	rtics Advisor dashboards, this as easy as possible, hem to Splunk's out-of-th ne metadata you care abc	this app includes a wor e-box-content, or creati	rkflow for listing all	ch Introspection Ma	Expo	rt 🛓 🛛
Воо	okmarked V	Vaiting on Data	inally, remem		_	and change any of these		Close	mented Cu	stom	
AW:	S Detect New Open S3 buckets			ation / from Expired Use Force Access Beha			and Response min accounts using net. rShell Process - Encode	ed Event	Security ct Mimikatz Via PowerShe cCode 4663 ct New Local Admin accou		
	i-Virus or Anti-Malware Host With A Recurring Malware	e Infection	• Detect		to dynamic domain	Prohibited Proce Suspicious wevt					
	dit Trail					IDS or IPS	annan Data ata di iku danna				
•	Detect New Open S3 buckets		Email • Monito	r Email For Brand	Abuse	Vulnerability Sca	anner Detected (by targ	ets)			
i	Content		Open	Bookmarked	Waiting on Data	Ready for Deployment 0	Deployment Issues O	Needs Tuning	Successfully Implemented	Notes	Remove
>	Activity from Expired User Id	lentity	12						0		×
>	Brute Force Access Behavio	r Detected	Ľ						0		×
>	Create local admin accounts	using net.exe	12						0		×
>	Detect Mimikatz Via PowerS 4663	hell And EventCode	e [2						0	ø	×
	Detect New Local Admin acc	count	Z						0		×



Map Saved Searches to Splunk's Out-Of-The-Box Content 13 complete / 0 irrelevant / 43 remaining

Endpoint - Indicator of mimikatz Activity - Rule 🛽	0	Lateral Movement 🛽	Accept Recommendation Search Create New
			Not A Detection Clear ×
Identity Marker 🖸	9	Activity from Expired User Identity 🛽	Accept Recommendation Search Create New
			Not A Detection Clear ×
Network - AWS Config Violation - Rule 🛽	0	Network Protocol Violation 🛽	Accept Recommendation Search Create New
			Not A Detection Clear ×
osquery - Populate Query Status Lookup 🛂	0	Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection 🛽	Accept Recommendation Search Create New
			Not A Detection Clear ×
osquery - Populate Saved Queries 🖸	0	Osquery pack - ColdRoot detection 🖸	Accept Recommendation Search Create New
			Not A Detection Clear ×
seckit_idm_common_assets_host_expected_tracker_gen 🛽	0	Expected Host Not Reporting 🛂	Accept Recommendation Search Create New
			Not A Detection Clear ×
Threat - Many Unauthorized AWS Operations - Rule 🛽	0	Multiple Box operations 🛽	Accept Recommendation Search Create New
			Not A Detection Clear ×
Nutter Fundamention			
Button Explanation			Clos

sentials

X

Now when it is setup, let's see what we can do.



Splunk Security Essentials

lanage Bo	Content Overview								Expo	rt ⊥
lanage bou	MITRE ATT&CK Framework							_		
	Cyber Kill Chain						Correlation Sea	arch Introspection M	anage List A	dd Bookma
Bookmarked Waiting on Data					ementation es			emented Cu	Custom	
AWS Detect New Open S3 buckets Anti-Virus or Anti-Malware		Authentication • Activity from Expired User Identity • Brute Force Access Behavior Detected				dmin accounts using net. verShell Process - Encode	exe • Dete ed Even	 Windows Security Detect Mimikatz Via PowerShell And EventCode 4663 Detect New Local Admin account 		
Host With A Rec Audit Trail Detect New Ope	en S3 buckets	provide		to dynamic domain	Suspicious we IDS or IPS Vulnerability S	evtutil Usage Gcanner Detected (by targ	gets)			
		Email Monitor Email For Brand Abuse								
		Open	Bookmarked	Waiting on Data	Ready for Deployment 1	Deployment Issues 0	Needs Tuning	Successfully Implemented	Notes	Remov
i Content										
	xpired User Identity	[2	0	0	0	\bigcirc	\bigcirc	0		×
Activity from E	Expired User Identity ccess Behavior Detected	12	0	0	0	0	0	0		×
Activity from E								•		
 Activity from E: Brute Force Ac Create local ac 	ccess Behavior Detected	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	Ø	×

Each number represents a piece of content. Follow the headlines 1, 2 and 3 to find and drill down into the content.

This dashboard requires that you have gone through the Data Inventory. Click here go to Data Inventory.



1. Available Content

Click in the graphs below to filter on an area you want to highlight.

Chart View	Radar View	Sankey View	Security Journey	View		
Split by		Status		Featured	Bookmarked	Highlight Data Source
Арр	•	Any	•	Yes	Yes	None X

Click to filter



...

Edit Export -



Each number represents a piece of content. Follow the headlines 1, 2 and 3 to find and drill down into the content.

This dashboard requires that you have gone through the Data Inventory. Click here go to Data Inventory.





Edit

Export •

2.

•••

Each number represents a piece of content. Follow the headlines 1, 2 and 3 to find and drill down into the content.

This dashboard requires that you have gone through the Data Inventory. Click here go to Data Inventory. Active Available Needs data 325 10 23 **1. Available Content** Click in the graphs below to filter on an area you want to highlight. Security Journey View **Chart View** Radar View Sankey View Split by Status Highlight Data Source Featured Bookmarked Х Any Data Source • • Yes Yes None X **Click to filter** 160 Hover 140 120 001 Cases 08 C Use 60 40 Active Available 20 Needs data . is a per period and the ability Delection Malvare Analysis * comunication Jon Webrook Websenet roomsecution IDS OF IPS ANNS AntiMaware DNS Email asedIDS Assignment philip could be were a could be could be could be a could be a could be a cou OLS 6C8

Edit

Export -

C.

...

Each number represents a piece of content. Follow the headlines 1, 2 and 3 to find and drill down into the content.



C.



Each number represents a piece of content. Follow the headlines 1, 2 and 3 to find and drill down into the content.

This dashboard requires that you have gone through the Data Inventory. Click here go to Data Inventory. Active Available Needs data 325 123 **1. Available Content Data Sources with** Click in the graphs below to filter on an area you want to highlight. Radar View Security Journey View **Chart View** Sankey View untapped value Split by Highlight Data Source Status Bookmarked Featured Any Х Yes Yes Data Source • None X -**Click to filter** 160 140 120 Use Cases 00 00 00 40 Active Available 20 AZUre Spink of Heaten Date Aughting Heaten Backup 25ed IDS 105011PS ANS OLP Email 6CR are Analysis ONS web Proft web Server THYSICAl Secur VS Securi

Edit

Export •

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Data Source



Edit

Export •

.... D.

Each number represents a piece of content. Follow the headlines 1, 2 and 3 to find and drill down into the content.

This dashboard requires that you have gone through the Data Inventory. Click here go to Data Inventory. Active Available Needs data 325 23 **1. Available Content** Click in the graphs below to filter on an area you want to highlight. **Chart View** Radar View Sankey View Security Journey View Split by Highlight Data Source Status Featured Bookmarked - X Any Data Source • Yes Yes None X **Click to filter** 160 140 120 Scroll down 001 Cases 08 Cases 09 Use 40 Active Available 20 Hele And Shuth Loss And Take And Itali ANNS Web Server Data Source: Endpoint Detection and Response WS Secur Available: 135

Edit

Export •

... D.

Content selection

Status	Originating app	Use Case	Journey	Data Source	Data Source Category
Available - X	Any -	Any	Any -	Endpoint Detection X	Any
Bookmark Status	Featured	Search Filter			
Any -	Any -]		

2. Selected Content



3. View Content

Click the button below to drill down in to the content.

Drill down to content selection

Content selection

Status		Originating app	Use Case		Journey	Data Sou	rce	Data	Source Cate	egory	
Available	e 🔹 🗙	Any -	Any	•	Any	- Endpo	nt Detection	X	ıy	•	
Bookmark	Status	Featured	Search Filter								$\overline{}$
Any	•	Any -					onter	nt wi	th S	Statu	S
							Δ	vaila	ahlo		
2. Selec	ted Content						~	van		;	
Use the dro	op downs or tables to f	urther your selection.									
Selectio	on Content list	Selection by Data Source Sel	ection by Data Source Ca	tegory Selection	on by Use Case Se	lection by Journey					
										Data	Data
Journ ¢	ey Status ≑	Title 🗢	Data Source 🗢	Data Source Category \$	Use Case 🗢	App ≑	Bookmark Status ≑	Featured \$	Enabled \$	Availability	Coverage
1 Stage	_1 Available	Remote PowerShell Launches	Endpoint Detection and Response Windows Security	Process Launch Windows Security Logs	Advanced Threat Detection	Splunk Security Essentials	Not Bookmarked	No	No	Good	100 %
2 Stage	_1 Available	Disabled Update Service	Endpoint Detection and Response	Process Launch	Security Monitoring	Splunk Security Essentials	Not Bookmarked	No	No	Good	100 %
3 Stage	_2 Available	Spike in File Writes	Endpoint Detection and Response	Object Change	Security Monitoring Advanced Threat Detection	Enterprise Securi Content Update	y Not Bookmarked	No	No	Good	100 %
4 Stage	_2 Available	Investigate GDPR Breaches Using ES	Authentication Web Proxy Endpoint Detection and Response Application Data Anti-Virus or Anti-Malware Network Communication	Malware Detected Malware Definition Updates Application Logs Successful Authentication Failed	Compliance	Splunk App for Enterprise Securi	Not :y Bookmarked	Yes	No	Good	100 %

NC.

Content selection

8 Anti-Virus or Anti-Malware

Host-based IDS

10 IDS or IPS

Status	Originating app	Use Ca		Journey	Data Source	Data Source C	ategory
Available 👻	X Any	- Any	•	Any	✓ Endpoint Det	ection • X Any	-
Bookmark Status	Featured	Search	Filter				
Any	- Any	-				ontent with	Status
2. Selected Conten Use the drop downs or table Selection Content lis	es to further filter your selectio		a Source Category Set	lection by Use Case S	election by Journey	Available s Data Sou	
Click to filter							
Data Source 🗢			Total 🗢	Active 🗘	Available ≑	Needs data 🗢	Selected
1 Endpoint Detection	and Response		135	0	135	0	e
2 Windows Security			42	0	42	0	e
3 Network Communicati	ion		28	0	28	0	e
4 Web Proxy			28	0	28	0	e
5 DLP			26	0	26	0	e
6 Email			26	0	26	0	(
7 Authentication			21	0	21	0	0

-

What about MITRE ATT&CK?





325

...

123

1. Available Content

Click in the graphs below to filter on an area you want to highlight.

10

Content (Active)

Chart View	Radar V	'iew	Sankey View	Security Journey View					
Split by			Status		Featured	Bookmarked	Highlight Data Source		
Data Source	-	×	Available	- ×	Yes	Yes	None ×		

Click to filter


MITRE ATT&CK Framework

Each number represents a piece of content. Follow the headlines 1, 2 and 3 to find and drill down into the content.

For more details check the MITRE ATT&CK Navigator.



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Export •

Edit

1. Available Content

Click in the graphs below to filter on an area you want to highlight.

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix	Chart View	Radar View Sa	ankey Vie	w Security Journey View			
Color by		E ATT&CK Threat Grou		Highlight Data Source	Show Only Available Content	Show Only Popular Techniques	
Total	• No	ne	-	None ×	Yes	Yes	

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix

Initial Access \$	Execution \$	Persistence \$	Privilege Escalation 🗘	Defense Evasion 🗘	Credential Access 🗘	Discovery 🗘	Lateral Movement 🗘	Collection \$	Exfiltration \$	Command and Control \$	Impact \$
Drive-by Compromise	AppleScript	.bash_profile and .bashrc		Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	AppleScript	Audio Capture	Automated Exfiltration	Commonly Used Port	Data Destruction
Exploit Public- Facing Application	CMSTP	Accessibility Features	Accessibility Features	BITS Jobs	Bash History	Application Window Discovery	Application Deployment Software	Automated Collection	Data Compressed	Communication Through Removable Media	Data Encrypted for Impact
External Remote Services	Command-Line Interface	Account Manipulation	AppCert DLLs	Binary Padding	Scroll down	N ^{Browser Bookmark} iscovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Clipboard Data	Data Encrypted	Connection Proxy	Defacement
Hardware Additions	Compiled HTML File	AppCert DLLs	AppInit DLLs	Bypass User Account Control	Credential Dumping	Domain Trust Discovery	Exploitation of Remote Services	Data Staged	Data Transfer Size Limits	Custom Command and Control Protocol	Disk Content Wipe
Replication Through Removable Media	Control Panel Items	AppInit DLLs	Application Shimming	CMSTP	Credentials in Files	File nd Directory Disco ery	Logon Scripts	Data from Information Repositories	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Custom Cryptographic Protocol	Disk Structure Wipe
Spearphishing Attachment	Dynamic Data Exchange	Application Shimming	Bypass User Account Control	Clear Command His ry	Credential: n Registry	Netwoor Service	Pass the Hash	Data from Local System	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel	Data Encoding	Endpoint Denial of Service
Spearphishing Link	Execution through API	Authentication Package	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Code Signing	Exploitation Credential ccess	Netw Share Discovery	Pass the Ticket	Data from Network Shared Drive	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Data Obfuscation	Firmware Corruption
Choorphiching via	Execution through	DTTC Taba	Dulih Wijocking	Compile After Delivery	Earcod Authentication	Notwork Cniffing	Pomoto Dockton	Data from Pomovable	Exfiltration Over Physical	Domain Econting	Inhibit Suctom

Color by		MITRE ATT&CK T	nreat Group	Highlight Data Sourc	e	Show Only Available Co	ntent Sho	w Only Popular Tec	hniques		>.
Total	•	None	•	None ×		Yes		Yes			
✓ Total											
Active											
^{Ir} Available		Persistence ≑	Privilege Escalation \$	Defense Evasion 🗘	Credential Access 🗘	Discovery 🗢	Lateral Movement 🗢	Collection \$	Exfiltration 🗢	Command and Control \$	Impact 🗢
Needs data		.bash_profile and .bashrc Accessibility Features	Access Token Manipulation Accessibility Features	Access Token Manipulation BITS Jobs	Account Manipulation Bash History	Account Discovery Application Window	AppleScript Application	Audio Capture Automated Collection	Automated Exfiltration	Commonly Used Port Communication Through	Data Destruction Data Encrypted
Facing Application						Discovery	Deployment Software			Removable Media	for Impact
External Remote Services	Command-Line Interface	Account Manipulation	AppCert DLLs	Binary Padding	Brute Force	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Clipboard Data	Data Encrypted	Connection Proxy	Defacement
Hardware Additions	Compiled HTML File	AppCert DLLs	AppInit DLLs	Bypass User Account Control	Credential Dumping	Domain Trust Discovery	Exploitation of Remote Services	Data Staged	Data Transfer Size Limits	Custom Command and Control Protocol	Disk Content Wipe
Replication Through Removable Media	Control Panel Items	AppInit DLLs	Application Shimming	CMSTP	Credentials in Files	File and Directory Discovery	Logon Scripts	Data from Information Repositories	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Custom Cryptographic Protocol	Disk Structure Wipe
Spearphishing Attachment	Dynamic Data Exchange	Application Shimming	Bypass User Account Control	Clear Command History	Credentials in Registry	Network Service Scanning	Pass the Hash	Data from Local System	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel	Data Encoding	Endpoint Denial of Service
Spearphishing Link	Execution through API	Authentication Package	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Code Signing	Exploitation for Credential Access	Network Share Discovery	Pass the Ticket	Data from Network Shared Drive	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Data Obfuscation	Firmware Corruption
Spearphishing via Service	Execution through Module Load	BITS Jobs	Dylib Hijacking	Compile After Delivery	Forced Authenticatio	on Network Sniffing	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Domain Fronting	Inhibit System Recovery
Supply Chain Compromise	Exploitation for Client Execution	Bootkit	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Compiled HTML File	Hooking	Password Policy Discovery	Remote File Copy	Email Collection	Scheduled Transfer	Domain Generation Algorithms	Network Denial of Service
Trusted Relationship	Graphical User Interface	Browser Extensions	Extra Window Memory Injection	Component Firmware	Input Capture	Peripheral Device Discovery	Remote Services	Input Capture		Fallback Channels	Resource Hijacking
Valid Accounts	InstallUtil	Change Default File Association	File System Permissions Weakness	Component Object Model Hijacking	Input Prompt	Permission Groups Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media	Man in the Browser		Multi-Stage Channels	Runtime Data Manipulation
	LSASS Driver	Component Firmware	Hooking	Control Panel Items	Kerberoasting	Process Discovery	SSH Hijacking	Screen Capture		Multi-hop Proxy	Service Stop
	Launchctl	Component Object Model Hijacking	Image File Execution Options Injection	DCShadow	Keychain	Query Registry	Shared Webroot	Video Capture		Multiband Communication	Stored Data Manipulation
	Local Job Scheduling	Create Account	Launch Daemon	DLL Search Order Hijacking	LLMNR/NBT-NS Poison: and Relay	ng Remote System Discovery	Taint Shared Content			Multilayer Encryption	Transmitted Data Manipulation
	Mshta	DLL Search Order Hijacking	New Service	DLL Side-Loading	Network Sniffing	Security Software Discovery	Third-party Software			Port Knocking	
	PowerShell	Dylib Hijacking	Path Interception	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Password Filter DLL	System Information Discovery	Windows Admin Shares			Remote Access Tools	
	Regsvcs/Regasm	External Remote Services	Plist Modification	Disabling Security Tools	Private Keys	System Network Configuration Discovery	Windows Remote Management			Remote File Copy	
	Regsvr32	File System Permissions Weakness	Port Monitors	Execution Guardrails	Securityd Memory	System Network Connections Discovery				Standard Application Layer Protocol	
	Rundll32	Hidden Files and Directories	Process Injection	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Two-Factor Authentication Interception	System Owner/User Discovery				Standard Cryptographic Protocol	
	Scheduled Task	Hooking	SID-History Injection	Extra Window Memory Injection		System Service Discovery				Standard Non- Application Layer Protocol	
	Scripting	Hypervisor	Scheduled Task	File Deletion		System Time Discovery				Uncommonly Used Port	
	Service Execution	Image File Execution Options Injection	Service Registry Permissions Weakness	File Permissions Modification		Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion				Web Service	
	Signed Binary Proxy Execution	Kernel Modules and Extensions	Setuid and Setgid	File System Logical Offsets							
	Signed Script Proxy Execution	LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition	Startup Items	Gatekeeper Bypass							

Color by Active MITRE ATT&CK Threat Group

None

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Highlight Data Source

None ×

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Show Only Available Content

Yes

Show Only Popular Techniques

Yes

Initial Access ≑	Execution 🗢	Persistence ≑	Privilege Escalation 🗘	Defense Evasion 🗘	Credential Access \$	Discovery 🗘	Lateral Movement 🗘	Collection \$	Exfiltration \$	Command and Control \$	Impact \$
Drive-by Compromise	AppleScript	.bash_profile and .bashrc	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	AppleScript	Audio Capture	Automated Exfiltration	Commonly Used Port	Data Destruction
Exploit Public- Facing Application	CMSTP	Accessibility Features	Accessibility Features	BITS Jobs	Bash History	Application Window Discovery	Application Deployment Software	Automated Collection	Data Compressed	Communication Through Removable Media	Data Encrypted for Impact
External Remote Services	Command-Line Interface	Account Manipulation	AppCert DLLs	Binary Padding	Brute Force	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Clipboard Data	Data Encrypted	Connection Proxy	Defacement
Hardware Additions	Compiled HTML File	AppCert DLLs	AppInit DLLs	Bypass User Account Control	Credential Dumping	Domain Trust Discovery	Exploitation of Remote Services	Data Staged	Data Transfer Size Limits	Custom Command and Control Protocol	Disk Content Wipe
Replication Through Removable Media	Control Panel Items	AppInit DLLs	Application Shimming	CMSTP	Credentials in Files	File and Directory Discovery	Logon Scripts	Data from Information Repositories	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Custom Cryptographic Protocol	Disk Structure Wipe
Spearphishing Attachment	Dynamic Data Exchange	Application Shimming	Bypass User Account Control	Clear Command History	Credentials in Registry	Network Service Scanning	Pass the Hash	Data from Local System	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel	Data Encoding	Endpoint Denial of Service
Spearphishing Link	Execution through API	Authentication Package	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Code Signing	Exploitation for Credential Access	Network Share Discovery	Pass the Ticket	Data from Network Shared Drive	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Data Obfuscation	Firmware Corruption
Spearphishing via Service	Execution through Module Load	BITS Jobs	Dylib Hijacking	Compile After Delivery	Forced Authentication	Network Sniffing	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Domain Fronting	Inhibit System Recovery
Supply Chain Compromise	Exploitation for Client Execution	Bootkit	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Compiled HTML File	Hooking	Password Policy Discovery	Remote File Copy	Email Collection	Scheduled Transfer	Domain Generation Algorithms	Network Denial of Service
Trusted Relationship	Graphical User Interface	Browser Extensions	Extra Window Memory Injection	Component Firmware	Input Capture	Peripheral Device Discovery	Remote Services	Input Capture		Fallback Channels	Resource Hijacking
Valid Accounts	InstallUtil	Change Default File Association	File System Permissions Weakness	Component Object Model Hijacking	Input Prompt	Permission Groups Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media	Man in the Browser		Multi-Stage Channels	Runtime Data Manipulation
	LSASS Driver	Component Firmware	Hooking	Control Panel Items	Kerberoasting	Process Discovery	SSH Hijacking	Screen Capture		Multi-hop Proxy	Service Stop
	Launchctl	Component Object Model Hijacking	Image File Execution Options Injection	DCShadow	Keychain	Query Registry	Shared Webroot	Video Capture		Multiband Communication	Stored Data Manipulation
	Local Job Scheduling	Create Account	Launch Daemon	DLL Search Order Hijacking	LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay	Remote System Discovery	Taint Shared Content			Multilayer Encryption	Transmitted Data Manipulation
	Mshta	DLL Search Order Hijacking	New Service	DLL Side-Loading	Network Sniffing	Security Software Discovery	Third-party Software			Port Knocking	
	PowerShell	Dylib Hijacking	Path Interception	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Password Filter DLL	System Information Discovery	Windows Admin Shares			Remote Access Tools	
	Regsvcs/Regasm	External Remote Services	Plist Modification	Disabling Security Tools	Private Keys	System Network Configuration Discovery	Windows Remote Management			Remote File Copy	
	Regsvr32	File System Permissions Weakness	Port Monitors	Execution Guardrails	Securityd Memory	System Network Connections Discovery			_		
	Rundll32	Hidden Files and Directories	Process Injection	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Two-Factor Authentication Interception	System Owner/User Discovery	1	Not so	o good	cover	age
	Scheduled Task	Hooking	SID-History Injection	Extra Window Memory Injection		System Service Discovery			ctive d		
	Scripting	Hypervisor	Scheduled Task	File Deletion		System Time Discovery					
	Service Execution	Image File Execution Options Injection	Service Registry Permissions Weakness	File Permissions Modification		Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion				Web Service	
	Signed Binary Proxy Execution	Kernel Modules and Extensions	Setuid and Setgid	File System Logical Offsets							
	Signed Script Proxy	LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition	Startup Items	Gatekeeper Bypass							

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MITRE ATT&CK Threat Group

Highlight Data Source

Show Only Available Content

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Color by MITRE ATT&CK Threat Group			hreat Group	Highlight Data Source Show Only Available Content				Show Only Popular Tec	hniques	Show Only Popular Techniques					
Available	• ×	None	•	None ×		Yes		Yes							
MITRE ATT&CK	Matrix														
itial Access 🗢	Execution \$	Persistence \$	Privilege Escalation 🗘	Defense Evasion 🗘	Credential Access \$	Discovery 🗢	Lateral Movement	♦ Collection ♦	Exfiltration \$	Command and Control 🗢	Impact ≑				
ive-by Compromise	AppleScript	.bash_profile and .bashrc	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	AppleScript	Audio Capture	Automated Exfiltration	Commonly Used Port	Data Destructi				
ploit Public- cing Application	CMSTP	Accessibility Features	Accessibility Features	BITS Jobs	Bash History	Application Window Discovery	Application Deployment Softw	Automated Collection	Data Compressed	Communication Through Removable Media	Data Encrypted for Impact				
kternal Remote ervices	Command-Line Interface	Account Manipulation	AppCert DLLs	Binary Padding	Brute Force	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Clipboard Data	Data Encrypted	Connection Proxy	Defacement				
rdware Additions	Compiled HTML File	AppCert DLLs	AppInit DLLs	Bypass User Account Control	Credential Dumping	Domain Trust Discovery	Exploitation of Remote Services	Data Staged	Data Transfer Size Limits	Custom Command and Control Protocol	Disk Content W				
eplication Through emovable Media	Control Panel Items	AppInit DLLs	Application Shimming	CMSTP	Credentials in Files	File and Directory Discovery	Logon Scripts	Data from Information Repositories	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Custom Cryptographic Protocol	Disk Structure Wipe				
earphishing tachment	Dynamic Data Exchange	Application Shimming	Bypass User Account Control	Clear Command History	Credentials in Registry	Network Service Scanning	Pass the Hash	Data from Local System	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel	Data Encoding	Endpoint Denia of Service				
earphishing Link	Execution through API	Authentication Package	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Code Signing	Exploitation for Credential Access	Network Share Discovery	Pass the Ticket	Data from Network Shared Drive	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Data Obfuscation	Firmware Corruption				
earphishing via rvice	Execution through Module Load	BITS Jobs	Dylib Hijacking	Compile After Delivery	Forced Authenticatio	n Network Sniffing	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Domain Fronting	Inhibit Syste Recovery				
oply Chain npromise	Exploitation for Client Execution	Bootkit	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Compiled HTML File	Hooking	Password Policy Discovery	Remote File Copy	Email Collection	Scheduled Transfer	Domain Generation Algorithms	Network Denia Service				
usted Relationship	Graphical User Interface	Browser Extensions	Extra Window Memory Injection	Component Firmware	Input Capture	Peripheral Device Discovery	Remote Services	Input Capture		Fallback Channels	Resource Hijacking				
lid Accounts	InstallUtil	Change Default File Association	File System Permissions Weakness	Component Object Model Hijacking	Input Prompt	Permission Groups Discovery	Replication Thro Removable Media			Multi-Stage Channels	Runtime Data Manipulation				
	LSASS Driver	Component Firmware	Hooking	Control Panel Items	Kerberoasting	Process Discovery	SSH Hijacking	Screen Capture		Multi-hop Proxy	Service Stop				
	Launchctl	Component Object Model Hijacking	Image File Execution Options Injection	DCShadow	Keychain	Query Registry	Shared Webroot	Video Capture		Multiband Communication	Manipulation				
	Local Job Scheduling	Create Account	Launch Daemon	DLL Search Order Hijacking	LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoni and Relay		Taint Shared Con			Multilayer Encryption	Transmitted Da Manipulation				
	Mshta	DLL Search Order Hijacking	New Service	DLL Side-Loading	Network Sniffing	Security Software Discovery	Third-party Soft	ware		Port Knocking					
	PowerShell	Dylib Hijacking	Path Interception	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Password Filter DLL	System Information Discovery	Windows Admin Sh	ares		Remote Access Tools					
	Regsvcs/Regasm	External Remote Services	Plist Modification	Disabling Security Tools	Private Keys	System Network Configuration Discovery	Windows Remote Management			Remote File Copy					
	Regsvr32	File System Permissions Weakness	Port Monitors	Execution Guardrails	Securityd Memory	System Network Connections Discovery	1			Standard Inclination					
	Rund1132	Hidden Files and Directories	Process Injection	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Two-Factor Authentication Interception	System Owner/User Discovery		Po	tentiall	v aoo	d				
	Scheduled Task	Hooking	SID-History Injection	Extra Window Memory Injection		System Service Discovery									
	Scripting	Hypervisor	Scheduled Task	File Deletion		System Time Discovery		LUV	/erage	ayam	3 ι				
	Service Execution	Image File Execution Options Injection	Service Registry Permissions Weakness	File Permissions Modification		Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion		multin		PE Ta	otio				
	Signed Binary Proxy Execution Signed Script Proxy	Kernel Modules and Extensions LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition	Setuid and Setgid Startup Items	File System Logical Offsets Gatekeeper Bypass				munup							



MEMMES.



Color by		MITRE ATT&CK T	nreat Group	Highlight Data Sourc	e Sho	ow Only Available Co	ntent Show	w Only Popular Tec	hniques		Э.
Available	- ×	None	-	None ×		Yes		ſes			
MITRE ATT&CK	Matrix	viol	×		-						
Initial Access ≑	Execution \$	Pe Violent Mem	mes 🖕	Defense Evasion 🗢	Credential Access 🖨	Discovery \$	Lateral Movement 🗢	Collection \$	Exfiltration \$	Command and Control 🗢	Impact ≑
Drive-by Compromise	AppleScript	.bush_profile and	Access Token	Access Token	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	AppleScript	Audio Capture	Automated Exfiltration	Commonly Used Port	Data Destruction
Exploit Public- Facing Application	CMSTP	.bashrc Accessibility Features	Manipulation Accessibility Features	Manipulation BITS Jobs	Bash History	Application Window Discovery	Application Deployment Software	Automated Collection	Data Compressed	Communication Through Removable Media	Data Encrypted for Impact
External Remote Services	Command-Line Interface	Account Manipulation	AppCert DLLs	Binary Padding	Brute Force	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Clipboard Data	Data Encrypted	Connection Proxy	Defacement
Hardware Additions	Compiled HTML File	AppCert DLLs	AppInit DLLs	Bypass User Account Control	Credential Dumping	Domain Trust Discovery	Exploitation of Remote Services	Data Staged	Data Transfer Size Limits	Custom Command and Control Protocol	Disk Content Wipe
Replication Through Removable Media	Control Panel Items	AppInit DLLs	Application Shimming	CMSTP	Credentials in Files	File and Directory Discovery	Logon Scripts	Data from Information Repositories	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Custom Cryptographic Protocol	Disk Structure Wipe
Spearphishing Attachment	Dynamic Data Exchange	Application Shimming	Bypass User Account Control	Clear Command History	Credentials in Registry	Network Service Scanning	Pass the Hash	Data from Local System	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel	Data Encoding	Endpoint Denial of Service
Spearphishing Link	Execution through API	Authentication Package	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Code Signing	Exploitation for Credential Access	Network Share Discovery	Pass the Ticket	Data from Network Shared Drive	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Data Obfuscation	Firmware Corruption
Spearphishing via Service	Execution through Module Load	BITS Jobs	Dylib Hijacking	Compile After Delivery	Forced Authentication	Network Sniffing	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Domain Fronting	Inhibit System Recovery
Supply Chain Compromise	Exploitation for Client Execution	Bootkit	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Compiled HTML File	Hooking	Password Policy Discovery	Remote File Copy	Email Collection	Scheduled Transfer	Domain Generation Algorithms	Network Denial of Service
Trusted Relationship	Graphical User Interface	Browser Extensions	Extra Window Memory Injection	Component Firmware	Input Capture	Peripheral Device Discovery	Remote Services	Input Capture		Fallback Channels	Resource Hijacking
Valid Accounts	InstallUtil	Change Default File Association	File System Permissions Weakness	Component Object Model Hijacking	Input Prompt	Permission Groups Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media	Man in the Browser		Multi-Stage Channels	Runtime Data Manipulation
	LSASS Driver Launchctl	Component Firmware Component Object Model	Hooking Image File Execution	Control Panel Items DCShadow	Kerberoasting Keychain	Process Discovery	SSH Hijacking Shared Webroot	Screen Capture Video Capture		Multi-hop Proxy Multiband Communication	Service Stop Stored Data
		Hijacking	Options Injection		-	Query Registry		video capture			Manipulation
	Local Job Scheduling	Create Account	Launch Daemon	DLL Search Order Hijacking	LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay	Remote System Discovery				Multilayer Encryption	Transmitted Data Manipulation
	Mshta	DLL Search Order Hijacking	New Service	DLL Side-Loading	Network Sniffing	Security Software Discovery	Third-party Software			Port Knocking	
	PowerShell	Dylib Hijacking	Path Interception	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Password Filter DLL	System Information Discovery System Network	Windows Admin Shares			Remote Access Tools	
	Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr32	External Remote Services File System	Plist Modification Port Monitors	Disabling Security Tools Execution Guardrails	Private Keys Securityd Memory	System Network Configuration Discovery System Network	Windows Remote Management			Remote File Copy Standard Application	
	Rundl132	Permissions Weakness Hidden Files and		Exploitation for	Two-Factor	Connections Discovery System Owner/User				Layer Protocol Standard Cryptographic	
	Runu1132	Directories	Process Injection	Defense Evasion	Authentication Interception	Discovery				Protocol	
	Scheduled Task	Hooking	SID-History Injection	Extra Window Memory Injection		System Service Discovery				Standard Non- Application Layer Protocol	
	Scripting	Hypervisor	Scheduled Task	File Deletion		System Time Discovery				Uncommonly Used Port	
	Service Execution	Image File Execution Options Injection	Service Registry Permissions Weakness	File Permissions Modification		Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion				Web Service	
	Signed Binary Proxy Execution	Kernel Modules and Extensions	Setuid and Setgid	File System Logical Offsets							
		LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition	Startup Items	Gatekeeper Bypass							

Color	by
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MITRE ATT&CK Threat Group

Highlight Data Source

None \times

Show Only Available Content

Yes

Show Only Popular Techniques

Yes

Violent Memmes 👻 🗙

Available

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix

Initial Access 🗢	Execution \$	Persistence \$	Privilege Escalation 🗢	Defense Evasion 🗢	Credential Access \$	Discovery 🗢	Lateral Movement ≑	Collection \$	Exfiltration \$	Command and Control \$	Impact \$
Drive-by Compromise	AppleScript	.bash_profile and .bashrc	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	AppleScript	Audio Capture	Automated Exfiltration	Commonly Used Port	Data Destruction
Exploit Public- Facing Application	CMSTP	Accessibility Features	Accessibility Features	BITS Jobs	Bash History	Application Window	Application Deployment Software	Automated Collection	Data Compressed	Communication Through Removable Media	Data Encrypted for Impact
External Remote Services	Command-Line Interface	Account Manipulation	Techn	iques kn	own to k	be used	Distributed Component Object Model	Clipboard Data	Data Encrypted	Connection Proxy	Defacement
Hardware Additions	Compiled HTML File	AppCert DLLs	b	y Violen	t Memm	es	Exploitation of Remote Services	Data Staged	Data Transfer Size Limits	Custom Command and Control Protocol	Disk Content Wipe
Replication Through Removable Media	Control Panel Items	AppInit DLLs				Discovery	Logon Scripts	Data from Information Repositories	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Custom Cryptographic Protocol	Disk Structure Wipe
Spearphishing Attachment	Dynamic Data Exchange	Application Shiming	Bypass User Account Control	Clear Commara History	Credentials in Registry	Network Scilice Scanning	Pass the Hash	Data from Local System	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel	Data Encoding	Endpoint Denial of Service
Spearphishing Link		Authentication Package	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Code Signing	Exploitation for Credential Access	Network Share Discovery	Pass the lick	Data from Network Shared Drive	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Data Obfuscation	Firmware Corruption
Spearphishing via Service	Execution through Module Load	BITS Jobs	Dylib Hijacking	Compile After Delivery	Forced Authentication	Network Sniffing	Remote Desktop 🛛 🚪	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Domain Fronting	Inhibit System Recovery
Supply Chain Compromise	Exploitation for Client Execution	Bootkit	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Compiled HTML File	Hooking	Password Policy Discovery	Remote File Copy	Email Collection	Scheduled Transfer	Domain Generation Algorithms	Network Denial of Service
Trusted Relationship	Graphical User Interface	Browser Extensions	Extra Window Memory Injection	Component Firmware	Input Capture	Peripheral Device Discovery	Remote Services	Input Capture		Fallback Channels	Resource Hijacking
Valid Accounts	InstallUtil	Change Default File Association	File System Permissions Weakness	Component Object Model Hijacking	Input Prompt	Permission Groups Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media	Man in the Browser		Multi-Stage Channels	Runtime Data Manipulation
	LSASS Driver	Component Firmware	Hookeng	Control Panel Items	Kerberoasting	Process Discovery	SSH Hijacking	Screen Capture		Multi-hop Proxy	Service Stop
	Launchctl	Component Object Model Hijacking	Image File Execution Options Injection	DCShadow	Keychain	Query Registry	Shared Webroot	Video Capture		Multiband Communication	Stored Data Manipulation
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	Mshta	DLL Search Order Hijacking	New Service	DLL Side-Loading	Network Sniffing	Security Software Discovery	Third-party Software			Port Knocking	
	PowerShell	Dylib Hijacking	Path Interception	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Password Filter DLL	System Information Discovery	Windows Admin Shares			Remote Access Tools	
	Regsvcs/Regasm	External Remote Services	Plist Modification	Disabling Security Tools	Private Keys	System Network Configuration Discovery	Windows Remote Management			Remote File Copy	
	Regsvr32	File System Permissions Weakness	Port Monitors	Execution Guardrails	Securityd Memory	System Network Connections Discovery				Standard Application Layer Protocol	
	Rundll32	Hidden Files and Directories	Process Injection	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Two-Factor Authentication Interception	System Owner/User Discovery				Standard Cryptographic Protocol	
	Scheduled Task 🛛 🧯	Hooking	SID-History Injection	Extra Window Memory Injection		System Service Discovery				Standard Non- Application Layer Protocol	
	Scripting	Hypervisor	Scheduled Task	File Deletion		System Time Discovery				Uncommonly Used Port	
	Service Execution	Image File Execution Options Injection	Service Registry Permissions Weakness	File Permissions Modification		Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion				Web Service	
	Signed Binary Proxy Execution	Kernel Modules and Extensions	Setuid and Setgid	File System Logical Offsets							
	Signed Script Proxy Execution	LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition	Startup Items	Gatekeeper Bypass							

Color by	MITRE ATT&CK Threat Group	Highlight Data Source	Show Only Available Content	Show Only Popular Techniques	>.
Available - X	Violent Memmes - X	None ×	Yes	Yes	

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix

Initial Access ≑	Execution \$	Persistence ≑	Privilege Escalation 🗘	Defense Evasion ≑	Credential Access 🗘	Discovery 🗘	Lateral Movement 🗘	Collection \$	Exfiltration ≑	Command and Control \$	Impact ≑
rive-by Compromise	AppleScript	.bash_profile and .bashrc	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	AppleScript	Audio Capture	Automated Exfiltration	Commonly Used Port	Data Destructio
Exploit Public- Facing Application	CMSTP	Accessibility Features	Accessibility Features	BITS Jobs	Bash History	Application Window Discovery	Application Deployment Software	Automated Collection	Data Compressed	Communication Through Removable Media	Data Encrypted for Impact
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Replication Through Removable Media	Control Panel Items	AppInit DLLs	Application Shimming	CMSTP	Credentials in Files	File and Directory Discovery	Logon Scripts	Data from Information Repositories	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Custom Cryptographic Protocol	Disk Structure Wipe
Spearphishing	Dynamic Dita Exchar	cation Shimming	Bypass User Account Control	Clear Command History	Credentials in Registry	Network Service Scanning	Pass the Hash	Data from Local System	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel	Data Encoding	Endpoint Denial of Service
Spearphishing Link	xecu. through PI	Authentication Package	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Code Signing	Exploitation for Credential Access	Network Share Discovery	Pass the Ticket	Data from Network Shared Drive	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Data Obfuscation	Firmware Corruption
pearphiskîng via erviActive: 0	Execution through Module Load	BITS Jobs	Dylib Hijacking	Compile After Delivery	Forced Authentication	Network Sniffing	Remote Desktop 🛛 🟅 Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Domain Fronting	Inhibit System Recovery
Available: 6 Needs data: 6	Exploitation for Client Execution	Bootkit	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Compiled HTML File	Hooking	Password Policy Discovery	Remote File Copy	Email Collection	Scheduled Transfer	Domain Generation Algorithms	Network Denial Service
Total: 12	Graphical User Interface	Browser Extensions	Extra Window Memory Injection	Component Firmware	Input Capture	Peripheral Device Discovery	Remote Services	Input Capture		Fallback Channels	Resource Hijacking
Selected: 0 Threat Groups:	InstallUtil	Change Default File Association	File System Permissions Weakness	Component Object Model Hijacking	Input Prompt	Permission Groups Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media	Man in the Browser		Multi-Stage Channels	Runtime Data Manipulation
Violent Memmes	LSASS Driver	Component Firmware	Hooking	Control Panel Items	Kerberoasting	Process Discovery	SSH Hijacking	Screen Capture		Multi-hop Proxy	Service Stop
	Launchct1	Component Object Model Hijacking	Image File Execution Options Injection	DCShadow	Keychain	Query Registry	Shared Webroot	Video Capture		Multiband Communication	Stored Data Manipulation
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	Scheduled Task 🖀	Hooking	SID-History Injection	Extra Window Memory Injection		System Se vice Discovery				Standard Non- Application Layer Protocol	
	Scripting	Hypervisor	Scheduled Task 🖀	File Deletion		System Ti e Discovery				Uncommonly Used Port	
	Service Execution	Image File Execution Options Injection	Service Registry Permissions Weakness	File Permissions Modification		Virtuali Evasion				Web Service	
	Signed Binary Proxy Execution	Kernel Modules and Extensions	Setuid and Setgid	File System Logical Offsets			V	V			
	Signed Script Proxy Execution	LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition	Startup Items	Gatekeeper Bypass		•	•	•			

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Content selection

Status Any • Data Source Category Any	Originating app Any Bookmark Status Any	 MITRE ATT&CK Tactic Initial Access Featured Any 	X Sea	TRE ATT&CK Technique Spearphishing Link - X earch Filter	MITRE ATT&CK Threat Group Violent Memmes X	Any -
2. Selected Content Use the drop downs or tables to for Selection Content list		Selection by Data Source Category	Selection I	by MITRE ATT&CK Tactic Se	election by MITRE ATT&CK Technique	Selection by MITRE Threat Group
Total Selected	12			Selection by Status	Needs data	Available

3. View Content

Click the button below to drill down in to the content.

Drill down to content selection

Security Content

Export ↓



Alerts when a host with multiple infections is discovered.



Stage 5: Automation and Orchestration [2]

You are monitoring your SOC with Splunk.

Stage 6: Advanced Detection 12

You have the highest level of detection!



Triggered when a user visits a suspicious domain name that appears to be algorithmically generated.



Command and Control

Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA)

Bookmark selection for tracking



Don't get Tunnel Vision

Process Injection Redundant Access

Signed Binary Proxy

Regsvr32 Rundl132 Scripting

None x

-

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix

- X

None

Available

tial Access ≑	Execution \$	Persistence ≑						ction 🗢	Exfiltration \$	Command and Control \$	Impact 🗢
ive-by Compromise	Command-Line Interface	Accessibility Feat		RE ATT&C			d on	ted tion	Data Compressed	Commonly Used Port	Disk Structure Wipe
oit Public- ng Application	Compiled HTML File	Account Manipulati	Те	echnique	popu	larity		taged	Data Encrypted	Connection Proxy	
ernal Remote vices	Dynamic Data Exchange	Create Account	Control	Control	Dumping	-	Protocol	from Local System	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Custom Command and Control Protocol	
rphishing chment	Execution through API	External Remote Services	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Code Signing	Credentials in Files	Network Share Discovery	Remote File Copy	Data from Network Shared Drive	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel	Custom Cryptographic Protocol	
arphishing Link	Exploitation for Client Execution	Hidden Files and Directories	New Service	Compiled HTML File	Input Capture	Network Sniffing	Remote Services	Data from Removable Media		Data Encoding	
d Accounts	Mshta	Modify Existing Service	Process Injection	DLL Side-Loading	Network Sniffing	Peripheral Device Discovery	Windows Admin Shares	Email Collection		Remote Access Tools	
	PowerShell	New Service	Scheduled Task	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information		Permission Groups Discovery		Input Capture		Remote File Copy	
	Regsvr32	Redundant Access	Valid Accounts	Disabling Security Tools		Process Discovery		Screen Capture		Standard Application Layer Protocol	
	Rund1132	Registry Run Keys / Startup Fold	der Web Shell	File Deletion		Query Registry				Standard Cryptographic Protocol	
	Scheduled Task	Scheduled Task		Hidden Files and Directories		Remote System Discovery				Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol	
	Scripting	Shortcut Modification		Indicator Removal from Tools		Security Software Discovery					
	Service Execution	Valid Accounts		Indicator Removal on Host		System Information Discovery		Δim	for a b	oroad	
	Signed Binary Proxy Execution	Web Shell		Masquerading		System Network Configuration Discovery					
	User Execution	Windows Management Instrumentati Event Subscription	on	Modify Registry		System Network Connections Discovery		ſ	overag	Ie	
	Windows Management Instrumentation			Mshta		System Owner/User Discovery					
				Obfuscated Files or Information		System Service Discovery					
				Process Hollowing		System Time Discovery					

Yes

🗹 Yes

2.

Learn Splunk for Security





Extensive Docs

Focused To Your Needs

SSE contains Data Onboarding docs, SPL docs, Security Context, and App docs

Wherever you are in your journey, SSE will help

View SPL 亿	×
index=* sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail AllUsers = eventName=PutBucketAcl	<pre>// First we bring in AWS Cloudtrail logs, filtering for the PutBucketAcl events that occur when bucket permissions are changed, and filtering for any that include AllUsers.</pre>
spath output=userIdentityArn path=userIdentity.arn	<pre>// Next, we extract the User who made the change, via the spath search command that will traverse the JSON easily.</pre>
spath output=bucketName path="requestParameters.bucketName"	<pre>// Similarly, we extract the bucket name.</pre>
<pre> spath output=aclControlList path="requestParameters.AccessControlPolicy.AccessControlList" spath input=aclControlList output=grantee path=Grant{} mvexpand grantee spath input=grantee</pre>	<pre>// Here is where things get tricky AWS uses JSON arrays to show multiple permissions in one message. What we're doing here is extracting that block of ACLs spath will return a multi-value field to us. Then we can expand that into multiple events (so if before there were 2 events with 3 ACLs defined in each, we would end up with six events three copies of each original event, but the grantee field would be different). Finally, we can use spath to extract the values from each grantee field.</pre>
search "Grantee.URI"=*AllUsers	<pre>// Next, we can search for just those individual permissions apply to all users (unauthenticated users). While we're missing some context here about who else has permissions, we can follow-on to investigate.</pre>
table _time, Permission, Grantee.URI, bucketName, , userIdentityArn sorttime	// Last, we format the data a bit to meet our needs.



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Content Guides to Useful Docs

Whether you're new to Splunk or new to security, be guided to the right content



Learn Security

If you're new to security itself, it can be difficult to even understand the content recommendations made. This guide points you to content that has the best written explanations and documentation, targeted specifically at folks just getting started.

Launch Feature

Launch: Security Contents	Launch w/ tour	The Security Contents Page is the main landing page for Splunk Security Essentials, providing a
Page		complete list of content and the ability to drill-down into any individual item. It's the kicking off point for

Hands-On









Security Journey

DESCRIPTION

Find anomalous behavior and unknown threats by applying machine learning, data science and advanced statistics to analyze the users, endpoint devices, and applications in your environment.

MILESTONES

At this stage, you have given yourself a fighting chance to detect adversaries and insiders even when they leave only subtle traces of their activity.

- You are employing the most advanced techniques available to identify unknown threats.
- You are employing new detection mechanisms as they become available, leveraging your team's expertise and leveraging outside research organizations.

CHALLENGES

- At this stage, you will be challenged to constantly improve your security organization.
- To gain new capabilities, your team will likely be required to perform new research.
- Although you are at the top of your game, there are no guarantees and the most advanced adversaries may still successfully attack your organization.



STAGE 2

Normalization Apply a standard security taxonomy and add asset and identity data

STAGE 3

Expansion

STAGE 4

Enrichment

Collection

STAGE 1

Collect basic security logs and other machine data from your environment

SOC Automation
Advanced Threat Detection

DATA SOURCES

This stage focuses more on what you do with the data you have vs. onboarding new sources.



......

Welcome to Splunk Security Essentials! Below you will find the primary areas where Splunk users get value from this app. Within each, you **Data Onboarding** go, and what (if anything) you need to configure. The goal of this free app is to help you be more successful more quickly with Splunk for out the docs site 2 or ask for help on Splunk Answers 2. Happy Splunking! Guides Held **Find Content** Learn Learn Splunk Learn Security **Security Journey Data Onboarding Guides Data Onboarding Guides** n Splunk users that show not just how to ingest the Getting data in can be tricky, and there are lots of ways to do it. This app contains documentation created in late 2017 for several of the products most popular data, but how to configure the products to generate the right kind of data. ✓ Launch Feature Launch: Data Source Nine data source onboarding guides that are simple enough to use, but also blessed y Splunk's professional services. These will tell you not only how to Launch w/ tour **Onboarding Guides** ingest data into Splunk, but also how to configure the systems in order to send the right data in the first place!

.....

Welcome to Splunk Security Essentials! Below you will find the primary areas where Splunk users get value from this app. Within each, you will see a guide showing you where to go, and what (if anything) you need to configure. The goal of this free app is to help you be more successful more quickly with Splunk for Security. If you run into any issues, check out the docs site 🖸 or ask for help on Splunk Answers 🖾. Happy Splunking!



Demo Mode i

Learn Security

Home

Welcome to Splunk Security Essentials! Below you will find the primary areas where Splunk users get value from this app. Within each, you will see a guide showing you where to go, and what (if anything) you need to configure. The goal of this free app is to help you be more successful more quickly with Splunk for Security. If you run into any issues, check out the docs site 🛛 out the docs site 🖾 or ask for help on Splunk Answers 🖾 Happy Splunking!

Configuration



> Other Recommendations

Security Concepts Applied Through Detections

Security Content / Basic Malware Outbreak Assistant: Simple Search	Export 🔻
Description Looks for the same malware occurring on multiple systems in a short period of time.	Learn how to use this page 12 View Demo Data Live Data
Use Case Security Monitoring Category Endpoint Compromise Security Impact When the same malware occurs on multiple systems, you may be on the brink of a major incident as has been seen frequently with worms, ransomware, and broad phishing campaigns. Find out about these before they become a big deal! Alert Volume Low (?) SPL Difficulty Basic	Bookmark Status Not Bookmarked Data Availability [2] Good Journey Stage 1 [2] MITRE ATT&CK Tactics (Click for Detail) Initial Access Execution Privilege Escalation MITRE ATT&CK Techniques (Click for Detail) Drive-by Compromise Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link User Execution Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
 > Related Splunk Capabilities > Recommended Phantom Playbooks > How to Implement > Known False Positives > How To Respond > SPL Mode > Help 	





Demo Mode i

Welcome to Splunk Security Essentials! Below you will find the primary areas where Splunk users get value from this app. Within each, you will see a guide showing you where to go, and what (if anything) you need to configure. The goal of this free app is to help you be more successful more quickly with Splunk for Security. If you run into any issues, check out the docs site 12 or ask for help on Splunk Answers 12. Happy Splunking!



> Other Recommendations





Filter 🖊	Search	Learn how to use this page 🛂	Customize Filters	458 Total 10 Filtered	Clear	Default	Share
Journey All sel	Detections with	Data Sources		All 💌]		
Advance None	good SPL docs						

Stage 1: Collection 12

You have the data onboard, what do you do first?



Hosts Where Security Sources Go Quiet

A frequent concern of SOCs is that their data feeds will disappear. This search will look on a host-by-host basis for when your security sources stop reporting home.

Searches Included



A common method for Data Exfiltration is to send out many DNS or Ping requests, embedding data into the payload. This is often not logged.

Searches Included

Scroll Down



Emails with Lookalike Domains

Emailing from a main name that is similar to your own is a common phishing technique, such as splunk.com receiving an email from spiunk.com. This search will detect those similar domains.

Featured

Searches Included

Pull

Emails with User Lookalike Domains

To focus detection or response on privileged users, you must first build a list of accounts that have elevated rights or access to privileged information.

Featured

Searches Included

Find use analyze across r analyzir compar

Feature

Searche





Data Check	Status	Open in Search	Resolution (if needed)	ine-by-Line SP	
Must have Demo Lookup	Ø	Open in Search		Documentation	
Must have URL Toolbox Installed (provides Levenshtein lookalike detection and domain parsing)	0	Open in Search	The URL Toolbox app, written by Cedric Le Roux, not only similarity checking (e.g., typo detection) and Shannon entropy detection		
Enter a search					
`Load_Sample_Log_Data("Email Logs")`				All time	r Q

| stats count by Sender

rex field=Sender "\@(?<domain_detected>.*)"

| stats sum(count) as count by domain_detected

| eval domain_detected=mvfilter(domain_detected!="mycompany.com" AND domain_detected!="company.com" AND domain_detected!="mycompanylovestheenvironment.com")

| eval list="mozilla" | `ut_parse_extended(domain_detected, list)`

| foreach ut_subdomain_level* [eval orig_domain=domain_detected, domain_detected=mvappend(domain_detected, '<<FIELD>>' . "." . ut_tld)]

| fields orig_domain domain_detected ut_domain count

| eval word1=mvappend(domain_detected, ut_domain), word2 = mvappend("mycompany.com", "company.com", "mycompanylovestheenvironment.com")

| lookup ut_levenshtein_lookup word1 word2 | eval ut_levenshtein= min(ut_levenshtein)

where ut_levenshtein < 3</pre>

| fields - domain_detected ut_domain | rename orig_domain as top_level_domain_in_incoming_email word1 as domain_names_analyzed word2 as company_domains_used count as num_occurrences ut_levenshtein as Levenshtein_Similarity_Score

✓ 3 results (1/1/70 12:00:00.000 AM to 10/17/19 3:36:51.000 AM)

Job 🔻 🔲 🔮 Smart Mode 🔻

 \sim

Detect New Values Line-by-Line

Line-by-Line SPL Documentation

> Recommended Phantom Playbooks

- > How to Implement
- > Known False Positives

Data Check	Status Open Resolution (if needed)	
Must have Demo	View SPL 12	Line-by-Line SPL
	<pre>\`Load_Sample_Log_Data("Email Logs")`</pre>	Source address (t Documentation
Must have URL 1 Levenshtein look parsing)	stats count by Sender	<pre>// This is an inte per source address, so we don't end up running over the same email many times</pre>
Enter a search `Load_Sample_ stats count b	<pre> rex field=Sender "\@(?<domain_detected>.*)"</domain_detected></pre>	<pre>// Next we are going to extract the domain probably this should actually occur before the last stats, but the performance is similar and this way it matches the accelerated search where this step is required.</pre>
<pre> rex field=Ser stats sum(cou eval domain_c</pre>	stats sum(count) as count by domain_detected	<pre>// Now we aggregate per actual domain we will analyze, for performance reasons</pre>
eval domain_c eval list="mc foreach ut_su fields orig_c eval word1=mv lookup ut_lev	<pre> eval domain_detected=mvfilter(domain_detected!="mycompany.com" AND domain_detected!="company.com" AND domain_detected!="mycompanylovestheenvironment.com")</pre>	<pre>// Let's filter out any domains that our organization owns and expects to receive email from. You can have several domains here (I recommend no more than 10-20 eventually urltoolbox will get tired and stop doing adding Levenshtein fields, so you can look for null ut_levenshtein later if you are pushing this boundary).</pre>
where ut_leve fields - doma num_occurre	<pre> eval list="mozilla" `ut_parse_extended(domain_detected, list)`</pre>	<pre>// Now we use the free URL Toolbox app to parse out subdomains from the top level domains. We want to analyze each one, so that an attacker can't send mycompany.yourithelpdesk.com and get through, or mail.mycampany.com.</pre>
✓ 3 results (1/1/70 1	<pre> foreach ut_subdomain_level* [eval orig_domain=domain_detected, domain_detected=mvappend(domain_detected, '<<field>>' . "." . ut_tld)]</field></pre>	<pre>// The field we are going to pass to the Levenshtein algorithm is domain_detected, so let's add each subdomain to the multi-value field domain_detected.</pre>
> Recommer	Eiolda ania domain dotostad ut domain sount	// mbig stop is not normined but T like to filter down the list

e 🔻

> How to Implement

> Known False Positives

		0				1
ລາ	a		n	ρ	C	
u	.u	\sim	11	5	6	n

Status Open Resolution (if needed)

Must have Demo Must have URL 1 Levenshtein look parsing) Enter a search	View SPL 12 Stats count rex field=Sena Note: The sena is a series of the se	<pre>// First we start by pulling our dem source address (this could also work // This is an intensive exercise, so l urce address, so we don't end up // Next we are going to extract the domain should actually occur before the last stats, b is similar and this way it matches the accelerate this step is required.</pre>	
rex field=Ser stats sum(cou	Stats sum(count) as count by domain_detected	<pre>// Now we aggregate per actual domain we will analyze, for performance reasons</pre>	
<pre> eval domain_c eval list="mc foreach ut_su fields orig_c eval word1=mv lookup ut_lev</pre>		<pre>// Let's filter out any domains that our organization owns and expects to receive email from. You can have several domains here (I recommend no more than 10-20 eventually urltoolbox will get tired and stop doing adding Levenshtein fields, so you can look for null ut_levenshtein later if you are pushing this boundary).</pre>	
where ut_leve fields - doma num_occurre	eval list= mozilla ut parse extended(domain detected,	<pre>// Now we use the free URL Toolbox app to parse out subdomains from the top level domains. We want to analyze each one, so that an attacker can't send mycompany.yourithelpdesk.com and get through, or mail.mycampany.com.</pre>	
✓ 3 results (1/1/70 ⁻ Detect New Val	<pre> foreach ut_subdomain_level* [eval orig_domain=domain_detected, domain_detected=mvappend(domain_detected, '<<field>>' . "." . ut_tld)]</field></pre>	<pre>// The field we are going to pass to the Levenshtein algorithm is domain_detected, so let's add each subdomain to the multi-value field domain_detected.</pre>	? Smart Mode ▼
> Recommer	£is]da amis damain datastad ut damain saunt	// mbis star is not remained but T like to filter down the list	
> How to Imp	plement		

> Known False Positives

Improve Production Deployments





MITRE ATT&CK Throughout App

Utilization Made Easier



splunk> .conf19

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix

......

See what techniques you have or don't have coverage for. Drilldown to see those detections.

Annotate with threat groups that target you, or filter for techniques popular with many groups.

Considering a new data source? Highlight the techniques it supports.

Initial Access ¢	Execution ¢	Persistence ¢	Privilege Escalation \$	Defense Evasion \$	Credential Access ©	Discovery \$	Lateral Movement \$	Collection ¢	Exfiltration \$	Command and Control \$	Impact ¢
Drive-by Compromise	AppleScript	.bash_profile and .bashrc	Access Token 🆀 Manipulation	Access Token	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	AppleScript	Audio Capture	Automated Exfiltration	Commonly Used Port	Data Destru
Exploit Public- Facing Application	CMSTP	Accessibility Features	Accessibility Features	BITS Jobs	Bash History	Application Window Discovery	Application Deployment Software	Automated Collection	🛔 Data Compressed 🔰	Communication Through	Data Encryp
External Remote Services	Command-Line 🖀 Interface	Account Manipulation	AppCert DLLs	Binary Padding	Brute Force	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Clipboard Data	Data Encrypted		Defacement
Hardware Additions	Compiled HTML File	AppCert DLLs	AppInit DLLs	Bypass User Account	Credential Dumping	Domain Trust Discovery		🖀 Data Staged	當 Data Transfer Size Limits	Custom Command and Control Protocol	Disk Conter Wipe
Replication Through Removable Media	Control Panel Items	AppInit DLLs	Application Shimming	CMSTP	Credentials in Files	File and Directory and Discovery		Data from Information Repositories	<pre>Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol</pre>	Custom Cryptographic 2 Protocol	
		Application Shimming	Bypass User Account	Clear Command History	Credentials in	Network Service	Pass the Hash	a Data from Local	Exfiltration Over Command	Data Encoding	Endpoint De
Attachment Spearphishing Link	Exchange Execution through	Authentication	Control DLL Search Order	Code Signing	Registry Exploitation for	Scanning Network Share Discovery	Pass the Ticket	System Data from Network	and Control Channel Exfiltration Over Other	Data Obfuscation	of Service Firmware
	API	Package	Hijacking	code signing	Credential Access		rass the ricket	Shared Drive	Network Medium	baca obruscación	Corruption
Spearphishing via Service	Execution through Module Load	BITS Jobs	Dylib Hijacking	Compile After Delivery	Forced Authentication	Network Sniffing	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removabl Media	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Domain Fronting	Inhibit Sy: Recovery
Supply Chain Compromise	Exploitation for a Client Execution	Bootkit 1	Exploitation for a Privilege Escalation	Compiled HTML File	Hooking	Password Policy Discovery	Remote File Copy	Email Collection	Scheduled Transfer	Domain Generation	Network Der of Service
Trusted	Graphical User	Browser Extensions	Extra Window Memory	Component Firmware	Input Capture	Peripheral Device 🛛 🖀	Remote Services	Input Capture	*	Fallback Channels	Resource
Relationship Valid Accounts	Interface InstallUtil	Change Default File Association	Injection File System Permissions Weakness	Component Object Model	Input Prompt	Discovery Permission Groups Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media	8 Man in the Browser		Multi-Stage Channels	Hijacking Runtime Dat Manipulatio
	LSASS Driver	Component Firmware	Hooking	Control Panel Items	Kerberoasting		SSH Hijacking	Screen Capture	2	Multi-hop Proxy	Service Sto
	Launchetl	Component Object 1 Model Hijacking	Image File Execution Options Injection	DCShadow	Keychain	Query Registry	Shared Webroot	Video Capture		Multiband Communication	Stored Data Manipulatio
	Local Job Scheduling	Create Account	Launch Daemon	DLL Search Order Hijacking	LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay	Remote System Discovery	Taint Shared Content			Multilayer Encryption	Transmitte
	Mshta	DLL Search Order Hijacking	New Service	DLL Side-Loading		Security Software Discovery	Third-party Software			Port Knocking	
.	PowerShell 🖀	Dylib Hijacking	Path Interception	Deobfuscate/Decode	Password Filter DLL	System Information	Windows Admin Shares			Remote Access Tools	
	Regsvcs/Regasm	External Remote	Plist Modification	Disabling Security	Private Keys	System Network	Windows Remote			Remote File Copy	i
	Regsvr32	Services File System	Port Monitors	Tools Execution Guardrails	Securityd Memory	Configuration Discovery System Network	Management			Standard Application 🖀	
	Rundl132	Permissions Weakness Hidden Files and	Process Injection	Exploitation for	Two-Factor	Connections Discovery System Owner/User				Layer Protocol Standard Cryptographic	
		Directories		Defense Evasion	Authentication Interception	Discovery				Protocol	
	Scheduled Task	Hooking	SID-History Injection	Extra Window Memory Injection		System Service Discovery				Standard Non- Application Layer Protocol	
	Scripting 🖀	Hypervisor	Scheduled Task	File Deletion		System Time Discovery				Uncommonly Used Port	
.	Service Execution	Image File Execution Options Injection	Service Registry Permissions Weakness	File Permissions Modification		Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion				Web Service	
	Signed Binary Proxy	Kernel Modules and	Setuid and Setgid	File System Logical							
		Extensions LC_LOAD_DYLIB	Startup Items	Offsets Gatekeeper Bypass							
	Execution Source	Addition LSASS Driver	Sudo	Group Policy							
	Space after Filename	Launch Agent	Sudo Caching	Modification HISTCONTROL							
	Third-party	Launch Daemon	Valid Accounts	Hidden Files and	1						
	Software Trap	Launchetl	Web Shell	Directories Hidden Users							
	Trusted Developer Utilities	Local Job Scheduling		Hidden Window							


Automatic Dashboards

Alternative to Alerts

Driven by what data is in your environment, and follows all of Splunk's dashboard technical best practices

Essential Account Security		0 selected 14 available 14 to
Essential Host Security		0 selected 10 available 10 to
Essential Network Security		19 selected 25 available 25 to
Scanning		
Hosts with Apparent Scanning Activity		
Hosts with more than 500 hosts or 500 ports in a short period of time.		
Traffic		
Top Sources	Top Destinations	
Shows the most frequent sources for network traffic.	Shows the most frequent destinations for network traffic.	Network Blocks Over Time Shows the number of firewall blocks over time.
Top Dest Port		
Shows the most frequent destination ports for network traffic.		
File Uploads		
Number of File Uploads		
Shows the number of file uploads across the environment in the selected time period.		
Domains		
		Cancel Create Dashboa
		Calcel



Monitor Data Ingest

Understand Lag, and Impacted Detections

Powered by Splunk's Machine Learning Toolkit

Tenable	Vulnerability Scanner	index=main sourcetype=tenable:sc:vuln and events=744	The latency observed is outside normal ranges	56	0
Linux	Updates	index=main sourcetype=Unix:Update and events=35	We don't have an established baseline for this product	2560	0
Microsoft	Update Log	index=main sourcetype=WindowsUpdateLog and events=70355	We don't have an established baseline for this product	2	0
Microsoft	Windows Application Log	index=main sourcetype=WMI:WinEventLog:Application and events=14789 index=main sourcetype=WinEventLog and events=539920 index=main sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog and events=113850	We don't have an established baseline for this product	4 11	0
Microsoft	Windows System Log	index=main sourcetype=WMI:WinEventLog:System and events=29583	We don't have an established baseline for this product	15	0
Unknown	NEEDSREVIEW_main_netflow_	index=main sourcetype=netflow and events=5455	We don't have an established baseline for this product	82	3
Unknown	NEEDSREVIEW_main_openPorts_	index=main sourcetype=openPorts and events=1494	We don't have an established baseline for this product	6	1
Nessus	Vulnerability Scanner	index=main sourcetype=nessus and events=22580	We don't have an established baseline for this product	55	0
Blue Coat	ProxyAV	index=main sourcetype=bluecoat:proxysg:access:file and events=1392	No issues.	427	2
Bro	Conn	index=main sourcetype=bro_conn and events=13244	No issues.	16	3
Bro	DHCP	index=main sourcetype=bro_dhcp and events=24830	No issues.	59	0
Bro	DNS	index=main sourcetype=bro_dns and events=5266	No issues.	66	0
Bro	FTP	index=main sourcetype=bro_ftp and events=1220	No issues.	182	0
Bro	нтр	index=main sourcetype=bro_http and events=5266	No issues.	51	2



Track CIM Compliance

Ensure Data Formatting

SSE will analyze the most important CIM fields and evaluate whether your data matches.

i	vendorName	productName	Data Source Category \$	# Compliant Fields for Product ≑	Field Analyzed	% Compliant \$	# Failed \$	# Successful ≎	Regex Used ≑
>	Microsoft	Windows Host and Server	Failed Authentication	1	app dest src src_user user	69.90 100.00 38.07 54.65 40.84	2092 0 2443 2880 4768	4858 703 1502 3471 3292	<pre>^[\w:\-]+\$ ^[\w\]+\$ ^[\w\]+\$ ^[\w\]+\$ ^[\w\/\\-\.\$]{1,20}\$ ^[\w\/\\\-\.\$]{1,20}\$</pre>
>	Check Point	Network Anti-Virus	Malware Detected	0	dest signature src vendor_product	50.00 52.29 50.00 66.62	50 1774 50 2660	50 1944 50 5310	^[\w\]+\$ ^.{3,80}\$ ^[\w\]+\$ ^[\w\s\-:]+\$
>	Check Point	Threat Emulation	Malware Detected	1	dest signature src vendor_product	50.00 50.09 50.00 100.00	50 795 50 0	50 798 50 3186	^[\w\]+\$ ^.{3,80}\$ ^[\w\]+\$ ^[\w\s\-:]+\$
>	Blue Coat	ProxyAV	Proxy Requests	1	dest_ip http_method src status url	67.10 63.36 100.00 21.09	0 3290 3299 0 1770	0 6710 5706 10000 473	<pre>^\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\$ ^(?;GET POST HEAD PUT DELETE OPTIONS TRACE CONNEC ^[\w\]+\$ ^(?:https? ftp):\/{2}.+</pre>
>	Microsoft	Windows Process Launch	Process Launch	0	user	40.84	4768	3292	^[\w\/\\\-\.\$]{1,20}\$
>	AWS	VPC Flow Logs	Basic Traffic Logs	0	bytes dest dest_ip dest_port src src_ip src_port	50.00 50.00 50.24 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.23	209 50 105 50 50 109	209 50 106 50 50 110	<pre>^\d+\$ ^[\w\]+\$ ^\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\$ ^\d{1,5}\$ ^[\w\]+\$ ^\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\$ ^\d{1,3}\$ ^\d{1,3}\$</pre>
>	Check Point	URL	Basic Traffic	3	bytes	50.24	205	207	^\d+\$



Hands-On









- Security Detection Basics
- Advanced Detection Content
- Prescriptive Content Recommendations
- Risk-Based Alerting Content

Learn

- Learn Splunk
- Learn Security
- Security Journey
- Data Onboarding Guides



- Operationalize MITRE ATT&CK
- Monitor Data Ingest
- Automatically Generate Dashboards
- Deploy Content to your Environment
- Analyze CIM Compliance

Measure

- Justify New Data Sources via MITRE ATT&CK
- Document Your Deployed
 Content



Vegetables first! Make sure your data is in good shape...





Model Health Warning

status 🗢

There are 34 products with fewer than thirty data points: AWS CloudTrail, AWS CloudWatch, AWS VPC Flow Logs, Azure Active Directory, Microsoft Office 365, Microsoft Sysmon, Microsoft Update Log, Microsoft Windows Application Log, Microsoft Windows Domain Controller, Microsoft Windows Host and Server, Microsoft Windows Powershell, Microsoft Windows Process Launch, Microsoft Windows System Log, Splunk ES Risk Framework, Stream ARP, Stream DNS, Stream HTTP, Stream ICMP, Stream LDAP, Stream TCP, Stream UDP, Unknown

Data Latency by Product

This dashboard pulls a dataset from the configuration in the Data Inventory dashboard. A nightly search will run and over the past thirty days to determine how much latency is expected from each configured product. That data is pushed into a Machine Learning model and statistics are recorded. This dashboard then grabs data from the past four hours, calculates the current data lag, and feeds that through the ML model to determine if it is normal or not.

A

Vendor \$	Product 🗢	Index/Sourcetypes and Events \$	Summary 🗢	Minimum Lag Seen Per Product ¢	Maximum Lag Seen Per Product (if different) ≑	Number of Enabled Detections
AWS	CloudTrail	index=main sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail and events=23715	The latency observed is outside normal ranges	6467237		1
AWS	CloudWatch	index=main sourcetype=aws:cloudwatch and events=9938	The latency observed is outside normal ranges	6469299		0
AWS	VPC Flow Logs	index=main sourcetype=aws:cloudwatchlogs:vpcflow and events=142	The latency observed is outside normal ranges	6467312		0
Azure	Active Directory	index=main sourcetype=ms:aad:signin and events=537	The latency observed is outside normal ranges	6467649		3



status 🗢

There are 34 products with fewer than thirty data points: AWS CloudTrail, AWS CloudWatch, AWS VPC Flow Logs, Azure Active Directory, Microsoft Office 365, Microsoft Sysmon, Microsoft Update Log, Microsoft Windows Application Log, Microsoft Windows Domain Controller, Microsoft Windows Host and Server, Microsoft Windows Powershell, Microsoft Windows Process Launch, Microsoft Windows System Log, Splunk ES Risk Framework, Stream ARP, Stream DNS, Stream HTTP, Stream ICMP, Stream LDAP, Stream TCP, Stream UDP, Unknown

Data Latency by Product

This dashboard pulls a dataset from the configuration in the Data Inventory dashboard. A nightly search will run and over the past thirty days to determine how much latency is expected from each configured product. That data is pushed into a Machine Learning model and statistics are recorded. This dashboard then grabs data from the past four hours, calculates the current data lag, and feeds that through the ML model to determine if it is normal or not.

						4
Vendor 🗢	Product \$	Index/Sourcetypes a d Events \$	Summary \$	Minimum Lag Seen Per Product \$	Maximum Lag Seen Per Product (if different) ≑	Number of Enabled Detections
AWS	CloudTrail	index=main sourcet pe=aws:cloudtrail and events=23715	The latency observed is outside normal ranges	6467237		1
AWS	CloudWatch	index=main source pe=aws:cloudwatch and events=9938	The latency observed is outside normal ranges	6469299		Ø
AWS	VPC Flow Logs	index=main sourcetype=aws:clcudwatchlogs:vpcflow and	The latency observed is outside normal	6467312		0
Azure	Active Directory	index=main sourcetype=ms:aad:signin and events=537	The latency observed is outside normal ranges	6467649		3



Δ

splunk >ent	erprise App: Splunk Security	Essentials 🔻	Administrato	r 🝷 160 Messages 💌 Settir	nas 🔻 Activity 💌 Help 💌 🗌	Find Q
Home S	ecurity Content - Analytics A	Detail		Data A	vailabili	ty 🛛
Data Av	ailability	The latency observed is outside normal rar	nges			
Model Hea	alth Warning	Field	Value			
status 🗢		Vendor Name	AWS			
	34 products with fewer than th	Product Name	CloudTrail		Microsoft Sysmon, Microsof	
	Windows Application Log, Micro , Splunk ES Risk Framework, St	The Searches That Are Dependent	ESCU - Detect New Ope	n S3 buckets - Rule	Process Launch, Microsoft	Windows
Data Lator	ncy by Product					
		# of Detections Dependent	1		_	
	eard pulls a dataset from the config ed into a Machine Learning model	App-Internal productId	AWSCloudTrail		pected from each configured t through the ML model to det	
normal or no		The Minimum Lag Time	74d 20:32:32			
		The Lag Time for the Slowest Sourcetype+Index	6467552			
		What Index + Sourcetypes Seen	index=main sourcetype=aws	cloudtrail nd events=23715		
		Baseline: Average Lage Seen	00:09:43		imum Seen Maximum Lag	Number of Enabled
		Baseline: Lag when Baseline Captured	74d 23:02:16		Product Seen Per Product	Detections
Vendor 🗢	Product \$	Baseline: # of Data Samples		letection is i	mpactedl	•
AWS	CloudTrail	Baseline: Earliest Time	8/2/2019 2:35:00 AM (Your E	Browser's timezone)		1
		Baseline: Latest Time Seen	8/2/2019 10:20:00 PM (Your	Browser's timezone)		
AWS	CloudWatch	Basline: When Captured	10/16/2019 9:22:16 PM (Your	Browser's timezone)	469614	0
AWS	VPC Flow Logs			Close	467627	0
Azure	Active Directory	index=mai events=53	in sourcetype=ms:aad:signin and 37	The latency observed is outside normal ranges	6467964	3







Introduction

Welcome to the Common Information Model Compliance Check dashboard. This dashboard builds on top of the Data Inventory introspection to snow you what here are china compliance and compliance the second processing of the Data Inventory introspection to snow you what here are china compliance and the second processing of the Data Inventory introspection to snow you what here are china compliance and the second processing of the Data Inventory introspection to snow you what here are china compliance and the second processing of the Data Inventory introspection to snow you what here are china compliance and the second processing of the Data Inventory introspection to snow you what here are china compliance and the second processing of the Data Inventory introspection to snow you what here are china compliance and the second processing of the Data Inventory introspection to snow you what here are china compliance are china compliance and the second processing of the Data Inventory introspection to snow you what here are china compliance and the second processing of the Data Inventory introspection to snow you what here are china compliance are china compliance and the second processing of the Data Inventory introspection to snow you what here are china compliance are china compliance and the second processing of the Data Inventory introspection to snow you what here are china compliance are china compliance are china compliance. and tells you how those products are doing. CIM compliance is performed by checking common field values against a regular expression, also shown. Important note: this looks for the most common CIM fields used for most security content, but doesn't check all CIM fields.

If you're new to Splunk's Common Information Model, consider reading Splunk Docs 12. If you would like to go deeper into assessing the CIM compliance of your data, we highly recommend SA-cim_validator 12 -- this functionality is a simplified version of what Splunk's Vladimir Skoryk has built there.

Produ	ucts						_		
i	vendorName \$	productName ≑	Data Source Category 🗢	# Compliant Fields for Product ≎	Field Analyzed	% Compliant ¢	# Failed €	# Successful €	Regex Used 🗢
>	Microsoft	Office 365	Outgoing Messages	3	dest message_id recipient src src_user subject	59.13 100.00 100.00 61.54 0.00 100.00	85 0 80 208 0	123 208 208 128 0 208	^[\w\]+\$ ^[\w\]+\$ ^[\w\/\\\-\.\$]{1,20}\$
>	Stream	DNS	DNS Queries	5	<pre>dest_port message_type query query_count query_type src transaction_id transport</pre>	64.85 100.00 100.00 100.00 52.81 100.00 100.00	3267 0 0 0 4534 0 0	6027 17316 17324 0 314 5074 627 9294	^\d{1,5}\$ ^[\w\]+\$ ^[a-z0-9]+\$
>	Azure	Active Directory	Successful Authentication	0	app src user	1.68 56.98 0.00	528 231 537	9 306 0	^[\w:\-]+\$ ^[\w\]+\$ ^[\w\/\\\-\.\$]{1,20}\$

Prod	ucts						
i			Data Source Category 🗢 Outgoing Messages	# Compliant Fields for Product \$ 3	Field Analyzed dest message_id recipient	% Compliant € 59.13 100.00 100.00	CIM Compliance Check
T					src src_user subject	61.54 0.00 100.00	80 128 208 0 0 208
	field 🗢	count 🗢 distinct	:_count ≑ values ≑	7			
	dest	208	4 [{"value":"nul	l","count":122}, {"vai	lue":"18.224.52.12	6","count":84},	{"value":"34.217.56.192","count":1}, {"value":"74.6.137.64","count":1}]
	message_id	208	<pre><cy4pr17mb1206 <sn6pr17mb2061 <2019080100222 <by5pr17mb3368 <cy4pr17mb1206 a7b2-c7e3f9090 2.amazonses.co {"value":"<0ca JVKUGUBNKBZG6Z <1143724797.89 <1397551089.12 04193861f893@g {"value":"<201 {"value":"<201 {"value":"<201 {"value":"<201 {"value":"<201 {"value":"<201 {"value":"<201 {"value":"<201 {"value":"<201 {"value":"<201 {"value":"<201 {"value":"<201 {"value":"<201 {"value":"<201 {"value":"<201 {"value":"<201 {"value":"<201 {"value":"<204 {"value":"<206 891750f374d4@S 6b076d91c79a@w</cy4pr17mb1206 </by5pr17mb3368 </sn6pr17mb2061 </cy4pr17mb1206 </pre>	84388A62BD6EFCCB6D98B F1AC442084A4C7233271B(8.895A44212A@mx2.caza(019555F689B9A7E5F04DD 7D092679F0CE9AFDAB99B 7c0-000000@email.amaz(m>","count":2}, {"val(0a3f0bbef4b6bb82109bf) BNIJHDE7CPGM3DKQLENVU(3866.1564658937211.Jav 92658.1564698044664.Jav mail.com>","count":2} 906241452.x50Eqksu0166 90801002155.3525D4016/ 1.A5B654370F@mx2.caza(0.32CCD45190@mx2.caza(90801063445.ED37134C64 90801072037.9E15D35118 8122113.97343635.15646 N1NAM02FT062.eop-nam02 ww.fastmail.com>","cou	FDF0@CY4PR17MB1206 CDF0@SN6PR17MB2061 doresseguridad.com 3DF0@BY5PR17MB3368 FDF0@CY4PR17MB1206 onses.com>","count ue":"<0101016c4a51 f3d33c32- W4UDP0J2GC3D4J4ZTM vaMail.app@ltx1-ap avaMail.app@ltx1-ap avaMail.app@ltx1-a , {"value":"<20179 648@znet.kiev.ua>" A@mx2.cazadoresseg doresseguridad.com doresseguridad.com doresseguridad.com doresseguridad.com doresseguridad.com doresseguridad.com doresseguridad.com doresseguridad.com doresseguridad.com doresseguridad.com doresseguridad.com doresseguridad.com doresseguridad.com doresseguridad.com doresseguridad.com doresseguridad.com doresseguridad.com doresseguridad.com doresseguridad.com	.namprd17.prod. .namprd17.prod. .ar>","count":3] .namprd17.prod. .namprd17.prod. ":2}, {"value": 36d4-e6a0d277-71 NKBMRWWS3SHMVXGF p9401.prod.link p97686.prod.link 97986.99701128. ,"count":2}, {"v uridad.com.ar>" .ar>","count":2] .ar>","count":2] .id>",count":2] .id>",count":2] .id>	<pre>butlook.com>","count":3}, {"value":" butlook.com>","count":3}, {"value":" outlook.com>","count":3}, {"value":"<0100016c4a50ef52-3cbc33e3-42ac-4be6- "<0101016c4a501804-8a9c2f52-0280-43b5-8f48-adf60ad0b0db-000000@us-west- f42-458e-8c96-51c4a725e794-000000@us-west-2.amazonses.com>","count":2}, <pre></pre></pre>

Products % **CIM Compliance** vendorName # Compliant Fields Field Analyzed Compliant Data Source Category \$ productName \$ for Product \$ Check Office 365 Outgoing Messages $\mathbf{\vee}$ Microsoft 3 dest 59.13 message_id 100.00 recipient 100.00 src IZδ src u Are You field 🖨 distinct_count \$ values 🖨 count ≑ ":1}, {"value":"74. [{"value":"null","count":122}, dest 208 4 **Kidding Me??** ":10}, {"value":" message_id 208 [{"value":"<BY5PR17MB336878F267 98 <CY4PR17MB120684388A62BD6EFCCB6D98 <SN6PR17MB2061F1AC442084A4C7233271BCDF0 <20190801002228.895A44212A@mx2.cazadoresseguriu <BY5PR17MB3368019555F689B9A7E5F04DDBDF0@BY5PR17MB3368.namprd17.prod.outlook.com>","count":3}, {"value":" <CY4PR17MB12067D092679F0CE9AFDAB99BFDF0@CY4PR17MB1206.namprd17.prod.outlook.com>","count":3}, {"value":"<0100016c4a50ef52-3 a7b2-c7e3f90907c0-000000@email.amazonses.com>","count":2}, {"value":"<0101016c4a501804-8a9c2f52-0280-43b5-8f48-adf60ad0b0dt 2.amazonses.com>","count":2}, {"value":"<0101016c4a5136d4-e6a0d277-7f42-458e-8c96-51c4a725e794-000000@us-west-2.amazonses. { "value": "<0ca0a3f0bbef4b6bb82109bff3d33c32-JVKUGUBNKBZG6ZBNIJHDE7CPGM3DKQLENVUW4UDP0J2GC3D4J4ZTMNKBMRWWS3SHMVXGK4TJMN6FG3LUOA=====@microsoft.com>","count":2}, {"va <1143724797.893866.1564658937211.JavaMail.app@ltx1-app9401.prod.linkedin.com>","count":2}, {"value":" <1397551089.1292658.1564698044664.JavaMail.app@ltx1-app7686.prod.linkedin.com>","count":2}, {"value":"<1b135cbf-54cd-7c 04193861f893@gmail.com>","count":2}, {"value":"<2017997986.99701128.1564671771944.JavaMail.rock_man@push-dispatcher34 {"value":"<201906241452.x50Eqksu016648@znet.kiev.ua>","count":2}, {"value":"<20190731122854.03 1261BBF@mail.telkomc {"value":"<20190801002155.3525D4016A@mx2.cazadoresseguridad.com.ar>","count":2}, {"value":" <20190801002311.A5B654370F@mx2.cazadoresseguridad.com.ar>","count":2}, {"value":" <20190801002315.171AD450EC@mx2.cazadoresseguridad.com.ar>","count":2}, {"value":" 201008010 <20190801002350.32CCD45190@mx2.cazadoresseguridad.com.ar>","count":2}, {"value": {"value":"<20190801063445.ED37134C646@mymail.ipnet.co.id>","count":2}, {"value" {"value":"<20190801072037.9E15D351181@mymail.ipnet.co.id>","count":2}, {"value" {"value":"<2068122113.97343635.1564660805421.JavaMail.rocketman@push-dispatched

> 891750f374d4@SN1NAM02FT062.eop-nam02.prod.protection.outlook.com>","count":2}, 6b076d91c79a@www.fastmail.com>","count":2}, {"value":"<566935865.1063547.1564667069582.Java app6466.prod.linkedin.com>","count":2}, {"value":"<593627679.105573941.1564664720879.JavaMail.r

Sigh. Okay...



MITRE ATT&CK Throughout App

Utilization Made Easier



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splunk> .conf19

Operationalize MITRE ATT&CK

•	are orienting your security enviro	onment, you're in luc	Analyze ES Risk	
\sim	Setup Steps Completion of	of these steps is req	uired to get the value for this area.	-
•	Configure enabled sources.	Launch w/ tour	In the app configuration, you can include / exclude different sources of co seeing the free content from Splunk Security Essentials. Most users will le	Attributions
•	Configure on the Data Inventory page. 12	Launch w/ tour	Data Source Categories use standardized searches to find data configured also add custom products that either don't match the Common Information	with the tags that are used in Splunk's Common Information Model. You can Model, or mark that you have products you expect to add in the future.
~	Configure on the Manage Bookmarks page. 🛽	Launch w/ tour	Tracking what content you have active is key to so much Splunk Security E right content, integrations with Splunk Enterprise Security, Risk-based Alert bookmarking (set status Implemented), but it's often easier to configure via	
	Configure ES Integration.	Launch w/ tour	Assuming that you have ES in your environment, Splunk Security Essentials dashboard, along with raw searches of index=risk or index=notable. Just co	

Launch Features

Launch: Analytics Advisor MITRE ATT&CK Framework	Launch w/ tour	The Analytics Advisor dashboards are designed to help you understand what content you might want to deploy inside of Splunk based on the content you already have and the data that's present in your environment. The MITRE ATT&CK Overview dashboard even includes a customized MITRE ATT&CK Matrix that shows your level of coverage on MITRE ATT&CK while letting you filter for the data you have in the environment, or the threat groups that target you.
Launch: Analyze ES Risk Attributions	unch w/ tour	Risk-based Alerting is all oriented towards aggregating risky events. This dashboard looks at the content in the ES Risk Framework with out-of-the-box Bick aggregations. It also includes a customized MITRE ATT&CK Matrix based on your search filters, letting you see what techniques have been seen against a particular user, host, or network.
Launch: MITRE ATT&CK- based Content Recommendations	Launch w/ tour	With an understanding of what data you have, you can specify the types of security concerns you're facing and then use MITRE ATT&CK to filter for the Splunk content related to MITRE Techniques that are associated with many different threat groups.
Launch: Advanced Content		Splunk Security Essentials has a wealth of advanced security content and a list of all of Splunk's Security Content, complete with a mapping to popular frameworks like MITRE ATT&CK and the Kill Chain. Explore all of our content.
	MITRE ATT&CK Framework Launch: Analyze ES Risk Attributions Launch: MITRE ATT&CK- based Content Recommendations	MITRE ATT&CK Framework Launch: Analyze ES Risk Attributions Launch: MITRE ATT&CK- based Content Recommendations





MITRE ATT&CK Matrix

Initial Access \$	Execution \$	Persistence	Privilege Escalation 🗢	Defense Evasion \$	Credential Access ≑	Discovery \$	Lateral Movement \$	Collection \$	Exfiltration \$	Command and Control \$	Impact ¢	
Valid Accounts	Command-Line Interface	New Service	New Service	Scripting	Credential Dumping	Network Service Scanning			Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel	Commonly Used Port		
	Scripting	Valid Accounts	Valid Accounts	Indicator Removal on Host	Brute Force							
	PowerShell			Valid Accounts								
	User Execution											
Count of Risk Object Attributions by MITRE ATT&CK Tactic							Count of Risk Object Attributions by MITRE ATT&CK Technique					
400							400					





MITRE ATT	MITRE ATT&CK Matrix										
Initial Access ≑	Execution \$	Persistence	Privilege Escalation 🗢	Defense Evasion \$	Credential Access 🗢	Discovery \$	Lateral Movement 🗢	Collection	Exfiltration \$	Command and Control ≎	Impact \$
Valid Accounts	Command-Line Interface	New Service	New Service	Scripting	Credential Dumping	Network Service Scanning			Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel	Commonly Used Port	
	Scripting	Valid Accounts	Valid Accounts	Indicator Removal on Host	Brute Force						
	PowerShell			Valid Accounts							
	User Execution										

Aggregate Risk Attribution Scores by Analytic		Aggregate Risk Attribution Scores by Risk Object								
		Score	ATT&CK	risk_object 🗢	sparkline 🗢	Score \$	A Scroll Down			
Analyze ES R	ISK	÷	Tactics 🗢	agrady-l	Λ	4180				
		3840		agrady	Λ	4072				
Attribution	S	3168		FYODOR-L.froth.ly	Λ	1040	Credential Ac ess Defense Evasin Execution Persistence			
Threat – RR – Suspicious activity or known framework detected – Combined – Rule	Λ	3024		BudStoll	Λ	898				
Threat - RR - Suspisious Process or DLL detected -	Λ	1760		bstoll-l	Λ	848				
Combined - Rule				JeremiahWortoski	Λ	784				
ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule	Λ	960	Execution	jwortoski-l	Λ	784				
Threat – RR – Suspicious service or registry change	Λ	576		136.0.0.125		400				
detected - Combined - Rule				FyodorMalteskesko	Λ	364				
Threat - Threat List Activity - Rule	/\/	560		fmaltekesko-l	Λ	364				
ESCU – Create local admin accounts using net.exe – Rule	ΛΛ	520	Execution Persistence	A variety of						
Access - Brute Force Access Behavior Detected - Rule	M/	480	Credential Access	aggregation methods						
Threat - UEBA Threat Detected - Rule	Λ	480		age	gregatio	n me	etnoas			

Watch-listed Objects with Risk Attributions

	count	Score	Manager						Techniques
Fullname ≑	\$	\$	\$	Identities 🗢	Roles 🖨	BU ≑	Analytics 🗢	Tactics 🖨	\$
Bud Stoll	26	1826	fyodor	AzureAD\BudStoll BudStoll bstoll bstoll@froth.ly	americas privileged technical watchlist	americas	ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command - Rule Endpoint - Code42 Rule Match - Rule Threat - RR - Command and Control Activity Detected - Combined - Rule	Execution	PowerShell Scripting
							Threat - RR - Malware detected by Windows Defender -		

Combined – Rule



Count of Risk Object Attributions by MITRE ATT&CK Tactic

Analyze E	S Risk Attribut	ions								Edit Expor	t 🕶 🗌
Search Critera agrady Focused to: System-wide Me agrady # of Detections agrady		ters &CK	Ν	1ITRE ATT&CK Tacti 01. Initial Access			S Ris ions	S Risk ons			
1						Ο	5		1	0	
	5	14		10		05. Defense Evasion	06. Credential A	ccess	07. Discovery	08. Lateral Mo	ovement
% of MITRE AT Techniques	T&CK Averago Score	e Risk Object	# Risk Ob	ojects		0	0		Ο	0	
		ЛО		45		09. Collection	10. Command and	Cont	11. Exfiltration	12. Impa	act
		40				•	0		0	0	
MITRE ATT&C	C Matrix			Focu	ised	MITF	RE AT	Т&(Matrix	
Initial Access	Execution \$	Persistence	Privilege Escalation \$	Defense Evasion 🗢	Credential Access \$	Discovery \$	Lateral Movement \$	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control ≎	Impact \$
	Command-Line Interface			Scripting							
	Scripting										
	PowerShell										

MITRE ATT&CK Throughout App

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Push MITRE Techniques and Tactics into ES

	Limpoint	ouopicious notuui osuge						
✓ 8/2/19 12:00:00.000 PM	Endpoint	PowerShell process with an enco	oded con	nmand detected or	n BSTOLL	-L 🕒 Lo	w	
Description:				Related Investig	ations:			
The system BSTOLL-L executed a PowerS	Shell process that has a	an encoded command on the commar	nd-line	Currently not inv	estigated.			
Additional Fields	Value		Action	Correlation Sea	rch:			
MITRE ATT&CK Description	Command an	nd control (C2) information is	•	ESCU - Malicious PowerShell Process - Encoded Command				
		ng a standard data encoding system.		History:				
		encoding may be to adhere to ocol specifications and includes use		View all review activity for this Notable Event				
		code, Base64, MIME, UTF-8, or other		Contributing Events:				
	,	t and character encoding systems. ncoding systems may also result in		Show All Encoded PowerShell Events on BSTOLL-L				
	data compres	ssion, such as gzip. / PowerShell is a ractive command-line interface and		Adaptive Responses: C				
	1 5	scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions,			Mode	Time	Us	
					adhoc	2019-10-02T20:22:50+0000) a	
	•	covery of information and execution nples include the Start-Process		Risk Analysis	adhoc	2019-10-02T20:22:50+0000) a	
		can be used to run an executable		View Adaptive Response Invocations				
		ke-Command cmdlet which runs a cally or on a remote computer.		Next Steps:				
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic	Command an	nd Control / Execution	•	Recommended following steps:				
MITRE ATT&CK Technique	Data Encodin	ng / PowerShell	•					
Category	Endpoint Cor	npromise	•	1. ESCU-Contextualize: Based on ESCU context gathering re-				
Destination	BSTOLL-L		•			on Logs For Endpoint		
Destination Business Unit	Frothly		•	- ESCU - Get No		,		



MITRE ATT&CK Throughout App

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splunk> .conf19

Okay, that's a lot of MITRE ATT&CK...



... but can you deploy a real detection?









Stage 1: Collection 12

You have the data onboard, what do you do first?



Stage 1: Collection

You have the data onboard, what do you do first?




Accelerated Data

Phases

ces

r Anti-Malware

Multiple Infections on Host (Accelerated Data)

Data Check	Status	Open in Search	Resolution (if needed)			Schedule in ES
Must have accelerated data in your Malware Data Model	0	Open in Search	Add data to the Malware Data M and then accelerate that data m	Model using the Technology Add-on for your anti-malware product (look on Splunkbase) nodel.		
Enter a search						
<pre> tstats summariesonly=t allow_old_summar) as action from datamodel=Malware by rename Malware_Attacks.* as * transaction maxpause=1h dest where eventcount >=3 AND duration>240</pre>				gnature values(Malware_Attacks.category) as category values(Malv.re_Attacks.a	ction ~	All time 🕶 📿
✓ 21 events (1/1/70 12:00:00.000 AM to 10/17/19 0	6:05:40.00	0 AM)		Job ▼ II	1	🌻 Smart Mode ▼
Detect New Values	cumentatio	n		Schedule in ES		
> Recommended Phantom Playbook	s					
> How to Implement						
> Known False Positives						
> How To Respond						
> SPL Mode						

		Kill Chain Phases 🛽	_	
	Schedule an alert		×	
	Alert me when the number of outliers is greater than 0			
		Cancel	lext	
Data Check	Search			Schedule in ES
Must have accelerated data in your Malware Data Model	Open inAdd data to the Malware Data ModeSearchand then accelerate that data model	using the Technology Add-on for your anti-malware	oduct (look on Splunkbase)	
Enter a search				
	aries=t count values(Malware_Attacks.signature) as signatu by _time span=1m Malware_Attacks.dest	re values(Malware_Attacks.category) as cate	values(Malware_Attacks.action	All time 🔻 🔍
where eventcount >=3 AND duration>240			~	
✓ 21 events (1/1/70 12:00:00.000 AM to 10/17/19	9 6:05:40.000 AM)		Job 🔻 🔢 🔳	🕈 Smart Mode 🔻

Multiple Infections on Host Accelerated Data (Schedule in ES)

		Kill Chain	Phases 🛽	
	Save As Alert			×
	Settings			Vour Nomo
Data Check Must have accelerated data in your Malware	Search	I tstats summariesonly=t allow_old_summaries=t count values(Malware_Attacks.signature) as signature values(Malware_Attacks.category) as		Your Name I Duplicates)
Data Model	Title	Multiple_Infections_on_Host David		
Enter a search	Description	Generated by the Splunk Security Essentials a	pp at Thu, 17 Oct 2019 06:08:30 GMT	
<pre> tstats summariesonly=t allow_old_summ) as action from datamodel=Malware rename Malware_Attacks.* as *</pre>	Alert type	Scheduled	Real-time	alware_Attacks.action All time 🔻 🔍
<pre> transaction maxpause=1h dest where eventcount >=3 AND duration>240</pre>		Run on Cror	n Schedule 🔻	~
✓ 21 events (1/1/70 12:00:00.000 AM to 10/17/1§	Time Range	All ti	me ▶	Job ▼ II ■ • Smart Mode ▼
	Cron Expression	371***		
Detect New Values Line-by-Line SPL D	E star	e.g. 00 18 *** (every day at 6PM). Learn More		
	Expires	24	hour(s) 🔻	
> Recommended Phantom Playboo	Trigger Conditions			
> How to Implement	Trigger alert when	Number o	f Results 🔻	
> Known False Positives			Cancel Save	
> How To Respond				
> SPL Mode				

		Kill Chain Phases 🛽 🖉			
	Alert has been saved		×		
	You can view your alert, or continue editing it.				
Data Check Must have accelerated data in your Malware Data Model	Enabling ES Correlation Search ES Correlation Search Enabled! We recommend you click here t display fields.	o continue editing the Notable Event to customize the		k on Splunkbase)	Schedule in ES
<pre>Enter a search</pre>				alware_Attacks.action	All time - Q
 ✓ 21 events (1/1/70 12:00:00.000 AM to 10/17/19 Detect New Values Line-by-Line SPL D 				Job ♥ II III	🕈 Smart Mode ▼
> Recommended Phantom Playboo		Continue Editing View A	lert		
> How to Implement					
> Known False Positives					
> How To Respond					
> SPL Mode					



Administrator 🔻	336 Messa	iges 🔻 Settin	ngs • Activity •	✓ Help ▼	Find	Q
ns▼ Audit▼	Search -	Configure ▼			Enterprise	Security

•down search in a notable event or links in an

Essentials app at Thu, 17 Oct 2019

Wanuar

_summaries=t count as signature as category action from datamodel=Malware by est

You've Now Checked Your Data Latency

You've At Least Identified Missing CIM Fields

You've Pushed MITRE ATT&CK to ES

You've Analyzed High Risk Entities

You've Enabled New Detections

I Bet You Feel Pretty Great!



But How Will You Make This Guy Happy?





Measure Success





Justify New Data

Show what industry-standard capabilities you would have with new data onboard

MITRE ATT	&CK Threat Group	Highlight D	Data Source	Show Only A	Available Conten	it .
None		Endpoint	Detection and	× Yes		
istence ≑	Privilege Escalation 🗢	Defense Evasion 🗘	Credential Access 🗢	Discovery \$	Lateral Movement	Collection
h_profile and hrc	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	AppleScript	Audio Cap
ssibility ures	Accessibility Features	BITS Jobs	Bash History	Application Window Discovery	Application Deployment Software	Automated Collectio
unt pulation	AppCert DLLs	Binary Padding	Brute Force	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Clipboard
ert DLLs	AppInit DLLs	Bypass User Account Control	Credential Dumping	Domain Trust Discovery	Exploitation of Remote Services	Data Stag
nit DLLs	Application Shimming	CMSTP	Credentials in Files	File and Directory Discovery	Logon Scripts	Data from Informati Repositor
ication ming	Bypass User Account Control	Clear Command History	Credentials in Registry	Network Service Scanning	Pass the Hash	Data from System
entication	DLL Search Order	Code Signing	Exploitation for	Network Share Discovery	Pass the Ticket	Data from



~////////////



Make Auditors Happy with Excel or **PDF** Éxports of your Enabled Content



Export Enabled or Bookmarked Content

Generate dense Excel docs, or descriptive PDF exports that can include screenshots, SPL, and your deployment notes











Hands-On





Home Security Content Analytics Ad	visor Security Operations	Data▼ Advanced▼ [Documentation - Cor	nfiguration		Splunk Security Essentials
Security Content						
Overview	ou will find the primer cross wher	Soluply uppers got value from this	ann Within each you wil	ll and a suide chauing you where to so and what (if	any thing)	
				Il see a guide showing you where to go, and what (if sues, check out the docs site 🛽 or ask for help on Sp	,	Demo Mode i
Custom Content						
MITRE ATT&CK-Driven Content						
Recommendation	Lea	rn		Help Deploy	Measure	
Risk-based Alerting Content Recommendation Prescriptive Content Recomm Risk-Based Alerting Content	nendations .	Learn Splunk Learn Security Security Journey Data Onboarding Guides		 Operationalize MITRE ATT&CK Monitor Data Ingest Automatically Generate Dashboards Deploy Content to your Environment Analyze CIM Compliance 	ATT&CK	w Data Sources via MITRE t Your Deployed Content



IDS or IPS

Vulnerability Scanner Detected (by targets)

Web Proxy

Threat Activity Detected

Windows Security

Documentatio



• Vulnerability Scanner Detected (by targets)

Threat Activity Detected

Windows Security

Home Security Content - Analytics Ac	Advisor - Security Operations - Choose	e Content to Include	×	Splunk Security Essentials
Manage Bookmarks Bookmarked Waiting 37	g on Data Ready F Deployr Ø Demo S Enhance	on to the key default descriptions and tags, choose a e to include in the export: nark Details /here available) Screenshots (where available) ce Color (uncheck for black-and-white printing) nted or PDF-exported documents look best when ge	generated with Google	Export ± Correlation Search Introspection Manage List Add Bookmark Fully Implemented Custom 37
AWS • AWS Config Violation • AWS Guard Duty Alert • Detect New Open S3 buckets • Many Unauthorized AWS Operations	 Anti-Virus or Anti-Malware Host With A Recurring Malware Infection RR - Command and Control Activity Detected - Combined RR - Credential Theft Tool Detected - Combined RR - Discovery tool or technique detected - Combined RR - Malware detected by Windows Defender - Combined RR - Suspicious CLI command related to information gathering - Combined RR - Suspicious service or registry change detected - Combined RR - Suspisious Process or DLL detected - Combined 	 AWS Config Violation AWS Guard Duty Alert Detect New Open S3 buckets Many Unauthorized AWS Operations Authentication Activity from Expired User Identity Brute Force Access Behavior Detected DNS Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers RR - DDNS Activity Detected - System Threat Activity Detected 	Generate Monitor Email For Brand A Threat Activity Detected	
				Vendor ID - Combined Suspicious wevtutil Usage Threat Activity Detected

IDS or IPS

Vulnerability Scanner Detected (by targets)

Web Proxy

Threat Activity Detected

Windows Security

PDF Export

Includes status, screenshots, SPL, and your deployment notes





Next Steps





Splunk Security Essentials is the free Splunk app that makes security easier.



Four Pillars

Four ways in which SSE has delivered value to users





Testimonials

"I got the security essentials tool loaded and did a basic overview with the SOC. They lit up like christmas trees."

Security Tools Engineer, Fortune 100 Healthcare "I can take the content library off my list of projects for this year. It's already built! "

Director of Security, Small Financial Services



Key Takeaways

Security Essentials helps you in multiple ways.

- Security Essentials has evolved to being a key app for Splunk in security.
- 2. Helps you operationalize and measure the content you are deploying.
- 3. New app guide helps you choose your adventure.





Contributors

Guide

Download

Security Essentials now has it's own website

Contains all content, documentation and an online demo environment.

xamples 🖋						
	Security Use Case	Category		Data Sour	ces	Featu
1 (21 matches) 💌	All 💌	All 👻		All 👻		
sibility into who is accessing in- ope resources is key to your PR efforts. Splunk allows easy alysis of that information. atured arches Included oxy with App Awareness	Unencrypted communications leaves you vulnerable to a data breach – when users access Pil data, ensure that all connections are encrypted. Featured Searches Included Proxy with App Awareness	e à Stieron Indi movement is w controllers. Featured Searches Inclu Windows Secu	rhen a user starts w domain ded	Windo there a logins, login fr Featur Search	simple threshold for ws Security Logs to alert if rea large number of failed and at least one successful om the same source. ed es Included ws Security Logs	Loc occ sho Fer AV
Basic TOR Traffic Detection	Detect Excessive User Account Lockouts		t Uncleaned Detection		Flight Risk Web Browsing	
		Detect a syster	m with a malware			Find

Canabilities

Splunk Security

https://www.splunksecurityessentials.com

splunk> .conf19



Visit the Security Essentials booth at source=*Pavilion to see everything in action.



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