



Profiling Encrypted Network Traffic

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
Profiling Encrypted Network Traffic



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Visibility. Is. Crucial.

Activity Profiles

What should you be looking for in encrypted network traffic

Benign

- Keep sensitive data secure (e.g. web sessions, email, data transactions)

Malicious

- C2/Data exfiltration
- Hiding of exploit delivery
- Phishing email delivery/reception

Policy

- Sites/activity that aren't malicious, but pose risk to the business (HR, etc...)

Unknown

- Fertile hunting grounds



Technology Overview

#TechGoals

Data

Choose your own adventure

Process Data

- Executable that spawned the process
- IPs/hosts the process is connecting to
- Hash of the executable

Network Data

- Source/destination IPs
- Monitor SSL/encrypted traffic

Signatures for Matching

- Need to consolidate protocol properties to an easily defined signature

Process Data

Carbon Black

Behavioral detection

- Detects applications doing things like scraping memory, key logging, spawning shells, etc

Process and binary search of centralized data

- Hash and behavior based

Process based network activity

Live Response remediation

- Allows for host isolation
- Allows you to have a terminal shell on the host to kill process, add or delete files, perform mem dumps, etc

Carbon Black Data

```
{ [-]
  cb_server: cbserver
  child_pid: 11389
  child_process_guid: 00002cbb-0000-2c7d-01d5-63281beef976
  child_suppressed: false
  childproc_type: Exec
  computer_name: ██████████
  created: false
  event_type: childproc
  md5: 0E7E5C20005BD91119F505156D0AEC6C
  parent_guid: -8740844468342649000
  path: /usr/bin/egrep
  pid: 11387
  process_guid: 00002cbb-0000-2c7b-01d5-63281bedf3c8
  sensor_id: 11451
  sha256: D8B73C8D876DFD32D0CE9AA3498B68FE8AB1DA3FA622A557018FBF55DEAA89A6
  tamper: false
  tamper_sent: false
  timestamp: 1567605201.0951192
  type: ingress.event.childproc
}
```

Show as raw text

```
{ [-]
  cb_server: cbserver
  computer_name: ██████████
  direction: outbound
  domain: gearssdk.opswat.com
  event_type: netconn
  local_ip: ████████
  local_port: 0
  md5: B7E4BB821E860122F4ABB5F3D615C786
  pid: 49822
  process_guid: 00000b23-0000-c29e-01d5-63187dcefc14
  protocol: 17
  proxy: false
  remote_ip: ██████████
  remote_port: 22263
  sensor_id: 2851
  sha256: A63A2B22DC0B9C8A5C707B630467EC9187AA0217EED6929B7247FEC264D4144F
  timestamp: 1567605445.1196406
  type: ingress.event.netconn
}
```

Network Activity

Zeek (formerly Bro)

Open Source Network Monitoring tool

Passive IDS

- Can leverage various types of signatures

Scriptable

- Extend network monitoring capability

Logs everything that it sees allowing for forensics

- Common protocols: HTTP, SSL, SMTP, SSH, etc...
- Logs can be sent to Splunk

```

{ [-]
  conn_state: SF
  duration: 0.548862
  history: ShADadFfR
  id.orig_h: 172.███.███.███
  id.orig_p: 50252
  id.resp_h: 50.███.███.███
  id.resp_p: 54443
  local_orig: true
  local_resp: false
  missed_bytes: 0
  orig_bytes: 2406
  orig_ip_bytes: 3330
  orig_pkts: 18
  proto: tcp
  resp_bytes: 6163
  resp_ip_bytes: 6899
  resp_pkts: 14
  service: ssl
  ts: 2019-09-04T14:42:04.140274Z
  uid: CmYK2s41ua8EPSS7wh
}

```

Zeek Data

```

{ [-]
  cert_chain_fuids: [ [+]
  ]
  cipher: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
  client_cert_chain_fuids: [ [+]
  ]
  established: true
  id.orig_h: 172.███.███.███
  id.orig_p: 50252
  id.resp_h: 50.███.███.███
  id.resp_p: 54443
  issuer: CN=Go Daddy Secure Certificate Authority - G2,OU=http://certs.godaddy.com/repository/,O=GoDaddy.com\,
  Inc.,L=Scottsdale,ST=Arizona,C=US
  ja3: 3bd06d9912c4f0188afe4fa96706f560
  ja3s: 80b3a14bcc8598a1f3bbe83e71f735f
  resumed: false
  server_name: █████.conferdeploy.net
  subject: CN=*.conferdeploy.net,OU=Domain Control Validated
  ts: 2019-09-04T14:42:04.286903Z
  uid: CmYK2s41ua8EPSS7wh
  validation_status: ok
  version: TLSv12
}

```

splunk[®]>

**Making machine data accessible,
usable and valuable to everyone.**



Networking

How the packets work



SSL

What is it?

Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) is a standard security technology for establishing an encrypted link between a server and a client.

Uses certificates issued by a trusted CA

- Uses a public private key pair to establish an encrypted connection

Allows for the secure transfer of sensitive information


Used over TCP

SSL

Setup/Negotiation

Client

Server



JA3

What is JA3?

JA3 is a method of fingerprinting SSL/TLS encrypted network traffic. This allows you to identify what is on your network, establish a baseline and alert on anomalous activity

Developed around Lee Brotherston's 2015 research


- Lee's DerbyCon talk: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XX0FRAY2Mec>

Allows you to identify what's on your network and establish a baseline

- Identifies potentially malicious activity without having to MITM your encrypted network traffic
- Resource: <https://engineering.salesforce.com/tls-fingerprinting-with-ja3-and-ja3s-247362855967>

JA3

How it works



- ▼ TLSv1 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
 - Content Type: Handshake (22)
 - Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)
 - Length: 158
- ▼ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
 - Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)
 - Length: 154
 - Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) ←
 - ▶ Random: 50839cfafec110ae58d1edc2f2ffc51ec3c2e7ca65221bd4...
 - Session ID Length: 0
 - Cipher Suites Length: 72
 - ▼ Cipher Suites (36 suites) ←
 - Cipher Suite: TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV (0x00ff)
 - Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc00a)
 - Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc014)
 - ...
 - Compression Methods Length: 1
 - ▶ Compression Methods (1 method)
 - Extensions Length: 41
 - ▶ Extension: server_name (len=15)
 - ▶ Extension: supported_groups (len=8)
 - ▼ Extension: ec_point_formats (len=2)
 - Type: ec_point_formats (11)
 - Length: 2
 - EC point formats Length: 1
 - ▼ Elliptic curves point formats (1) ←
 - EC point format: uncompressed (0)
 - ▶ Extension: SessionTicket TLS (len=0)

769,255-49160-49172-...51-50-49164,,0
 =
 86ed02e0de5a31b81cc0cd8484f90d0f



Solution


Tying it all together



Phase 1

JA3


Workflow



Round 1

“JOIN”

Coming from an SQL background and Inner Join seemed like the right solution.



Splunk




Our "good" ideas

Problems with the Data



```
{ [-]
  cb_server: cserver
  computer_name: ██████████
  direction: outbound
  domain: fe3.delivery.mp.microsoft.com
  event_type: netconn
  local_ip: 172.██████████
  local_port: 56055
  md5: 8A0A29438052FAED8A2532DA50455756
  pid: 10112
  process_guid: 00003580-0000-2780-01d5-632dd3455b2f
  process_path: c:\windows\system32\svchost.exe
  protocol: 6
  proxy: false
  remote_ip: 64.4.54.18
  remote_port: 443
  sensor_id: 13696
  sha256: 7FD065BAC18C5278777AE44908101CDFED72D26FA741367F0AD4D02020787AB6
  timestamp: 1568129907.7368731
  type: ingress.event.netconn
}
```



```
{ [-]
  cb_server: cserver
  computer_name: ██████████
  direction: inbound
  domain:
  event_type: netconn
  local_ip: 172.██████████
  local_port: 63773
  md5: FF9298240EC54D396520527BAF17A2C4
  pid: 188
  process_guid: 0000381d-0000-00bc-01d5-52234ce95dca
  protocol: 17
  proxy: false
  remote_ip: 208.67.222.222
  remote_port: 443
  sensor_id: 14365
  sha256: 35F889A932FD17A94B8888A85552ADC6D2A5FB769E4709CF8D681EDE6DEBC961
  timestamp: 1568048710.225299
  type: ingress.event.netconn
}
```


Round 2

017AE1F09DF9C9CBCF73452D15D6B555	184.27.28.73 184.28.20.53 23.204.110.241 23.35.180.89	17305a56a62a10f6b0ee8edcc3b1769c	/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/CommerceKit.framework/Versions/A/Resources/commerce
01FDDAF4E453F1F08AF3AA61CC28667E	184.27.28.73 23.204.110.241	17305a56a62a10f6b0ee8edcc3b1769c	/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/CommerceKit.framework/Versions/A/Resources/commerced
027F61B67421425C97E8F4BEA64836E5	17.249.9.246	17305a56a62a10f6b0ee8edcc3b1769c f6b71761263862d25b0a2759609a5850	/System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/CoreParsec.framework/parsec-fbf
02FE4FC137CAE0A9E8C22C2AF114C0BF	107.152.24.197 107.152.25.197 107.152.26.197 107.152.27.197	17305a56a62a10f6b0ee8edcc3b1769c	c:\program files (x86)\box\box for office\upgradeservice.exe


```
( index=<CB Index> netconn ) OR ( index=<Zeek Index> ja3 )
| lookup ja3_dict_2.csv JA3 as ja3 output Application
```

```
| where isnull(Application)
| eval remote_ip = coalesce(id.resp_h, dest_ip, remote_ip, "null")
| stats values(md5) as md5 values(ja3) as ja3 values(process_path) as process_path by remote_ip
| mvexpand md5
| stats values(remote_ip) as remote_ip values(ja3) as ja3 by md5
```

```
| lookup threat_intel_file_hash_lookup md5 OUTPUTNEW process_path as process_path
| search NOT(md5="") AND ja3=*
| search NOT (remote_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR remote_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR remote_ip=192.168.0.0/16)
```

Successes

What we found with this initial phase






Phase 2

JA3S

JA3S




- ▼ TLSv1 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Server Hello
 - Content Type: Handshake (22)
 - Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)
 - Length: 53
- ▼ Handshake Protocol: Server Hello
 - Handshake Type: Server Hello (2)
 - Length: 49
 - Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) ←
 - ▶ Random: 50839c9fe3bf7e9175dce3716adb1be4c8169f24f7c4a012...
 - Session ID Length: 0
 - Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA (0x0005) ←
 - Compression Method: null (0)
 - Extensions Length: 9
 - ▼ Extension: renegotiation_info (len=1) ←
 - Type: renegotiation_info (65281)
 - Length: 1
 - ▶ Renegotiation Info extension
 - ▼ Extension: SessionTicket TLS (len=0)
 - Type: SessionTicket TLS (35)
 - Length: 0
 - Data (0 bytes)

769,5,65281-35

=

40c6454d9891ee409d90595091506207

Workflow



JA3S

Success

00d1b0d0e7f24458a3219d13fa42fa7f	api.skype.com
00ddf2745f58a36d0871eb19f60c7817	www14.software.ibm.com
015c1ebe2352d6c942d84f5b4591acdb	209.197.219.29
0191d81a4ad7ee1a330a1e2c51d23ace	bidder.criteo.com csm.da.us.criteo.net csm.va.us.criteo.net dis.us.criteo.com mesu.apple.com pix.us.criteo.net sslwidget.criteo.com static.criteo.net

```

index=<Zeek Index> ja3s established="true"
  NOT (dest_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR dest_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR dest_ip=192.168.0.0/16)
| eval dst_server = coalesce(server_name, dest_ip)
| lookup ja3s_dict.csv ja3s as ja3s output remote_server
| where isnull(remote_server)
| stats values(dst_server) as remote_server by ja3s

```



Phase 3

JA3 + JA3S

JA3+JA3S

```
61b05773cda43e16a78ae1150092c068:ccc514751b175866924439bdbb5bba34
```

```
( index < CB_Index > netconn ) OR (ir
NOT [| inputlookup "ja3-ja3s_
ja3s=mvindex(ja3_lookup,1)
```

```
| eval ja3_lookup = ja3+":"+ja3s, dst_s
| eval remote_ip = coalesce('id resp_h
```

```
| stats values(md5) as md5 values(ja3
values(process_path) as proc
```

```
| mvexpand md5
```

```
| stats values(remote_ip) as remote_ip values(md5) as md5 values(dst_server) as dst_server by ja3_lookup
```

```
| lookup threat_intel_file_hash_lookup md5 OUTPUTNEW process_path as process_path
```


```
| rex field=process_path "(?P<application>[^\W]+)$"
```

```
| search NOT (md5="") AND
```

```
ja3_lookup=* NOT (remote_ip=10.0.0.0/8 OR remote_ip=172.16.0.0/12 OR remote_ip=192.168.0.0/16)
```

```
| stats values(dst_server) as dst_server values(md5) as md5
```

```
values(application) as application values(remote_ip) as remote_ip by ja3_lookup
```



```
DAC36A AssetCacheLocatorService 172.217.14.77
```

```
4A86EE Google Chrome Helper
```

```
DA9765 Notes
```

```
30AC79 Shift
```

```
343D4E | eval ja3=mvindex(ja3_lookup,0),
```

```
38DCCC chrome.exe
```

```
89D5B1 mDNSResponder
```

```
7B2AF8
```

```
7A2C4
```

```
DAC36A AddressBookSourceSync 172.217.14.106
```

```
4A86EE Google Chrome Helper 172.217.5.74
```

```
B4CBF1 Shift
```

```
server by remote_ip
```

```
6659E9 chrome.exe
```


```
5CBB61D61EA8D7E588791AE56FF8BE24 com.apple.Safari.SafeBrowsing.Service
```

```
6588C02C1B856998C3D41E1523A15C0C com.apple.WebKit.Networking
```

```
69A8A8A14380K16947DAFAA6B0D19765 Firefox
```


```
87C781B2FB3F8111836107A6860A5691 mDNSResponder
```


Workflow



Operationalizing the solution

Taking the workflow and making it real





Learnings

Notes

Take-aways and Tips

JA3 lookup validation

- VT, ReversingLabs, etc...

JA3S lookup validation

- Google SafeBrowsing, 3rd party reputation lists, threat intel feeds

There is LOTS of value in looking at encrypted network traffic



splunk>

Thank

You!

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