How to Mitigate Insider Threat With Splunk UBA

SEC1623

Prasanth Sadanala & Annette Fontanilla



Forward-Looking Statements

During the course of this presentation, we may make forward-looking statements regarding future events or plans of the company. We caution you that such statements reflect our current expectations and estimates based on factors currently known to us and that actual events or results may differ materially. The forward-looking statements made in the this presentation are being made as of the time and date of its live presentation. If reviewed after its live presentation, it may not contain current or accurate information. We do not assume any obligation to update any forward-looking statements made herein.

In addition, any information about our roadmap outlines our general product direction and is subject to change at any time without notice. It is for informational purposes only, and shall not be incorporated into any contract or other commitment. Splunk undertakes no obligation either to develop the features or functionalities described or to include any such feature or functionality in a future release.

Splunk, Splunk>, Data-to-Everything, D2E and Turn Data Into Doing are trademarks and registered trademarks of Splunk Inc. in the United States and other countries. All other brand names, product names or trademarks belong to their respective owners. © 2020 Splunk Inc. All rights reserved



Annette Fontanilla

Prasanth Sadanala

Consultant | Splunk

Information Security Specialist | TD Bank





What is Splunk UBA?


Splunk UBA uses machine learning capabilities to help organizations find hidden threats and anomalous


behavior across users, devices and applications. Splunk UBA detects insider threats using out-of-the-box use cases that use **unsupervised machine learning algorithms**.

| splunk > User Behavior Analytics | | | O Explore ∨ | ©; Analytics ∽ | 🛠 Manage 🗸 | Q System ∽ | C Scope ~ | admin |
|--|------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|------------|-------------------|-----------|----------|
| | ANOMALIES | | | ■≣ AI | PPS | | Threats | Review |
| |)36 ⁹ | 3 Anomalous | 279 Anomalous | | | | Users | Review |
| | | 9 All Known All Unknown | 4.8K All Internal 134 All External | | pps | | Analytics | Dashboar |
| ▲ Latest Threats | | | A Threats | Timeline (Last 7 D | ays) | | | |
| Data Exfiltration by Suspicious User or Device | Aug 31 | 4 | | Malwa | re | • | • | |
| Compromised Web Server | Aug 30 | 6 | | Compromised Accou | nt 😑 | | • | |
| Data Exfiltration by Suspicious User or Device | Aug 30 | 4 | | Compromised Web Serv | er | | • | |
| Data Exfiltration by Compromised Account | Aug 30 | 8 | | Exfiltratio | in | • | | |
| Suspicious Activity After Intrusion | Aug 30 | 4 | Privile | ge Escalation Powersh Activi | | | • | |
| Malware | Aug 30 | 6 | | Suspicious Data Collectio | | • | • | |
| Showing top 20 of 39 threats | | View Details | t Tyl | Exfiltration after Accou Takeov ompromise wus Intern | er | | • | |
| Latest Anomalies | | | P Anomali | es Timeline (Last | 7 Days) | | | |
| HTTP Proxy Domain | Aug 31 | 2 | | AmplificationDOS | | | • | |
| HTTP Proxy Domain | Aug 31 | 2 | A | nomalous USB Activity | | | • • | |
| DLP Unusual Vector Peer | Aug 31 | 6 | | AD Audit Log Cleared | | | ٠ | |
| | | | | ·· ·· · | | | | <u> </u> |




Splunk UBA Detections





Agenda






Insider Threat Program


What to consider?

| 1 | Include the proper stakeholders Human Resources, Legal, Privacy, Risk Management, Information Technology and Security |
|---|--|
| 2 | Identify the company's most valuable assets People, Information, Intellectual Property, Technology |
| 3 | Intentional vs. Unintentional insiders Negligence vs. Malicious/Financial Gain/Disgruntled Employees |
| 4 | Security Policies Data Use Policy |
| 5 | Build Insider Threat Use Cases Aside from Data Loss Prevention |
| 6 | Apply Lessons Learned Identify Gaps, Use Case Development |
| | splunk> |


Common Types of Malicious Insiders



Common Types of Malicious Insiders



Common Types of Malicious Insiders



Data Onboarding

Required

- Assets
- Identities
- Windows Security (AD)
- Firewall
- VPN
- Proxy
- DNS
- DHCP



Data Onboarding

Required

- Assets
- Identities
- Windows Security (AD)
- Firewall
- VPN
- Proxy
- DNS
- DHCP

Nice to Have

- Authentication
- Badge
- Cloud Data
- DLP
- Endpoint
- Email
- External Alarm
- Network IDS/IPS
- Printer



Data Onboarding

Enrichment


- Assets
- Identities
- Windows Security (AD)
- Firewall
- VPN
- Proxy
- DNS
- DHCP

- Authentication
- Badge
- Cloud Data
- DLP
- Endpoint
- Email
- External Alarm
- Network IDS/IPS
- Printer




Data Enrichment

Take advantage of out of box capabilities





Insider Threat Detection in UBA



splunk> .conf20

Data Exfiltration

Suspicious New Access

| Anomaly Types | Data Sources | Mitre Framework |
|---|--|---|
| Suspicious Data movement Suspicious Network Connection Flight Risk User Unusual Printer Usage Downloads from Internal Server Excessive Data Transmission Unusual USB Activity Unusual File Extension | Firewall DLP VPN Cloud/Box Data HTTP | Tactic: TA0010 Exfiltration Techniques: T1020 Automated Exfiltration T1030 Data Transfer Size Limits T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative protocol T1537 Transfer Data to Cloud Account T1029 Scheduled Transfer T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service T1052 Exfiltration Over USB |



Compromised User Account

| Anomaly Types | Data Sources | Mitre Framework |
|---|--|--|
| Period with unusual Windows Security Event sequence External Alarm Blacklisted Application Suspicious Network Exploration Suspicious AD activity Malicious AD activity Multiple AD login errors Multiple Authentication errors | AD/Windows Security Events External Alarms VPN Cloud Data Authentication | Tactic: TA0006 Credential Access Techniques: 1110 Brute Force 11555 Credentials from password stores 11552 Unsecured Credentials 11078 Valid Accounts |

splunk> .conf20


Lateral Movement

| Anomaly Types | Data Sources | Mitre Framework |
|--|--|---|
| Multiple External Alarms Brute Force Attack Suspicious Network Exploration Local Account Creation External Alarm Activity Suspicious Powershell Activity Scanning Activity Unusual External Alarm | AD/Windows Security Events External Alarms Network Endpoint | Tactic: TA0008 Lateral Movement Techniques: T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer T1563 Remote Service Session Hijacking T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material T1078 Valid Accounts |



Custom Use Case Framework

Rare Events vs. Time Series Models



Time Series

Tracks Activity Over a Period of Time




Custom Use Case Framework

How do I know if my use case can be applied to the custom use case framework?





Key Takeaways



Thank You! I ooking fe splunk> .conf20