# Splunking around the Phishmas Tree

SEC1494
Technical Session





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# Why am I here?



# Splunking around the Phishmas Tree

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# How can this story help you?

1

Stay ahead of emerging threats

2

Reduce risk exposure

3

Improve team efficiency

## Learning Objectives

Pivot on data points to expand visibility

Create a search to find the threat actor's domains

Automate the search to run regularly

Explore last mile possibilities

# Attack Overview

#### Initial Contact

- iPhone 14
- SW Ontario, CA area code
- Security notice for possible unexpected login attempt
- Subdomain
- Attributed to a TA named Chenlun/Sinkinto01



8:30




+1 (226) 338-5459


#### Security Notice

Your account is logged in from Mumbair, India. If this is not from you, please verify your account in the secure link below.

XZDXUC us43869yoplfb.iekatz67286441.usY QJNODBYR


#### Domain Profile





- Domain is relatively young
- Shows high Domain Risk Score
- Charles Schwab login

#### Domain Profile




#### **Guided Pivots:**

- Alias tied to 75 other domains
- Email address
- Street address

### DNS Activity

- Original subdomain seen 5/30/25
- Youngest subdomain seen 6/9/25
- Many other recently active subdomains



# Related Domains

# Pivoting on alias

19 other domains with same alias seen in the last month

Two patterns emerge. One at apex-level and another at the subdomain level

Domain \$	Risk Score \$
ajvsgx72941760.us	100
ccdwet22559668.us	100
ccrizv77518814.us	100
eyjveg50956366.us	100
iciqfv25486908.us	100
iekatz67286441.us	100
ieymob32761302.us	100
irbsoo67934556.us	100
ivecqk13344821.us	100
kiuddi95581479.us	100
kwmqpk84060386.us	100
nkqogc11466552.us	100
nqgopi95040498.us	100
renivj45317060.us	100
utnazq92814937.us	100
wjtvcn35599165.us	100
wpmcal14629035.us	100

### Original domain has 5 subdomains

```
rrname $

us43869xrr.iekatz67286441.us.

us43869fjjr.iekatz67286441.us.

us46871rctfy.iekatz67286441.us.

us43869bdgyfxl.iekatz67286441.us.

us46871hhguyez.iekatz67286441.us.
```

### DGA Pattern

### Example DGAs

```
randomstring20250718[.]com (date-based)
```

randomstring1752868754341[.]com (time-based)

abc12345[.]xyz (alphanumeric combo)

cityjulydish[.]net (word-based)

#### pDNS Flexible Search

Flexible Search Documentation

Select a time range

**~** 

Query (i)

Query type (i)

^us[[:digit:]]{5}.+\.[[:alpha:]]{6}[[:dig

RRName (Left-Hand)

#### rrname \$

All time

us49951cxh.ajvsgx72941760.us.

us49951dvp.ajvsgx72941760.us.

us49951wzy.ajvsgx72941760.us.

us49951abej.ajvsgx72941760.us.

us49951dlqj.ajvsgx72941760.us.

us49951chfpf.ajvsgx72941760.us.

us49951wfeoq.ajvsgx72941760.us.

us499511vmwrjm.ajvsgx72941760.us.

us43338cwa.ccdwet22559668.us.

us43338qkq.ccdwet22559668.us.

### Regex Query Results

274 unique subdomains

^us[[:digit:]]{5}.+\.[[:alpha
:]]{6}[[:digit:]]{8}\.us\.\$

# Automating in Splunk

## Demo

#### SPL Report

- Detect subdomains matching DGA pattern.
- Filter out domains already seen in past searches.
- Save the new subdomains for reference and analysis.
- Output the list of new, potentially malicious domains.

## Demo

# Scheduling the Report

- Set to run every 8hrs
- Priority can be raised depending on level of risk
- No schedule window for consistent execution

#### **Edit Schedule**

Report	Chenlun_Domain_Discovery
Schedule Report	✓ Learn More 🗷
Schedule	Run on Cron Schedule ▼
Cron Expression	0 */8 * * *
Time Range	Last 24 hours ▶
Schedule Priority?	Default ▼
Schedule Window?	No window ▼

# Trigger Actions

## Demo

### Trigger Actions

Automate an action after your report runs to:

- Email your SOC team
- Execute a custom script
- Trigger a Webhook
- Create a Notable Event
- Send results to Splunk SOAR

#### **Trigger Actions**

+ Add Actions >

Forwards search results from Splunk Enteprise to UBA



#### Send email

Send an email notification to specified recipients



#### Send to SOAR

Send search results to SOAR.

Send to Splunk Mobile Send a notification to Splunk Mobile recipients



#### **STM** Stream Capture

Creates stream capture



#### Webhook


Generic HTTP POST to a specified URL

# Last Mile Options

#### Email SOC Members

Send the latest results of the search via email:

- Can include CSV of results
- Can link to the reports or results for easy access
- Adjust priority easily



When triggered

### Splunk SOAR

If you are a Splunk SOAR user, there are two handy options:

- Send to SOAR
- Run Playbook in SOAR

#### **Trigger Actions**

When triggered

+ Add Actions > Send to SOAR V SOAR X Select... • Instance Forward results to this Server/Asset. Sensitivity \*Sensitivity level for these events. Severity \*Severity of these events. Label Label for these events. Worker Set X Select... Select adaptive response relay worker set. Use "local" for non-adaptive response relay server. Alert Action Select... Account Search produced no results. Select Account from SOAR Alert Action

Configuration. Use blank for non-adaptive

response relay server.

### External SOAR

If you don't use Splunk SOAR you can still use a trigger action to connect to your SOAR via:

- Webhook
- Custom Script

#### **Trigger Actions**

# Add Actions ▼

When triggered

URL https://your.server.com/foo/bar

Specified URL to send JSON payload via HTTP POST (ex., https://your.server.com/api/v1/webhook).

Learn More IZ

### Sinkhole via DNS

If you know the results of your report are bad news and want to take immediate action by sinkholing at the DNS level.

```
$TTL 2h
 2
    @
                            localhost. root.localhost.
            IN
                    SOA
 3
                            2025063001 ; serial
 4
                            1h
                                        ; refresh
 5
                            15m
                                        ; retry
 6
                            30d
                                        ; expire
                            2h )
                                        ; minimum TTL
 8
 9
                            localhost.
            IN
                    NS
10
    ; Block specific domains by returning NXDOMAIN
    bad-domain.com.
                            CNAME
   malicious-site.net.
                            CNAME
14
    ; Redirect to a sinkhole IP
    phishing-site.org.
                                     192.0.2.1
17
18
    ; Wildcard block all subdomains
    *.tracking-domain.com.
                            CNAME
20
```

# Review



### Why do this?

1

Stay ahead of emerging threats

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3

Improve team efficiency

# Questions?



### Thank You!

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